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Dec 01, 2023
LT GEN P R SHANKAR (Retd)

Myanmar’s Civil and Drugs War: An Analysis

The State of Conflict On October 27 the newly formed Three Brotherhood Alliance of the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army launched a surprise assault called Operation 1027 on Tatmadaw (Junta forces) in the northern Shan State of Myanmar. Since then, these three ethnic armed organizations have seized over 150 military outposts and several key towns astride the route to the Chinese border, as well as highways crisscrossing Shan State. They claim to have blocked the Junta’s land access to China. This alliance has been backed by Myanmar’s parallel, National Unity Government (NUG). These actions have galvanised all other armed groups operating in Myanmar to throw their hat in the ring. A combined force of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Arakan Army (AA), and Kawlin People’s Défense Force have occupied Kawlin and Khampat towns in Sagaing Region (opposite Manipur and Nagaland) as part of Operation 1027. Clashes between the Arakan Army (AA) and the junta’s military have broken out in the northern part of Rakhine State and the southernmost tip of Chin State opposite Mizoram. The Karenni National People’s Liberation Front launched (Karenni Nationalities Défense Force (KNDF), Karenni Army and People’s Défense Forces) launched Operation 1107 in the Kayah state of Myanmar which borders Thailand and seized a township there. Many areas of North East and North West of Naypyidaw are in turmoil. The civil war in Myanmar seems to be expanding to engulf the country. There are speculations that the Tatmadaw which is under intense pressure might collapse. There are also assessments in the Western media that the Tatmadaw might be defeated by these ethnic forces and that democracy can be established in Myanmar under the NUG. In my opinion, this is not some great resistance movement with noble ideals to restore democracy in Myanmar. This civil war is a product of an expanding drug economy which has upset the balance in the region. This descent into chaos has just commenced and will continue for the next few years. Understanding the dynamics involved is the key to this game. Myanmar is rich in minerals, including metal ores, petroleum, and natural gas, and also has significant deposits of precious and semiprecious stones. All these are still firmly under the control of the Tatmadaw and form the basic sustenance for it to survive. However, Myanmar is also the main source of drugs in the infamous Golden Triangle. The areas of illicit crop cultivation are shown in the map below. The bulk of the Golden Triangle area lies in Myanmar. Understanding the drug economy is the key to the problems confronting Myanmar and in turn India. Source: https://www.unodc.org/roseap/en/2016/11/golden-triangle-opium-economy/story.html ; The Drug Economy The Shan state of Myanmar is the largest producer of illegal drugs within the infamous Golden Triangle—a tri-junction at the Myanmar, Laos and Thailand borders. Traditionally the area had poppy cultivation and heroin was the main drug. However, the poppy production in the Golden Crescent doubled soon after the US invasion of Afghanistan. As a result, the cultivation and manufacturing of poppies shifted away from the Golden Triangle. Drug cartels in Myanmar switched from heroin and opium to synthetic drugs like methamphetamine, which are less expensive, simpler to create and more profitable. Accordingly, acreage under poppy cultivation in Myanmar decreased. Since the 2010s, production of the more potent and profitable methamphetamine made the Shan region, the world’s largest producer and exporter of this drug. Most of the source chemicals were procured from across the border in China, while some amount also came in from India. Overall poppy cultivation kept reducing further in the Shan state. However, as source chemicals for methamphetamine were smuggled in through Manipur, poppy cultivation started increasing in Northeast India. In Myanmar, this transition from a poppy economy to the meth economy was marked by drug wars termed as ethnic conflicts/civil wars/armed disruptions/political turbulence from around 2005-2015 in which these very ethnic armed groups were involved with the Tatmadaw. Some kind of a balance was reached between these ethnic armed groups and the Tatmadaw. Agreements were probably reached to give each group its share in the drug economy. In comparison, the original Mafia is juvenile. However, the current story starts in Afghanistan. Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan plunged by an estimated 95 percent following a drug ban imposed by the Taliban in April 2022 as per the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Opium cultivation in Afghanistan fell across all parts of the country, from 233,000 hectares to just 10,800 hectares in 2023. Opium output decreased from 6,200 tons in 2022 to just 333 tons in 2023. Correspondingly opium cultivation in Myanmar has increased. As per UNODC opium poppy cultivation has surged by 33 % in the Golden Triangle and opium yields have the potential to burgeon by 88%! The regional market for heroin is valued at a staggering $10bn, according to the UN. Simultaneously, ever since the Tatmadaw seized power in Myanmar in Feb 2021, there has also been a severe economic contraction in the country. Further, the war in Ukraine has fuelled global inflation which has not escaped Myanmar. This has resulted directly in a scale-up of synthetic drugs. Hence the drug dynamics in the region have changed significantly in the recent past. Overall, the Golden Triangle is returning to its roots of poppy cultivation and also expanding the outsized synthetic drug economy. It is a double bonanza for the drug cartels. The stakes are therefore very high for every armed group in the region including Tatmadaw. They are all fighting for their turfs and a piece in the expanding drug pie. The Chinese Interests Like always, Chinese interests are complex and deep rooted. One needs to understand that China has a long border with Myanmar with ethnic spill overs. It is also proximate to the drug flow out of the Golden Triangle and has its concerns. Most importantly it has invested heavily in Myanmar through the BRI (CMEC) which are at risk following this armed upheaval. However, one has to understand the historical perspective to get the right idea. When the Communist Party of China drove out the Kuomintang in 1949, some part of it escaped into the Shan state of Myanmar (then Burma). To eliminate them, China massively supported the Communist Party of Burma (in the 1960s and 1970s). Some of the rebel groups trace their history to the communist party. Ever since. China has been supporting all or most of the armed groups in the region to keep them under their control. China has always needed these Shan state-based armed groups since the area was a sanctuary for Chinese nefarious activity. Chinese criminal syndicates operate from Myanmar into China. Their range of operations includes drug smuggling, brothels, casinos, telecom scams, online gambling, cyber fraud, and human trafficking. They operate on both sides of the border. Chinese police offer rewards of up to 500,000 yuan (US$68,500) for information on suspected syndicate heads in Shan state. Some of them are Chinese citizens. As per Chinese media, there are five powerful families which control much of the criminal activity in Kokang, which is a region in the Shan state. The original mafia is a pale shadow of what goes on here. In addition to this, China has several BRI projects in Myanmar. China needs to safeguard these assets and investments. The entry into Myanmar is through the Shan State which is the epicentre of the current fighting. If the fighting escalates and movement through this region is affected, it will be hard on China. Hence it has to support some or most of the armed groups. China will also have to pay protection money to these groups. Otherwise, some of them will extract their price. However, at a macro level, it supports the Tatmadaw for its larger aims which include projects in the hinterland and an entry into the Bay of Bengal through the Kyaukphyu port. China is playing both sides. It has no other choice. Further China controls all the arms into this area through the United Wa State Army (UWSA). The UWSA is not a member of the Brotherhood Alliance. It has declared its neutrality in the ongoing fighting. However, UWSA is the main Chinese conduit and supplier of weapons to all groups in the area. China provides arms at “friendship prices” to UWSA. As per reports UWSA has not provided sophisticated arms from China to the Brotherhood Alliance. The alliance seems to be self-contained and well stocked for now. China may not have played any active part in Operation1027, but it has a hand in it. The UWSA appears to be its surrogate. China also sees an opportunity to stir trouble in India. The ongoing conflicts In Myanmar provide the ideal conditions for China to meddle in Manipur which has been the victim of self-created political trouble since the past 4-6 months. This is a golden opportunity that China will not miss. Analysis It is reiterated that the main driver of the multi front attacks on the Tatmadaw is the expanding drug economy of Myanmar within the Golden Triangle. Every group is protecting its turf and vying for an enhanced share. The armed groups are regional mafias and are more interested in their stake in drugs. None of the groups have given any clarion call for the restoration of democracy. It is the NUG that has aligned itself with the armed groups and not the other way round. The NUG does not have the finances or political heft to unite and lead an insurrection against Tatmadaw at a scale enough to overthrow it. All these groups, especially those bordering China have been aligned or against it at some point of time. They have also been with or against Tatmadaw at various points of time. Their interests are supreme. Even when there was normalcy, most of these armed groups were not fully under the control of the Tatmadaw. Their mutual existence