Part 1 of this article talked about History, Challenges, Current Status and Future of the The INDO-PACIFIC and QUAD. You can read it here.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

India has presence in the Eastern Indian Ocean but its presence in the Western Indian Ocean near Africa’s East Coast & Middle East) is minimal. As I have mentioned earlier Modi government has been able to crucially negotiate agreements for bases in Oman (Duqm Port) & Seychelles (Assumption Island) to increase presence in the Western Indian Ocean. Indian President Ram Nath Kovind’s visit to Mauritius and Madagascar earlier this year was part of India’s push to increase its presence in the East African and Indian Ocean littorals. India offered Mauritius a patrol vessel, $100 million line of credit for defense purchases & increased cooperation with the Mauritian Coast Guard. India has signed MOU’s to develop new airstrip and jetty facilities on the islands of Akalega, for future use by the Indian Navy & install state-of-the-art telecommunications equipment. During French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit earlier this year agreement was reached on granting Indian naval vessels access to French ports in both the Indian Ocean (Réunion and Mayotte) and the Pacific (French Polynesia and New Caledonia) & also allowing the French to use Indian facilities.

In a significant development US has agreed to India’s request to post a defense attaché to the US military’s Central Command Headquarters (CENTCOM) in Bahrain. This which will help in improving coordination and logistical support between the two navies in the Western Indian Ocean.

India has also stepped up aid to Indian Ocean littoral states through its Project SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), which is designed to revive India’s ancient trade routes and cultural linkages around the Indian Ocean—a counter-move to China’s MSR (Maritime Silk Road).

Image: Courtesy of www. newindianexpress.com

To keep an eye out on the PLAN in the Indian Ocean the Indian Navy has started doing 7 “Mission based deployments” (MDP) to keep an eye on not only the IOR but also its  entry and exit routes.

1. MALDEP: Straits of Malacca
2. NORDEP: North Bay of Bengal, north of the Andaman & Nicobar  islands
3. ANDEP: Between North Andaman & South Nicobar.
4. GULFDEP: North Arabian Sea, Strait of Hormuz & Persian Gulf
5. POGDEP: Gulf of Aden (Anti-piracy patrol)
6. CENDEP: South of India off the Maldives & Sri Lanka
7. IODEP: South Indian Ocean off Mauritius, Seychelles & Madagascar

India belatedly at the turn of the last century started realizing the strategic importance of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands due to its location near the shipping lanes in IOR & its close proximity to the western entrance of the Malacca Straits. To improve co-operation between the three armed forces in this region India’s first tri services command was established in this region in 2001.

India currently has old Dornier-228 aircraft & Mi-17 helicopters for surveillance of the areas around Andaman & Nicobar Islands. India has three air force bases in the region at Port Blair, Car Nicobar & Campbell Bay (at southernmost point in the island chain). India deploys maritime patrol/ anti-submarine warfare (ASW) Poseidon P-8i aircrafts from a base in Tamil Nadu to Port Blair & beyond. Currently efforts are underway to extend the runways on Car Nicobar & Campbell Bay from 3,000 to 10,000 feet by 2021. This will allow the P-8i to fly to these more southern locations (instead of Port Blair) increasing the maritime domain awareness to the south in the IOR. These longer runways should also allow heavy lift aircraft like Lockheed C-130 to land & take off from these islands improving the transport capability to these remote locations. Recently a proposal has been made to base a squadron of fighter aircraft permanently in Andaman & Nicobar. When this finally happens it would make the joke in strategic circles come true that the Andaman & Nicobar Islands are India’s only “unsinkable aircraft carrier”. These fighter aircraft would useful if a blockade of the strategic Malacca Strait needs to be done when hostilities break out. Indian Navy plans to commission its second Floating Dry Dock Navy near Port Blair to allow more naval ships to be maintained and serviced in the islands. They are also constructing three forward operating bases (FOBs) in the islands to allow its Khukri class corvettes to be deployed across various islands. These are good steps but a lot more still needs to be done to develop this strategic “gold mine” that India possess.

