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Apr 21, 2026
YagnaSri

The Dravidian Deception: The Rise of AIADMK, Populism, Corruption and Turbulent Legacy

Part A How Tamil cinema's biggest star transformed political culture — and what his governance model bequeathed to Tamil Nadu MGR: The Star Becomes the State When M.G. Ramachandran led the AIADMK to a decisive victory in the 1977 Tamil Nadu assembly elections, it represented something genuinely unprecedented in Indian democratic history: the elevation of a film star to chief ministership on the primary basis of his screen persona rather than any prior administrative or legislative experience. MGR's victory margin was enormous — the AIADMK won 130 of 234 assembly seats, while the DMK was reduced to 48 — demonstrating the extraordinary depth of his personal popularity. MGR served as Chief Minister from 1977 until his death in December 1987, interrupted only by a period of President's Rule in 1980. His decade of governance was complex: marked by genuine social programmes that benefited the poor, considerable economic development relative to the pre-1977 baseline, but also by a model of personalised, film-star governance that deepened the culture of competitive populism, weakened independent institutions, and set the template for the increasingly extravagant welfare schemes that have since become the currency of Tamil electoral competition. Social Programmes and the MGR Model MGR's most enduring contribution to Tamil Nadu's social landscape was the Midday Meal Scheme — which he dramatically expanded from its Congress-era origins under Kamaraj into a comprehensive nutritional programme reaching millions of school children. The scheme, which provided free meals to children in government schools, contributed significantly to improved school enrolment and nutrition indicators among Tamil Nadu's poor. It remains one of the best-administered public programmes in the history of Indian states and has been replicated nationally. He also introduced schemes for free distribution of household items, established the Tamil Nadu Noon Meal Programme as a flagship policy, and maintained a populist economic orientation that kept Tamil Nadu's social indicators relatively strong compared to other Indian states. His government's record on primary healthcare and elementary education was genuinely credible. MGR's governance was not merely about populist handouts — he maintained a relatively clean personal record and ran a tighter administration than either his predecessor Karunanidhi or his successor Jayalalithaa. But the model he established — using welfare schemes as electoral currency — created expectations and competitive dynamics that would bankrupt Tamil Nadu's public finances in subsequent decades. The AIADMK-Congress Alliance and National Politics MGR's most consequential decision in national politics was his alliance with the Congress Party under Indira Gandhi and subsequently Rajiv Gandhi. This alliance — unusual given the DMK's long history of hostility to Congress — was primarily a pragmatic calculation: the AIADMK needed Central government goodwill for Tamil Nadu's development funding, and Congress needed AIADMK support in the Lok Sabha. The alliance held through much of the 1980s and delivered political dividends to both sides. The Congress-AIADMK alliance also had implications for Tamil Nadu's relationship with the national mainstream. Unlike the DMK, which has consistently sought to position itself as the champion of Tamil interests against the Centre, MGR's AIADMK under the alliance model worked within the national coalition framework. This was marked as a period of relatively cooperative federalism, though it also meant that Tamil Nadu's governance was sometimes subordinated to Central political considerations. MGR and the LTTE: A Fatal Sympathy One of the most consequential and troubling aspects of MGR's legacy was his government's sympathy and covert support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. The LTTE and other Tamil militant groups operating in Sri Lanka were allowed to maintain training camps and logistics networks in Tamil Nadu through much of the 1980s. This support was partly the product of genuine public sentiment in Tamil Nadu regarding the plight of Sri Lankan Tamils, who faced real discrimination and violence from the Sinhalese-majority Sri Lankan state. MGR is said to have provided financial support to the LTTE and even stopped the deportation of LTTE cadre after a shootout in PondyBazar in 1982. While all this was done with no ill intentions, the long-term consequences of his policies are a matter of record. However, the tolerance of LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu had catastrophic consequences. The LTTE's presence in the state contributed to the growth of arms trafficking networks, created parallel power structures that operated outside the law, and ultimately culminated in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in Sriperumbudur in 1991 — one of the most shattering political crimes in post-independence Indian history, carried out by an LTTE suicide bomber on Tamil Nadu soil. Tamil Nadu's political class — across both DMK and AIADMK — bears significant moral responsibility for the conditions that allowed the LTTE to operate from Tamil soil. The sympathy for Tamil Eelam that animated both parties' engagement with Sri Lankan Tamil issues was not merely a humanitarian impulse — it was an expression of the latent separatist DNA that Dravidian ideology had never genuinely renounced. Death of MGR and the Succession Crisis MGR suffered a massive kidney failure and stroke in 1984, and while he recovered sufficiently to return to office, his health never fully stabilised. He died on December 24, 1987, sparking an extraordinary public outpouring of grief — hundreds of thousands gathered in Chennai, and reports of suicides among his most devoted fans filled the newspapers for days. The intensity of the popular mourning reflected the quasi-religious status MGR had achieved in Tamil public consciousness. His death created an immediate succession crisis within the AIADMK. His widow, Janaki Ramachandran, briefly became Chief Minister but could not hold the party together or maintain a legislative majority. The government fell within months, and fresh elections in 1989 returned Karunanidhi and the DMK to power. The AIADMK itself split into competing factions — one aligned with Janaki, another with the party's film-industry base — before Jayalalithaa emerged as the dominant figure. The succession dynamics following MGR's death revealed the fundamental fragility of personalised, star-politician governance. MGR had built a movement around himself rather than around institutions, ideas, or collective leadership. When the individual was gone, the movement had no organic mechanism of renewal. This was a lesson that Jayalalithaa would repeat a generation later with even more dramatic consequences. Part B The Jayalalithaa Years: Populism, Corruption, Legal Battles, and a Turbulent Legacy From