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Apr 25, 2026
Ankita Dutta

Foreign Interference in India’s North-East – The Threat of a Separate Christian Nation Part-II

In this second part of the series, we address an important question: which are the routes through which arms and ammunition are smuggled into India? Most sophisticated military-grade weapons entering the North-East are traced back to Myanmar, sourced through a fragmented and informal ecosystem. Previously, in 2023, a 40-year-old American citizen and ex-US Army veteran, Daniel Stephen Courney, who also claims to be a preacher, had caused a stir in Manipur and fueled an intense debate over foreign interference in the North-East.[1] Under the guise of humanitarian aid, videos of Courney distributing military-grade protective gear, including long-range surveillance drones (capable of operations beyond five kilometres), bulletproof jackets, combat helmets, boots, sleeping bags, and other military equipment to Kuki militants in Manipur, had surfaced online. In one of the clips, Courney could be seen expressing solidarity with the Kuki-Zo community, whom he described as being “persecuted” for their Christian faith.[2] He also explicitly likened his donated drones to those used by the US Special Forces for monitoring the enemy and positioning local security forces. It was later known that in India, his missionary outreach work has been focused on the tribal and inaccessible areas of Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Chhattisgarh, and Manipur. The curious case of the so-called “climate activist” from Manipur, Licpriya Kangujam, is also quite well-known. At the peak of the conflict in Manipur in June 2023, she had met Pope Francis in the Vatican, briefing him about the ongoing violence in the state and urging him to restore peace.[3] Later, in January 2024, Licpriya took to her official Facebook handle, requesting her followers and supporters to help acquire a “thermal drone” to aid in the conflict in Manipur.[4] She was reported to have distributed drones and night vision cameras to militants during the conflict in Manipur. Undoubtedly, this is a covert Western strategy that has been going on repeatedly, masked in the garb of “religious charity”. It is led by missionary networks to create strategic footholds in the North-East and ignite tensions. Militant groups of the North-East operating with Western-origin weapons aren’t simply a local issue. It exposes a wider South-East Asian arms network connecting the different North-Eastern states with Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia via Myanmar. Incidents of extortion, kidnappings, drug trafficking, and attacks on our security forces along the Indo-Myanmar border in the states of Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram, and Arunachal Pradesh are very common. For long, the active presence of Western Intelligence agencies along the borders of North-East India and Myanmar is an open secret. However, the routes became more active after Sheikh Hasina's ouster from Bangladesh, and the formation of the Interim Government led by Md. Yunus. It is through the missionary networks that Western operatives, including Christian radical missionaries and various vested interest groups, function. They have been infiltrating the North-East in significant numbers. Over time, they blend in very well with the societal fabric and then use the tribes, especially the converted ones, to execute their agenda. The strategic geographical location of the North-East along the borders of China, Bangladesh and Myanmar facilitates illegal cross-border movements of people and arms. Western secret operatives mostly make use of the porous and sparsely populated Mizoram border across Champhai and the remote Lawngtlai-Saiha belt to travel into Myanmar and, in collaboration with the resistance forces there, work against the Tatmadaw. Earlier, too, such operatives have been arrested in Mizoram. The notoriously porous, rugged, and thickly forested India-Myanmar international border is extremely difficult to control, especially given that it has an age-old established history of shared ethnic ties and frequent cross-border movements of both civilians and militants. Chief Minister of Mizoram Lalduhoma had voiced concerns over the growing volume of unregulated cross-border trading activities along Southern Mizoram as well as the increasing number of people entering Lawngtlai district from Myanmar through the Zochachhuah entry point.[5] The border has long served as a conduit for enabling the easy flow of smuggled timber and teak, arms and weapons, training, and political agenda, making border patrolling and monitoring too difficult. As of March 2026, only 2.6 per cent of the international border has been fenced. It remains one of South Asia’s active illicit arms routes, intertwined with narcotics networks and insurgent financing supported by decades of international backing. (Picture Credits: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/27/india-myanmar-road-mizoram-tribal-areas-modi) Weapons originating from South-East Asian black markets, touted as one of the largest and most well-stocked global weapons supply chains, besides Myanmar civil war stockpiles and Chinese-origin or global surplus stocks, move through the Sagaing region or Chin State before entering India through the porous frontiers of Manipur or Mizoram. Smuggling of weapons is a nuanced affair involving different stages and is generally not done across large groups.[6] Weapons are rarely transported in bulk or moved directly to their final destination. Instead, it is being carried out in small consignments of a decentralised logistics system, mostly in small groups of five to ten individuals. They carry them across short distances (barely more than 30 kilometres), avoiding main roads and relying on forest tracks and unmapped terrain.[7] A conglomerate of more than hundreds of insurgent groups operating along the Indo-Myanmar border functions as quasi-contractors. Their cadres play a key role in facilitating the cross-border movement of arms and weapons. Border-adjacent camps, well-hidden caches and safe houses along the way double as temporary storage hubs and redistribution points. The routes of smuggling change frequently. For this purpose, a long network of several small temporary ‘ghost’ villages (often known as phoenix villages) and village-like infrastructure has been created along the extremely remote Southern and Eastern borders in Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland.[8] These regions are characterised by inhospitable riverine terrain comprising dense forest cover, steep hill ranges, extremely high rainfall, and vast stretches of forested area lacking motorable roads. Western operatives and weapons specialists like Matthew VanDyke and cadres of different terrorist groups have always exploited and taken advantage of this complex topographical landscape that imposes severe logistical constraints for enforcement agencies. For illicit networks, it offers depth, concealment, and flexibility. The temporary ‘ghost’ villages or phoenix villages, especially in the Chin and Sagaing regions of Myanmar, act as deep reserves for terror groups and are often used as launch-pads to foster instability along our porous and fragile North-Eastern borders. Built to breed insurgents and terrorists, the phoenix villages sometimes also serve as storehouses, delivery, dispersion or distribution points for smuggled arms. In other words, these villages are the main transit routes for weapons, and the people residing there act as both suppliers and contractors. Local porters, overground workers, and many unemployed youth with no past criminal record form the backbone of this weapons transportation system. Each group manages a defined segment of the route, handing off consignments in sequence, resembling a relay. Thus, no single carrier moves the weapons across the entire distance. Instead, they are transferred zone-wise, often through individuals familiar with specific terrain corridors. Even when apprehended, carriers rarely possess enough information to expose the broader network. This multiplicity is what makes the system resilient. If one route is disrupted for any reason, weapons can be rerouted via other operational paths, thereby sustaining the continuous flow of weapons and a gun culture that is not only being steadily normalised but also acquiring social legitimacy. (To be Continued….) [1] https://www.facebook.com/TheAssamTribune/posts/an-ex-us-army-veteran-has-caused-a-stir-in-manipur-after-videos-surfaced-showing/1007590001413363/ [2] Ibid. [3] https://www.facebook.com/groups/279786261860144/posts/305638579274912/ [4] Indian Climate Activist Licypriya Kangujam seeks crowdfunding to acquire Thermal Drone to aid in ‘entering war’, Ukhrul Times, January 18, 2024. https://ukhrultimes.com/indian-climate-activist-licypriya-kangujam-seeks-crowdfunding-to-acquire-thermal-drone-to-aid-in-entering-war/ [5] Mizoram CM flags surge in unregulated trade along Kaladan corridor, The Assam Tribune, March 12, 2026. https://assamtribune.com/north-east/mizoram-cm-flags-surge-in-unregulated-trade-along-kaladan-corridor-1609329 [6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-7LPdOreSCk [7] Ibid. [8] Ibid.