was based on a policy of ‘live and let live’ as also of shared plunder. Tatmadaw cannot control all groups. With the increase in revenues due to drugs, all these groups will acquire autonomy. They might not be beholden to China hereafter as probably being perceived. While most groups depend on drugs/ arms smuggling for sustenance, Tatmadaw has other resources of the country at its disposal – minerals, gas, coal and oil. It is economically far stronger and militarily better organised despite its setbacks. The Army has more technology, heavy artillery and air power on its side which it uses with no holds barred. The Tatmadaw has weathered many such rebellions in the past. There has been no evidence yet of mass defections of soldiers or senior leaders that could lead to its collapse. Also, none of the armed groups have the political motivation or capability to overthrow Tatmadaw. In the worst-case scenario, if Tatmadaw falls, there will be utter chaos in Myanmar. As long as fighting continues China will not be able to make headway. The scale of the drug economy is huge. This reduces China’s leverage to play both sides. It cannot buy off the groups. China is also worried because the drug trade flows into the mainland. Chinese crime syndicates with deep links to one armed group or the other are also active in this region. So far China has shown no inclination of deploying PLA in the area. Overall, the situation will remain fluid for a long time to come. Myanmar will remain unstable till the armed groups and Tatmadaw get fatigued. It will then lead to some internal truce and sharing arrangement and stability. Course of Action for India India will have to contend with the new dimension of the Myanmar problem for a long time. There will be more refugees. India must organise refugee management in conjunction with the state governments in Manipur and Mizoram as also the Myanmar government. India should ensure that it does not get drawn in into the turmoil in Myanmar. Already there are clear indications that some Meitei and Kuki groups have aligned themselves with armed groups or Tatmadaw in Myanmar. They are also procuring arms from sources in Myanmar. It is well known that all the insurgent groups operating out of Manipur are well-ensconced into the drug economy. The quest for land in the hills by some ethnic groups could well be to get a greater share of the poppy economy. India must take a major initiative to provide a social and economic alternative to the lure of poppy cultivation and drug production. Manipur is at long-term risk if this is not done. The problems in Myanmar will not allow the ethnic fractures in Manipur to heal unless GOI and state governments rise above themselves. If the problem is not tackled with the seriousness it deserves, Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland and part of Arunachal will be disturbed. We need to talk more to solve this situation in the nation than the elections in 2024! The situation developing here is far more important for India than in Israel and Gaza; upon which we seem to be fixated! The choices are ours. So will be the consequences of neglect. Image source: Reuters

Nov 30, 2023
Ramaharitha Pusarla

Maldives Tango with Turkey: A Strategic Shift

India-Maldives relations took a new turn with the election of a new President Mohammed Muizzu. After storming into power on the pledge of reversing the “India First” policy of his predecessor Ibrahim Solih, Muizzu has formally placed a request with the Indian government for the withdrawal of troops stationed in Maldives. Muizzu, the Presidential candidate of the Progressive Congress, a coalition between his own People’s National Congress (PNC) and former Abdulla Yameen’s People’s Party of Maldives (PPM), entered the electoral fray after the Supreme Court barred Yameen from the Presidential election. Voted out of power in 2018, pro-China leader Yameen led the ‘India Out’ campaign which gained momentum after India and Maldives, headed by the Solih government, signed an agreement to construct and maintain a new harbour at Uthuru Thila Falhu naval facility. India extended a $50 million line of credit to Maldives. This harbour, besides enhancing the capabilities of the Maldivian National Defence Forces (MDNF), can improve the maritime surveillance of its vast economic exclusive zones. India has trained over 1000 MDNF forces in the past years and meets 70% of training requirements. In the run-up to the Presidential elections, Yameen and Muizzu have campaigned that the naval facility being built under the Solih government would eventually be turned into India’s military base. This motivated campaigning is baseless. As revealed by the Maldivian government, 77 Indian personnel are stationed in Maldives of which 50 of them were assigned to maintain the Dhruva helicopters given by India and the rest are engaged in the maintenance of Dornier aircraft. These Indian assets are stationed in the Maldives for medical emergencies, evacuations, and rescue operations, tracking the drug traffickers, and maritime surveillance to assist the