film heroine to power queen — the rise, fall, and return of Tamil Nadu's most controversial chief minister The Rise of Jayalalithaa Jayaram Jayalalithaa entered Tamil Nadu politics as MGR's protege and political heir, transitioning from a celebrated film actress and MGR's on-screen partner to the AIADMK's most dominant figure after his death. Her path to the Chief Ministership was neither smooth nor uncontested — she faced intense resistance from within the AIADMK's male-dominated old guard, was publicly humiliated in the Tamil Nadu assembly in 1989 when DMK legislators manhandled and tore her saree. She had to fight repeated internal challenges to her authority. That public humiliation in the assembly — one of the most shocking incidents of violence against a woman politician in post-independence India — galvanised public sympathy for Jayalalithaa and transformed her into a figure of resilience and defiance. She vowed publicly that she would not enter the assembly again until she could do so as Chief Minister. She kept that promise, leading the AIADMK to a massive victory in 1991 in the immediate aftermath of the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, which had generated enormous public anger against the DMK's perceived sympathy for the LTTE. First Term: Governance Overshadowed by Corruption Jayalalithaa's first term (1991-1996) began with genuine promise. She was intelligent, administratively engaged, and in the early months of her tenure demonstrated capacity for decisive governance. She took strong action against the LTTE networks in Tamil Nadu following the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, cooperating with Central intelligence agencies in a way that the DMK had conspicuously failed to do. She oversaw the continued expansion of welfare schemes and took several administrative reform initiatives. But her first term became synonymous with corruption on a scale and brazenness that shocked even a political culture already inured to governmental venality. Her close associate Sasikala Natarajan — whose family would later become the most notorious symbol of AIADMK corruption — was established in Jayalalithaa's official residence and became the conduit through which patronage, contracts, and appointments were dispensed. The Sasikala family's acquisition of businesses, properties, and political influence during Jayalalithaa's first term represented one of the most egregious examples of crony capitalism in post-independence Tamil Nadu. The 'Jaya TV' empire, the granite quarry contracts, the real estate acquisitions, the disproportionate assets case that would follow — all of these had their origins in the systematic looting of Tamil Nadu's state machinery during Jayalalithaa's first term. The Amma who styled herself as the mother of the Tamil people was simultaneously permitting her official household to function as a private extraction machine. Attack on the Kanchi Matham: Anti-Hindu Governance Among the most troubling episodes of Jayalalithaa's tenure was the 2004 arrest of Kanchi Shankaracharya Jayendra Saraswati — the head of one of Hinduism's most ancient and revered monastic institutions, the Kanchi Kamakoti Peetham — on charges of conspiracy to murder. The arrest, ordered by the Tamil Nadu police under the DMK government that had returned to power, was carried out with maximum drama and public humiliation: the Shankaracharya was arrested while attending a religious function, handcuffed, and paraded before cameras. The charges — which were eventually dropped after a prolonged legal process — were widely regarded by the Hindu community as politically motivated. The Kanchi Matham had centuries of connection to Tamil Hindu society and had been at the forefront of social reform, temple administration, and preservation of Vedic learning. Its head's arrest was seen as a deliberate political attack on Hindu institutional authority by a government deeply embedded in the Dravidian anti-Hindu tradition. The episode revealed the continuity of the anti-Hindu impulse across both major Dravidian parties. Whether under DMK or AIADMK, the Tamil Nadu government's relationship with Hindu religious institutions has been marked by suspicion, interference, and in this case, outright persecution of religious leadership. The systematic state takeover of Hindu temples — which continues to this day and has no parallel in the treatment of churches or mosques — is another expression of this institutionalised anti-Hindu bias in Tamil governance. Legal Battles, Conviction, and the Disproportionate Assets Case The legal case that most defined Jayalalithaa's post-1996 political life was the disproportionate assets case filed by the Supreme Court, tracking assets accumulated during her first term that were wildly disproportionate to her known income sources. The case, which wound through the courts for nearly two decades, resulted in her conviction by a special court in Bangalore in September 2014 — she was sentenced to four years' imprisonment and fined Rs. 100 crore, and was temporarily disqualified from holding public office. The conviction was overturned on appeal by the Karnataka High Court in 2015, a decision that itself was challenged before the Supreme Court. Jayalalithaa died in December 2016 before the Supreme Court delivered its final verdict. The Supreme Court ultimately, in 2017, set aside the High Court acquittal and restored the special court's conviction — but the convicted person was no longer alive to face its consequences. This legal saga — conviction, acquittal, restoration of conviction — illustrated the intersection of political power and judicial process in Tamil Nadu's governance. During her periods of legal vulnerability, Jayalalithaa used the full resources of state power to manage the cases, delay proceedings, and maintain political relevance. Her periods in office following her legal battles were marked by a pattern of using governance to advance her personal legal interests — a corruption of the executive function that damaged the integrity of Tamil Nadu's administration. Death and the Succession Void Jayalalithaa was hospitalised in September 2016 and died on December 5, 2016 — the circumstances of her death, including the true medical timeline, the role of Sasikala in her final months, and the conduct of those around her in her last weeks, remain subjects of serious controversy and public inquiry. The Justice A. Arumughaswamy Commission appointed to investigate the circumstances of her death has made findings critical of those who managed her medical care and access during her hospitalisation. Her death created a succession void that shattered the AIADMK. Sasikala attempted to claim the Chief Ministership. It was blocked by the Governor, and she was subsequently convicted in the long-pending disproportionate assets case and sent to prison in Bengaluru. The AIADMK split between O. Panneerselvam and Edappadi K. Palaniswami factions reunited temporarily, and then faced the 2021 elections in a weakened state. The DMK, under M.K. Stalin, won a decisive victory.

