Overview

As of this date, the United States maintains approximately 750 military bases across 80 countries, hosting 174,000 active-duty personnel, including around 50,000 in the West Asia / Middle East across 19 sites in Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Rooted in Cold War strategies, these bases counter terrorism, the Ayatollah's Regime in Iran, threats from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-occupied China and the legacy threat from Russia. The bases also provoke reactions, directly or indirectly support certain controversial regimes hosting these bases and burden the United States economy despite approximately $5–$7 billion in host contributions.

This exigency has turned into a continuing arrangement making it a paradigm deviation from the American founders’ vision of avoiding long lasting or permanent entanglements, potentially prompting conservative nationalist Trump administration to consider reassessing their role, weighing American lives and limbs as well as assets against rivals’ probable gains.

Historical Exigency-turned-Legacy

Post-World War II bases in Germany, Japan and South Korea were established to counter communism. The Gulf War in 1991 and post-9/11 wars expanded West Asia / Middle East presence.

Bases enable rapid response but fuel anti-Americanism activities, cause environmental harm, and raise ethical issues, such as the Chagossian displacement from Diego Garcia.

United States Military Commands and Overseas Bases - Structure

United States geographic combatant commands oversee overseas bases, aligning them with strategic objectives:

United States Central Command (CENTCOM): Manages West Asia / Middle East bases (e.g., Al Udeid in Qatar, Al Asad in Iraq, Naval Support Activity in Bahrain), overseeing around 50,000 troops for operations against Ayatollah's Regime in Iran and terrorism. Al Udeid, CENTCOM’s forward headquarters, was targeted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on June 23, 2025.

United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM): Supervises ~80,000 troops across bases in Japan (Yokosuka), South Korea (Camp Humphreys), and Guam (Andersen Air Force Base), countering authoritarian regimes of CCP-occupied China and North Korea.

United States European Command (EUCOM): Directs ~34,000 troops in Europe (e.g. Ramstein in Germany, Aviano in Italy) under NATO, countering legacy threats from Russia.

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM): Oversees Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti for counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa.

United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM): Manage limited overseas bases in Latin America and the Caribbean, with minimal global impact.

Role: Commands coordinate operations, logistics and host nation agreements, ensuring bases support U.S. and allied objectives.

Geopolitical Implications

Strategic Benefits: Bases like Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey deter Ayatollah-occupied Iran and enable counterterrorism, supporting North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and bilateral operations.

Alliance Reassurance: Bases signal commitment to NATO, Japan and others, but allies’ dependence raises questions about their self-defence capabilities and risks American lives.

Vulnerability: Bases face missile/drone attacks, risking American lives for undeserving Jihadi allies’ security as seen in Ayatollah Regime’s IRGC attacks on Al Asad Air Base in Iraq (2020) and Al Udeid (June 23, 2025).

Paradox of Terrorist Attacks killing Innocent Americans: Jihadi attacks linked to host countries (Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar) ironically killed Americans (31 personnel killed in 2023 Hamas attacks), questioning the cost of defending such undemocratic and/or avowed Jihadi allies through the bases.

Controversial Regimes: Democratic sovereign nations may not allow US military bases in their nations while the so called “Jihadi” leaders and dictators are easily manipulated to get into agreements for military bases. This is a very tricky situation but anti-American or anti-Kafir Jihadi entities are better avoided for setting US military bases.

Host Country Contributions and Economic Impact

Economic Burden vs. Contributions: Gross costs of these bases are $66 billion (operations) and $80 billion (total, including personnel at $10,000–$40,000 extra per overseas troop). Net costs are $59–$73 billion after $5–$7 billion host contribution, straining a $37 trillion+ debt economy.

Potential savings could be up to $12.4–$18.2 billion if 20–25% of bases are closed and 43,500 troops are repatriated. This may also result in approximately $1–$1.5 billion in lost contributions (e.g. Japan, Qatar).

Japan: Approximately $2 billion/year (utilities, housing, labour) for bases like Yokosuka Naval Base, covering ~33% of $5.7 billion cost, plus tax waivers and rent-free facilities under a bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

South Korea: Approximately $1 billion/year for Camp Humphreys, covering ~22% of $4.5 billion, with free rent and tax exemptions (as per SOFA).

Germany: Rent-free facilities and tax waivers for Ramstein Air Base, part of $10 billion European base costs, under NATO frameworks.

Qatar: $8 billion one-time investment in Al Udeid.

Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE: Rent-free facilities, cost-sharing (approximately $1–$2 billion total estimated).

Saudi Arabia: Likely rent-free facilities.

Djibouti: Revenue from Camp Lemonnier via multi-national basing.

Economic Impact on Host Countries: United States spending boosts local economies, though occupation-based bases (e.g. Iraq) may strain hosts.