MDNF. Operated by MDNF with the Maldives flag, Indian assets have been used in 976 missions since 2019. Indeed, during the course of the meeting with Minister Kiren Rijiju, India’s representative at the Muizzu swearing-in ceremony, the President acknowledged the contribution of Indian assets in medical evacuations. But having vowed to expel Indian troops citing a threat to sovereignty, Muizzu ordered the removal of Indian assets and ordered the review of close to 100 bilateral agreements signed with India during the Solih regime. Situated along the east-west shipping lanes that serve as conduit for two-thirds of global trade, Maldives is an important geopolitical hotspot. In the past decade, Maldives has switched sides from India to China and became a vital lynchpin for regional rivalry. Muizzu’s anti-India stance has fueled the speculation of replenishing the Indian troops with Chinese forces. Clarifying his stance, Muizzu in an interview said, “Maldives is too small to be entangled in geopolitical rivalry”. Insisting that he is pro-Maldivian, Muizzu added, “for the Maldives, it is very important that we put our interests first… and also we want to work together with all countries, have a good and friendly relationship, cordial, candid, friendly relationship”1. In tune with the advocated “pro-Maldives” position, in a major departure from the customary first visit of elected leaders of the neighbouring countries to India, Muizzu made Turkey his first destination for the state visit. This development has two major dimensions that are hard to ignore- the overt geopolitical dimension and the understated theological connection. Steering the foreign policy away from the India and China tangle, Muizzu is attempting to charter a new course. The wild swings in Maldivian foreign policy with a change in the leadership at the helm are keeping countries guessing. Beset with the daunting task of shrinking forex reserves and tasked with the immediate challenge of raising $200 million for the budgetary expenses of the remaining 45 days of the year, Muizzu has started negotiations with various countries. To supplement the credit line of $71 million from India scheduled for December, the Budget Committee headed by the Foreign Minister has commenced talks with foreign partners including the Middle Eastern countries2. Indeed, even before his official inauguration Muizzu travelled to different countries and managed to secure $80 million from the UAE for the Male Airport Project. Enthused by Turkey’s interest and discussions of potential collaboration in tourism, education, air connectivity and reciprocal investments, and responding to the personal invite extended by President Erdogan, Muizzu embarked on his first state visit to Turkey. Turkey and Maldives established diplomatic ties in 1979. However, the low-key ties received a boost with the visit of Erdogan in his previous stint as Prime Minister in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami. Subsequently, ministerial bilateral visits and close coordination with the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Countries) have stabilised the bilateral ties. In 2021, Maldives and Turkey have agreed to establish a joint economic committee and explored the prospects of visa-free travel3. The talks focussed on religious cooperation and the building of an Islamic Centre on the Hulhumale Island connected by a causeway bridge to Male and the Maldives' main airport, Velana. Muizzu in his talks with the Turkish Finance Minister during the visit called for expediting the construction plans of Velana International Airport (VIA). Other than the developmental partnership, the principal motivating attribute of Muizzu’s Turkey visit is the religious connection. Reflecting on ties with Turkey, Muizzu underscored that cultural and belief similarities could act as a catalyst in strengthening bilateral relations and expressed his firm commitment to bolstering economic and diplomatic relations with Turkey. Advocating his Neo-Ottoman dream of establishing an Islamic Caliphate, Erdogan has positioned Turkey as the paragon of Islam. Connected by the umbilical cord of religion, Maldives, the smallest 100% Muslim state intends to secure ties with Turkey. The 1932 Maldivian constitution mandated that Islamic law should be the basis for governance and administration, and the political reforms and new revisions to the constitution in 2008 proclaimed that under article 9 (d) “a non-Muslim may not become a citizen of the Maldives”. Sunni Muslims alone are conferred with land ownership and citizenship. The longest-serving president of Maldives, Abdul Gayoom, educated at Al-Azhar University Egypt advocated hardline Islam and allowed the infiltration of hardcore Wahhabi ideology into Maldives along with Saudi aid after the 2004 tsunami. The radical Wahhabi influence soon gained ground in the archipelago. Mohammed Nasheed who succeeded Gayoom after the introduction of a multiparty system and democracy won the election forming a broad-based coalition including the Adhalaath Party similar to the Muslim