Apr 21, 2026
Siddhartha Dave

Gujarati Brought Up as Bengali: Can Dinesh Trivedi Re-script Bharat–Bangladesh Diplomacy?

At a time when the geopolitics of energy is once again redrawing fault lines across Asia, Bharat’s decision to nominate Dinesh Trivedi as High Commissioner to Bangladesh is far more than a routine diplomatic reshuffle. It is a calculated political signal—both to Dhaka and to the wider region—that New Delhi is willing to blend political instinct with diplomatic tradition. A Political Appointment in a Strategic Neighbourhood For over three decades, Bharat has largely relied on career diplomats from the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) to manage relations with its immediate neighbours. The last notable political appointment in the neighbourhood dates back to the early 1990s, when historian Bimal Prasad was sent to Kathmandu. Even in Dhaka—one of Bharat’s most sensitive and strategically vital postings—the tradition has been strictly bureaucratic. This makes Trivedi’s probable nomination a departure of consequence. Historically, political appointees have been reserved for key global capitals. The appointment of Vinay Kwatra to Washington after serving as Foreign Secretary, or earlier placements like RK Raghavan in Cyprus and Dalbir Singh Suhag in Seychelles, were exceptions rather than the rule. But Dhaka is neither Washington nor London—it is a neighbourhood capital with deep civilisational, political, and security linkages with Bharat. That New Delhi has chosen to send a politician here suggests that diplomacy with Bangladesh is entering a more political, personality-driven phase. Timing: Energy Crisis and Regional Flux The timing is not incidental. Bangladesh is currently grappling with an acute energy crisis, exacerbated by the ongoing tensions in West Asia, particularly the U.S.-Israel confrontation with Iran and the strategic chokehold over the Strait of Hormuz. For an energy-import dependent economy like Bangladesh, disruptions in supply chains translate quickly into domestic instability. In such a scenario, Bharat’s outreach—through a politically seasoned envoy—signals readiness to engage not just at the bureaucratic level, but through political understanding and negotiation. A career diplomat brings procedural finesse. A politician brings negotiation instincts, ideological clarity, and the ability to read political undercurrents. Dhaka, at this moment, requires both. The Man: Gujarati Roots, Bengali Soul Dinesh Trivedi’s personal journey is itself a metaphor for the layered identity that Bharat often embodies. Born into a Gujarati family that migrated from Karachi during Partition, Trivedi’s upbringing unfolded in Kolkata. His father’s professional journey with Hindustan Construction Company anchored the family in Bengal, shaping Trivedi’s cultural and linguistic sensibilities. Educated at St. Xavier’s College, Calcutta, and later at the University of Texas at Austin, he represents a blend of regional rootedness and global exposure. Fluent in Bangla, trained in classical music, and once even aspiring to join the Indian Air Force as a pilot, Trivedi defies the stereotype of a conventional politician. His Gujarati lineage gives him a trader’s instinct and pragmatism; his Bengali upbringing lends him cultural fluency in a region where identity and language matter deeply. In Dhaka, this duality could become a diplomatic asset. Political Trajectory: From TMC Insider to BJP Voice Trivedi’s political career has been equally layered. A long-time associate of Mamata Banerjee, he rose within the Trinamool Congress (TMC), serving as Railway Minister (2011–12) and Minister of State for Health (2009–11) in the UPA government. His shift to the BJP ahead of the 2021 West Bengal elections marked a significant ideological repositioning. This transition—from a regional party deeply embedded in Bengal’s politics to a national party with a strong central leadership—has equipped him with insights into both regional sensitivities and national