On May 30 2018 Defense Secretary Jim Mattis announced that Pacific Command (USPACOM) has been renamed Indo-Pacific Command "in recognition of the increasing connectivity of the Indian and Pacific Oceans." Mattis emphasized that this was recognition of the changing regional reality and the critical role of India in shaping the future of this region. “We are looking right now at the role of the Indian Ocean, with the largest democracy in the world coming into its own with economic progress - that’s India. We need to recognize the growing significance of the Indian Ocean, the Indian Subcontinent and India itself. So, I wanted to make certain that the title reflected the reality,” Mattis said. The name change is more symbolic & doesn’t change PACCOM’s area of operations from India to Hawaii but it shows the increase in importance of India in the eyes of US to deal with their common adversary China.

This announcement has been well timed as it came just a week before two important events. One of them was the MALABAR 2018 naval exercise involving the US, Japan, and India & second was that it came a day before Indian PM Narendra Modi’s keynote address to the Shangri-La Dialogue.

The MALABAR exercise which was mostly held in the IOR, in 2018 is being held in the Western Pacific near the US territory of Guam adjacent to the disputed South China Sea. U.S. - India Malabar naval exercises which began in 2002 have expanded to now include Japan another member of the QUAD. There was some hope that Australia would be invited to this year’s version which didn’t happen. This provided ammunition to critics saying that India due to its reengagement with China this year is now bending over backwards to please China by not including Australia as part of the MALABAR exercises.

Malabar over the years has grown in complexity as seen from this year’s focus on a wide range of capabilities: combined carrier strike group operations, maritime patrol and reconnaissance operations, surface and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), medical operations, damage control, helicopter operations and visit, board, search and seizure. With increasing forays of the Chinese submarines in both Pacific & Indian Ocean theatres the QUAD navies are focusing more especially on anti-submarine warfare (ASW). This is borne out by the fact that all 3 navies this year had in their midst specific air, surface & sub surface resources for anti-submarine warfare (ASW):

INDIA:

1. INS Kamorta (Kamorta-class stealth ASW corvette)
2. P-8I (maritime patrol/ASW aircraft)

JAPAN:

1. JS Suzunami (Takanami-class guided-missile ASW destroyer)
2. JS Fuyuzuki (diesel-electric attack submarine)
3. P-1 (maritime patrol/ASW aircraft)

US:

1. USS Benfold (Los-Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarine)
2. P-8A (maritime patrol/ASW aircraft)

India to bolster its ASW capabilities after initially buying 8 Poseidon P-8i ASW maritime surveillance & patrol aircraft few years ago placed an order for 4 more aircraft in 2016. India has very small supply of in service naval helicopters capable of performing ASW operations. A proposal to purchase 123 naval multi-role helicopters has unfortunately gotten stalled in negotiations over pricing. India with just 2 nuclear & 13 conventional submarines in active service has limited sub surface numbers to match up against the vast PLAN submarine fleet (~10 nuclear & 50+ conventional subs). The much heralded Project 75 which started in the late 90’s was to produce 6 modern conventional submarines starting in 2012. However as of today only 1 (INS Kalvari) of these 6 submarines has entered service as the program is years behind schedule and with huge cost over runs. On the nuclear submarine front India is looking to manufacture multiple nuclear powered submarines in India. This four-decade old Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project which is shrouded in extreme secrecy is India’s most expensive defense project ever costing a reportedly whopping R 90,000 crore. Last November without much fun fare India’s 2nd nuclear powered ballistic missile sub SSBN INS Arighat was launched. After conducting extensive sea trials which will take couple of years it will join India’s other SSBN INS Arihant in active service. SSN (nuclear powered attack sub/not ballistic missile sub) INS Chakra India’s other nuclear submarine currently in active service is on a 10 year lease from Russia which expires in 2022. Indian Navy has opened up talks with the Russians for leasing another nuclear SSN after the current lease expires. India last year launched third of its proposed four ASW Kamorta-class corvettes but they lack a dedicated ASW helicopter & towed sonar array which reduces their overall efficacy. There were media reports some time ago about Japan & US helping India to install a sound surveillance sensors (SOSUS) chain between Sumatra (Indonesia) & Indira Point (Great Nicobar) to monitor PLAN submarines in the eastern IOR though there has been no official confirmation of these developments ever since the report most likely due to the top secret nature of this project. All these issues combined together hamper Indian Navy’s ASW capabilities against the PLAN submarine threat in IOR.