Brotherhood. Adhalaath Party stirred public protests against Nasheed for signing cooperation agreements with Israel on tourism, health and education which eventually led to the resignation. Nasheed who carried an activist image was perceived as pro-West and secular. To prove his credentials, Waheed who became the President after Nasheed’s exit cancelled the GMR group’s international airport building project and hosted Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Projecting himself as the defender of Islam, Abdulla Yameen, half-brother of Gayoom, came to power in the 2013 Presidential elections backed by Islamists. The firm grip of religious conservatism on the Island can be assessed from the findings of the 2015 Soufan Group report. As per the report Maldives topped the global per capita table for fighters going to Syria. A record 200 Maldivians of the population of 5,00,000 travelled to Syria. A Maldivian Police report of December 2019 reveals that 423 Maldivians attempted to join the ISIS of which 173 managed to enter the war zone. There has been a sudden spurt in terror attacks on the island since 2017. Ibrahim Solih who was voted to power in 2018 confronted the Islamists and designated 17 organisations as terror organisations under PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act 1990)4. The ISIS-run Voice of Hind magazine has openly called on Maldivians to join jihad and launch extremist acts in Maldives (and India)5. The “India Out” campaign launched by Yameen is an offshoot of the growing intolerance of the Islamists towards the Solih government’s pro-Indian approach, and counter-terror cooperation with India and Western governments. Muizzu who began his political career with the Adhalaath Party and joined hands with Yameen is now intent on burnishing his pro-Islamist position is distancing Maldives from India. Muizzu was an unlikely Presidential candidate who entered the polls after Yameen was disqualified. Days after his inauguration, the cracks in his coalition, Progressive Party of Maldives is out in the open with the resignation of Yameen who is set to form a new party. Ahead of the vital Parliamentary elections in February 2024 tentatively, maintaining a core support is vital for the newly elected President. His visit to Turkey serves the twin purpose of diversifying ties by reducing dependence on India and wooing the Islamists who are positively inclined to have close ties with Middle Eastern Countries. From Turkey, Muizzu will be attending the COP28 in UAE to pitch aid for the small islands that are especially vulnerable to climate change. Maldives has been receiving funds from Saudi and UAE since 1978 and 1976 respectively. While UAE’s assistance has been rather muted having promised an ambitious economic revival plan, Muizzu is under pressure to deliver to win handsomely in the upcoming Majilis elections. Muizzu’s diversification of diplomatic ties aligns with Erdogan’s ambitions of gaining influence in the Indian Ocean Region. Turkey which has consolidated a trilateral alliance with Pakistan and Azerbaijan recently might eagerly look forward to forming a similar alliance against India with Pakistan and Maldives. In this context, the silent role played by Pakistan in bringing Maldives and Turkey must be carefully scrutinised. Notably, Federal Minister of Pakistan Murtaza Solangi represented Pakistan at Muizzu’s swearing-in ceremony. Muizzu accompanied by a high-level delegation signed an agreement on trade and economic cooperation with Turkey. Both countries reaffirmed their belief that permanent peace can be attained through the creation of sovereign Palestine with east Jerusalem as its capital. Located 60 nautical miles from Minicoy in Lakshadweep, Maldivian shifting strategic orientation is consequential for India. A stable and secure Maldives is vital for regional security. The lurking presence of an Islamist Turkey and Maldivian slippage into the Islamic orbit will pose a new set of challenges. Holding defence cooperation with India on review, Muizzu is exploring increased cooperation in various areas of counterterrorism, cybersecurity and training for Maldives civil defence6 with Turkey. Maldives has been an important partner of India’s Neighbourhood First Policy. Given the geographical proximity, no country other than India can fill the big shoes of the “first responder” role. With Turkey making inroads into the IOR, New Delhi, besides closely monitoring the developments and engaging with domestic stakeholders, must work with like-minded Gulf partners. References https://www.livemint.com/news/world/maldives-is-too-small-to-be-maldives-leader-says-chinese-troops-will-not-replace-indians-11700014306535.html https://atolltimes.mv/post/business/6449 https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkey-maldives-to-jointly-establish-economic-committee https://maldivesindependent.com/crime-2/about-1400-extremists-willing-to-kill-in-maldives-149692 https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/maldives-extremism-and-terrorism https://psmnews.mv/en/129111 Image source: India TV News