Apr 25, 2026
Siddhartha Dave

From Cultural Undercurrents to Electoral Assertion: The Quiet Architecture Powering Bengal’s Political Realignment

The extraordinary 92.88% turnout in Phase 1 of West Bengal’s electoral cycle is not merely a statistical anomaly—it is a political signal of deep consequence. In electoral behaviour analysis, such high participation rarely emerges in isolation. It reflects an intensification of public sentiment, a shift from passive voting to assertive political engagement. Bengal today appears to be entering precisely such a phase, where electoral participation is no longer routine but expressive—often shaped by accumulated grievances, identity concerns, and aspirations for structural change. At the heart of this evolving landscape lies the quiet yet determined work of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Operating beyond the immediacy of electoral cycles, the RSS has steadily invested in building a long-term societal presence in Bengal. What is now becoming visible in political outcomes is, in many ways, the cumulative result of years of disciplined organisational expansion and cultural engagement. Bengal’s Historical Resistance—and Its Gradual Transformation West Bengal has historically occupied a distinctive intellectual and cultural space within Bharat. The legacy of Rabindranath Tagore and Swami Vivekananda shaped a society deeply anchored in philosophical introspection, literary excellence, and a form of universal humanism. This cultural environment, reinforced by decades of Left ideological dominance, created barriers to the acceptance of cultural nationalism as articulated by the RSS. Yet, cultural ecosystems are not immutable. The political transition of 2011 under Mamata Banerjee introduced a new paradigm centred on identity-driven welfare politics and grassroots mobilisation. The RSS, rather than confronting this shift, demonstrated its characteristic adaptability. It began to align its outreach with local idioms, cultural symbols, and societal concerns, thereby embedding itself gradually within the Bengali social fabric. The Post-2024 Strategic Reset The 2024 Lok Sabha elections served as a moment of introspection for the Bharatiya Janata Party in Bengal. The reduced seat tally underscored a critical lesson: electoral success built predominantly on leadership appeal cannot substitute for sustained organisational depth. This realisation catalysed a recalibration, where the emphasis shifted decisively towards strengthening grassroots networks. In this transformation, the RSS assumed a central role. Its organisational philosophy—rooted in daily engagement, ideological training, and social service—offered a framework that transcended electoral immediacy. The transition from personality-driven mobilisation to institution-based consolidation reflects not merely a tactical adjustment but a deeper strategic evolution. The Expanding Organisational Ecosystem The scale of the RSS’s expansion in Bengal is both impressive and instructive. From a historically marginal presence, it has evolved into a widespread network with thousands of functional units across the state. This growth is not merely quantitative; it signifies a qualitative deepening of engagement at the grassroots level. The organisation’s national strength, reflected in its vast network of daily shakhas and social initiatives, provides a robust backbone to this regional expansion. The centenary phase has further energised these efforts, with sustained outreach and leadership involvement, including extensive visits by Mohan Bhagwat. Such engagement underscores the importance accorded to Bengal as a key frontier in the broader civilisational mission. Cultural Reframing and Civilisational Integration One of the most significant aspects of the RSS’s work in Bengal has been its effort to harmonise regional identity with a broader civilisational consciousness. Rather than presenting cultural nationalism as an external imposition, the RSS sought to demonstrate its organic resonance with Bengal’s own spiritual and intellectual traditions. By drawing upon the legacy of figures like Vivekananda, who articulated a confident and inclusive vision of Hindu thought, the RSS has positioned its narrative as a continuation rather than a contradiction of Bengal’s heritage. This cultural reframing is subtle yet powerful. It transforms the discourse from one of ideological confrontation to one of civilisational continuity. In doing so, it reduces resistance and fosters acceptance, particularly among sections of society that value intellectual coherence and cultural authenticity. Festival-Based Mobilisation as Social Cohesion The increasing prominence of public celebrations such as Ram Navami reflects another dimension of the RSS’s strategy. These events are not merely religious observances; they function as instruments of community bonding and collective expression. Organised with discipline and participation, they create a shared sense of identity that transcends individual differences. Such