strategic priorities. Such experience may prove crucial in Dhaka, where domestic politics often intersect with bilateral relations. Breaking the IFS Monopoly in Dhaka As former High Commissioner Veena Sikri has noted, Dhaka has historically remained the domain of seasoned IFS officers. Even the first envoy after Bangladesh’s creation in 1971, Subimal Dutt, though retired, came from a bureaucratic lineage. Trivedi’s appointment breaks that continuum. This development inevitably raises a set of critical questions about the evolving nature of Bharat’s foreign policy. Is New Delhi consciously moving towards a more politically agile and responsive diplomatic framework in its neighbourhood? Does this appointment signal a broader shift towards a leader-driven foreign policy, where political trust and alignment outweigh bureaucratic continuity? Or is it simply a pragmatic response to the increasingly political and personality-driven nature of regional engagements, especially in countries like Bangladesh, where domestic politics and foreign relations are deeply intertwined? In reality, the answer appears to lie in a combination of all three factors, reflecting both strategic intent and situational necessity. At the same time, the appointment of a political envoy brings with it a mix of opportunities and risks. On the positive side, such an envoy enjoys direct access to the political leadership in New Delhi, which can significantly expedite decision-making and enhance coordination. A seasoned politician is also better equipped to read, interpret, and respond swiftly to political signals, both overt and subtle, within the host country. Moreover, political figures often possess greater flexibility in conducting informal negotiations, building personal rapport, and navigating complex political landscapes beyond the rigid frameworks of traditional diplomacy. However, these advantages are accompanied by equally significant risks. A political appointee may lack the depth of training and experience in formal diplomatic protocols that career diplomats possess, which can sometimes lead to missteps in sensitive situations. There is also the danger of bilateral engagement becoming overly politicised, potentially complicating long-term institutional relationships. Additionally, perception challenges within the host country may arise, where such an appointment could be viewed through a political or ideological lens rather than as a purely diplomatic initiative. Balancing these opportunities and risks will ultimately determine the success of this unconventional but strategically significant move. A Civilisational Connect, Reimagined Bharat and Bangladesh share more than borders—they share history, culture, language, and civilisational memory. From the legacy of 1971 to contemporary economic interdependence, the relationship is layered and sensitive. In sending a “Gujarati brought up as Bengali,” New Delhi may be attempting to symbolically bridge identities—trader pragmatism with cultural empathy, national strategy with regional understanding. If leveraged well, this appointment could mark a new phase in neighbourhood diplomacy—one that is less rigid, more political, and deeply attuned to the realities of the region. If mishandled, it risks blurring the line between diplomacy and domestic politics. Either way, Dhaka just became one of the most closely watched diplomatic postings in Bharat’s foreign policy landscape. (PS: This article was first published in Organiser)

The Dravidian Deception: Birth of DMK, Dynastic Consolidation and Competitive Communalism Part 4

The Dravidian Deception: Periyar’s Poisonous Legacy Masks Racism, Anti-Hinduism and Anti-National Politics Part 3

Akshaya Tritiya: Reclaiming a Dharmic Tradition Beyond Consumerism

Featured Articles

The Dravidian Deception: The Rise of AIADMK, Populism, Corruption and Turbulent Legacy

Gujarati Brought Up as Bengali: Can Dinesh Trivedi Re-script Bharat–Bangladesh Diplomacy?

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