RIMPAC, the Rim of the Pacific Exercise, the world's largest international maritime warfare exercise has participants from all over the world. US has sent out a very strong message this year by disinviting China from the exercises due to the provocative steps taken in the South China Sea such as deploying anti-ship missiles, SAMs, etc. Even though Australia was not invited to the MALABAR exercises it was recently decided that the four QUAD navies will have their ships sail jointly towards Hawaii where RIMPAC is held. Indian Navy’s INS Sahyadri (a Shivalik-class stealth multi-role frigate) currently taking part in MALABAR exercise will sail with ships from other 3 navies of the QUAD in an unmistakable combined show of force which should appease somewhat concerns from detractors who were unhappy with Australia’s non invite for the MALABAR exercises.

Before heading to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore Modi first visited Indonesia & Malaysia. Indonesia which has a strategic location in the Eastern Indian Ocean (controlling the choke points to enter IOR from South China Sea) remains a key player in IOR & Southeast Asia. Indonesia a large archipelagic nation consisting of 17,508 islands, is less than 90 nautical miles from southern end of India’s Andaman & Nicobar Islands. After the meet between Indian PM Modi & Indonesia president Widodo both nations in a joint statement stated the importance of achieving a free, open, transparent, rules-based, peaceful, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region, where sovereignty and territorial integrity, international law, in particular UNCLOS, freedom of navigation and overflight, sustainable development and an open, free, fair and mutually beneficial trade and investment system are respected. Both countries realize that they need to increase engagement & cooperation to offset the power of the Chinese in the Indo-Pacific. Most importantly Indonesia and India announced plans to develop a strategic Indonesian naval port in the Sabang. 

Sabang is located on the northern end of Sumatra Island at the western entrance of the strategic Malacca Strait. This will give the Indian Navy much closer access to the vital Malacca Strait (similar to the overseas bases in Oman, Mauritius & Seychelles in the Western IOR). Since the port is 40 meters deep it could be used to accommodate large ships & even submarines. Another important agreement reached during this meet was for the Indian & Indonesia Navies to conduct their first ever bilateral naval exercise in the Java Sea.

During Modi’s visit to Singapore as part of the same trip it was announced that in near future India will have a new trilateral exercise with Thailand and Singapore though exact dates are yet to be announced. Singapore has been drawing close with India since past few years including having a logistics agreement & extensive defense cooperation with India. But an underappreciated fact is that this exercise should bring India closer to Thailand which is a very important in naval terms due to its strategic geographic location.

Image: Courtesy of http://kracanal-maritimesilkroad.com

China currently is bedeviled with what it calls the “Malacca Dilemma” where it has to navigate the narrow straits to enter the IOR. Due to congestion & shallow nature of the Malacca Strait, PLAN submarines & heavy naval vessels have to travel to the deeper Sunda & Lombok straits for ingress/egress into the IOR. This added distance increases the travel time of PLAN vessels while giving India an advantage on being able to focus on small narrow straits for surveillance (vs having to track a large open oceanic area).

Kra Canal is a proposal to build a canal (similar in concept to Suez/Panama canals) to connect the Andaman Sea to the west & Gulf of Thailand to the east across a narrow strip of land in Thailand around 100km long. This would shorten the distance between the Andaman Sea & Gulf of Thailand by ~1200kms. The proposal has been thrown around for a century but it has never been executed most likely due to the engineering challenges & cost associated with it. There have been some proposals to build a canal as part of the OBOR project by the Chinese. The Chinese stand to be the biggest beneficiaries of this proposal as it would help solve their “Malacca” dilemma. PLAN naval vessels would now via the Kra Canal cross over from Gulf of Thailand into the Andaman Sea (bypassing the narrow Indonesian straits) putting the Andaman & Nicobar Islands under direct threat. This will save the PLAN upto a weeks’ worth of time by sailing across the Kra Canal vs having to sail south towards the Sunda or Lombok Straits. The “bypass” would now neutralize India’s advantage of blocking the Malacca Straits for China during war. Many naval experts believe that this could very well end India’s primacy in the IOR which would be disastrous for India. As of February 2018, Thai Prime Minister had declared that the canal was not a government priority. Closer relations with Thailand are of paramount importance which this trilateral exercise should help improve further. Suppose in future Thailand changes its mind & looks to build the Kra Canal India can now leverage its close friendship with them to dissuade them from doing as the Kra Canal will threaten India’s maritime security & primacy in the IOR.