mobilisation also serves as a rehearsal for larger societal engagement. It familiarises communities with collective action, builds organisational capacity, and reinforces cultural confidence. Over time, these gatherings contribute to the normalisation of a more assertive public expression of identity, which can have significant political implications. The Shifting Mindset of the Bhadralok The Bengali middle class, often referred to as the Bhadralok, has traditionally been sceptical of overtly ideological politics. However, recent developments—ranging from governance concerns to allegations of corruption and institutional decline—have begun to alter this disposition. A section of this class is increasingly open to alternatives that promise stability, accountability, and cultural rootedness. The RSS’s emphasis on discipline, social service, and national commitment resonates with these aspirations. Its non-electoral character lends it a degree of credibility, allowing it to engage with the Bhadralok not merely as voters but as participants in a broader societal project. The Matua Question and Identity Politics The Matua community represents a significant and politically sensitive constituency in Bengal. Issues related to citizenship, identity, and socio-economic security have placed this community at the centre of political discourse. The RSS’s engagement here reflects its broader approach of addressing societal concerns through a combination of ideological clarity and grassroots interaction. By engaging with the community’s aspirations and anxieties, the organisation contributes to shaping a narrative that integrates identity with national belonging. This has the potential to influence not only electoral outcomes but also the broader discourse on citizenship and inclusion. Electoral Recalibration in Sensitive Constituencies In constituencies with significant minority populations, shifts in voter dynamics are introducing new complexities into the electoral landscape. Changes in voter rolls, patterns of participation, and community alignments are altering traditional calculations. The RSS, through its continuous grassroots presence, is better positioned than most to understand and respond to these evolving dynamics. This capacity for real-time societal feedback allows for a more nuanced approach to political engagement. It also reinforces the organisation’s role as a bridge between ground realities and strategic planning. Tribal Consolidation and the Jangal Mahal The tribal regions of Bengal, particularly in areas such as Jangal Mahal, have historically experienced economic marginalisation and identity-related challenges. The RSS’s work in these areas focuses on social service, cultural engagement, and community empowerment. By addressing both material and psychological needs, it fosters a sense of inclusion and dignity. This engagement is gradual and trust-based, reflecting the organisation’s long-term approach. Over time, it contributes to the emergence of new socio-political alignments, grounded in shared experiences and aspirations. Beyond Strategy: The Ethos of Silent Nation-Building What distinguishes the RSS’s work in Bengal is not merely its strategic coherence but its underlying ethos. It operates without the urgency of electoral deadlines, focusing instead on building enduring relationships within society. Its programmes—whether in education, service, or cultural outreach—are designed to create a resilient social foundation. This model of engagement, often described as silent nation-building, reflects a belief that lasting political change must be rooted in societal transformation. It is an approach that prioritises depth over immediacy, continuity over spectacle. A Transformation Beyond Elections The developments unfolding in West Bengal today cannot be fully understood through the prism of electoral arithmetic alone. They represent a deeper shift in the state’s socio-political fabric—one in which the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh is playing a pivotal role. Through sustained effort, cultural sensitivity, and organisational discipline, the RSS has moved from the margins of Bengal’s public life to a position of growing influence. Its work exemplifies a long-term vision, where political outcomes are seen not as endpoints but as reflections of deeper societal currents. Regardless of the immediate results in 2026, the structural transformation underway in Bengal is likely to endure. And in that enduring shift lies the true significance of the RSS’s quiet yet profound contribution.

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Foreign Interference in India’s North-East – The Threat of a Separate Christian Nation Part 1

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Foreign Interference in India’s North-East – The Threat of a Separate Christian Nation Part-II

From Cultural Undercurrents to Electoral Assertion: The Quiet Architecture Powering Bengal’s Political Realignment

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