United States Military Inputs to NATO and Other Multilateral/Bilateral Agreements

The United States bases support NATO, multilateral and bilateral commitments.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): Approximately 34,000 United States troops in Europe (Ramstein, Aviano Air Base in Italy) contribute ~22% ($2.5 billion) of NATO’s $11.5 billion 2025 budget and 70% of operations via the $849.8 billion United States Department of Defense (DoD) budget. Allies (Germany, Italy, Turkey) provide ~$1 billion in rent-free facilities. Many of 32 allies meet NATO’s 2% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) defence spending target and this is likely to improve further as pressure mounts from the Trump Administration 2.0 to raise it to 5%.

Overseas Bases of Other Major Powers and Impact on United States Bases

CCP-occupied China: Naval base in Djibouti (since 2017, ~2,000 troops), logistics facilities in Cambodia (Ream Naval Base) and potential bases in Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri Lanka and the UAE.

Diplomacy/Geopolitics: CCP's Bases support the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), securing trade routes and countering United States influence in the Indo-Pacific.

Negative Impact on United States Bases: CCP-occupied China’s bases compete for regional influence, necessitating United States’ retention of Indo-Pacific bases (e.g. Yokosuka, Andersen Air Force Base in Guam) to counter CCP expansion.

Russia: Bases in Syria (Tartus, Hmeimim), Armenia, Central Asia and influence in Belarus/Ukraine.

Diplomacy/Geopolitics: Bases counter NATO and United States influence in Europe and West Asia / Middle East.

Negative Impact on U.S. bases: Russia’s presence requires United States bases in Germany and Poland, raising NATO-related costs and risks.

India: No permanent bases; access agreements in Singapore, Mauritius, and Seychelles.

Diplomacy/Geopolitics: India counters CCP-occupied China via the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) without expansive basing.

Positive Impact on U.S. bases: India’s limited basing reduces pressure on United States Indo-Pacific bases, supporting Quad alignment.

France/United Kingdom (UK): France (Djibouti, UAE, Gabon) and the UK (Bahrain, Cyprus) maintain small networks for counterterrorism and NATO support.

Diplomacy/Geopolitics: Bases complement the United States' efforts in NATO/multilateral frameworks.

Positive Impact on U.S. Bases: Allied bases provide limited relief.

Balancing Impacts: The Trump administration may prioritise bases countering the CCP-occupied China / Ayatollah's Regime/ Russia over non-essential ones.

Specific Notes

Pakistan: No permanent bases; Shamsi Airfield use ended in 2021. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)’s Lashkar-e-Taiba ties (2008 Mumbai, six Americans killed) strain United States-India ties. Minimal contributions.

Afghanistan: No bases post-2021; operations from Qatar/UAE. U.S. Withdrawal hurt United States - India counterterrorism.

Turkey: Incirlik (NATO hub) hosts United States nuclear weapons and forces; Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Hamas support (2023, 31 Americans killed) complicates ties.

Qatar: Al Udeid (United States Central Command, 10,000+ personnel) saw Iran’s IRGC attack on June 23, 2025 (“Operation Glad Tidings of Victory,” 10–19 missiles, no casualties). $8 billion investment offset costs but Qatar’s Hamas ties risk American lives.

Syria: Al-Tanf Base (<1,000 troops) counters Ayatollah's Regime in Iran; no host contributions.

Iraq: Al Asad Air Base, Erbil face Ayatollah's Regime-backed attacks; minimal host support.

Indo-Pacific: Japan/South Korea (80,000+ troops, $3 billion contributions) counter dictatorial regimes of CCP-occupied China/North Korea.

Others: Germany (NATO, rent-free), Bahrain (United States Fifth Fleet, rent-free), Saudi Arabia (Prince Sultan Air Base), Djibouti (Camp Lemonnier).

Potential Policy Shifts Under a Nationalist Trump Administration

In concurrence with “America First” principle, these projections are likely to be on the agenda of Trump 2.0.

Founders’ Vision and America First: Trump’s first-term reductions based on principles suggest further potential reductions/closures, driven by pressures like American casualties and costs.

Controversial Regimes: Reducing reliance on Turkey/Pakistan could favour Israel/India. This adverse legacy positions compel tight rope walking and fine balancing.

Economic Rebalancing:

Net Costs: $59–$73 billion/year after $5–$7 billion contributions (Japan: $2 billion, South Korea: $1 billion, Middle East/NATO: ~$2–$4 billion).

Savings: Closing 150–190 non-essential bases (20–25%) and repatriating 43,500 troops could save $12.4–$18.2 billion/year (net, after ~$1–$1.5 billion lost contributions).

Conclusion

United States bases (750, $59–$73 billion net cost after $5–$7 billion NATO/multilateral/bilateral contributions) enable influence but risks to American lives due to jihadi attacks linked to Pakistan/Turkey/Qatar (2008 Mumbai: 6 Americans; 2023 Israel: 31 Americans) may compel Trump Administration to consider overhauling based on America First and on newer strategies and better alliances with improved technologies to counter CCP Jihadi nexus.