After these meetings PM Modi headed to the Shangri-La Dialogue which is a security forum held annually by an independent think tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) attended by heads of states & military chiefs of 28 Asia-Pacific states. The keynote speaker this year was Indian PM Narendra Modi.

Modi in his keynote speech called the Indo-Pacific “a natural region” that stretches from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of America.  He mentioned that Indo-Pacific “stands for a free, open, inclusive region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity. India’s own engagement in the Indo-Pacific Region — from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas — will be inclusive.”

In an oblique shot at China he said “We should all have equal access as a right under international law to the use of common spaces on sea and in the air that would require freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law. When we all agree to live by that code, our sea lanes will be pathways to prosperity and corridors of peace”. There was also implicit criticism of China’s OBOR program when Modi said “We understand the benefits of connectivity. There are many connectivity initiatives in the region. If these have to succeed, we must not only build infrastructure, we must also build bridges of trust. And for that, these initiatives must be based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, consultation, good governance, transparency, viability and sustainability. They must empower nations, not place them under impossible debt burden. They must promote trade, not strategic competition. On these principles, we are prepared to work with everyone.” He did put in a few good words to balance the criticism of China by saying “No other relationship of India has as many layers as our relations with China. We are the world’s two most populous countries and among the fastest growing major economies. Our cooperation is expanding. Trade is growing. And, we have displayed maturity and wisdom in managing issues and ensuring a peaceful border.” He included a personal reference to Chinese president Xi Jingping adding ”In April, a two-day informal Summit with President Xi helped us cement our understanding that strong and stable relations between our two nations are an important factor for global peace and progress. I firmly believe that, Asia and the world will have a better future when India and China work together in trust and confidence, sensitive to each other's interests.“

Regarding the United States he said “India’s global strategic partnership with the United States has overcome the hesitations of history and continues to deepen across the extraordinary breadth of our relationship. It has assumed new significance in the changing world. And, an important pillar of this partnership is our shared vision of an open, stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific Region.”

Regarding the feeling among ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members about being left out with the QUAD he tried to dispel this notion by stating “The ten countries of South East Asia connect the two great oceans in both the geographical and civilizational sense. Inclusiveness, openness and ASEAN centrality and unity, therefore, lie at the heart of the new Indo-Pacific. India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy or as a club of limited members. Southeast Asia is at its center. And, ASEAN has been and will be central to its future. That is the vision that will always guide India, as we seek to cooperate for architecture for peace and security in this region.” With the ASEAN states having doubts about the US commitment in the Pacific as the net security provider they were looking for India to play a bigger role. Earlier India was hesitant but now with its commitment of greater involvement as promised by PM Modi, this speech will surely be greatly welcomed by the ASEAN countries. The part about centrality of ASEAN to the Indo-Pacific would be music to the ears of the ASEAN leaders. This is to be seen as a part on the ongoing “AcT EAST” policy under the current government in New Delhi. This received a great boost earlier this year when all the 10 ASEAN heads of state were in New Delhi as chief guest for the India’s Republic Day parade. Simultaneously the acceptance of term “Indo-Pacific” in statements by both Indonesia this month & by Vietnam earlier this is year is significant as it now signals the acceptance of this term even by the ASEAN powers.

EPILOGUE:

The second meeting of this newly reborn Quad 2.0 came soon after the Shangri-La Dialogue. This time unlike the meeting in Nov. 2017 Japan included reference to “connectivity” in its statement while India did mention “maritime security” in its statement unlike last time. Disappointingly India still made no references to “freedom of navigation” unlike the other 3 QUAD members. This shows that while there are still differences of perception among the QUAD members they are gradually converging to similar set of principles. The steps taken so far have been more of “baby steps “ & much more needs to be done in future to get more tangible results.

Smaller nations need to be offered alternative financing to the Chinese “debt trap” model where these nations don’t end up handing over “dual use” facilities to the Chinese which can be used as Chinese military outposts in the future. During his visit to India in May 2017 Japanese’s PM Shinzo Abe & India PM Narendra Modi launched a vision document for setting up of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) – a collaborative vision between India and Japan to promote development, connectivity, and cooperation between Africa and Asia as part of a “liberal and value-based order.” The document stated that “The AAGC would consist of four main components: development and cooperation projects, quality infrastructure and institutional connectivity, capacity and skill enhancement and people-to-people partnerships. These four components are complementary to promote growth and all round development in both the continents.” This Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) is seen as counterbalance to the Chinese OBOR (One Belt One Road initiative. Japan under its “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” initiative, has pledged to spend $200 billion globally (including in Africa and the South Pacific) for infrastructure development. Japan developing the Matarbari port in Bangladesh, Trincomalee (along with India) in Sri Lanka & Dawei (along with Thailand) in Myanmar are examples of this infrastructure building outreach in the IOR. Just this week Abe committed to spend $50 billion to boost infrastructure investment in Asia. He said “funds will be available over the next three years. It is part of his strategy to strengthen cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region”. Once smaller nations realize the benefit from these infrastructure projects they will push back harder at the high interest “debt trap” financing type projects from China while moving towards India & other QUAD member’s sphere of influence. The other QUAD members especially India have to now put their money where their mouth is to make this alternate mechanism work for smaller countries. If India & others don’t their act together on the delivery front it will have disastrous consequences. These nations will instead turn to China for these infrastructure projects resulting in more countries falling into these “debt traps” & subsequently under Chinese influence.

There is a need to increase complexity & frequency of these military exercises among all of these like-minded nations. This will improve overall capabilities & inter-operability of various armed forces including learning of best practices. Nations can share intelligence & surveillance/reconnaissance data (if possible) especially on maritime domain awareness to keep an eye out on the Chinese activities in the region. Training of military personnel of smaller nations (especially when they use common platforms) should be increased to improve their defense capabilities. An example of this was the decision by India to train Sukhoi-30 pilots belonging to the Vietnamese Air force. Easy loans at nominal interest rates should be provided to facilitate military hardware sales to these smaller powers to build up their hard power. Knowledge transfer on weapon manufacturing will boost not only the recipient’s defense industries & economy but will also provide strategic benefits of self-reliance. Indian Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman this week inaugurated the first office of leading defense PSU Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) in Hanoi, Vietnam. BEL has set up its first Representative Office in Vietnam to address export business opportunities and to provide product support and services to users in the region. Since half of India’s trade passes through the SCS any conflict there would negatively impact India’s economy. For India to be considered a serious player in the Indo-Pacific it has to think seriously of committing some resources to the SCS to send a message to Beijing that if China can “play in India’s backyard” so can India play in theirs.  For next year’s MALABAR exercises unmindful of the Chinese response Australia needs to be invited to participate in these annual naval exercises. The US as the leading power in the world has to take up a more sustained program of pushback against unchecked Chinese military expansion in the South China Sea while also helping smaller nations to do so by building up their military capacities. This pushback against Chinese bellicosity might not have been possible earlier under previous US administrations who didn’t want to upset too much their cordial relations with China. Given the hard stance taken by Trump against China on trade matters this could be more possible now than ever before.

India’s trade with ASEAN at $72B (as of 2016) dwarfs in comparison to the $452 trade that ASEAN does with China. The 10 ASEAN countries with combined population of 640+ million & a combined GDP of $2.8T is a tremendous growth opportunity for India. I had earlier as part of a 3 part series on “The Great Game” between India & China covered the fillip given to regional connectivity projects by New Delhi. Projects such as the India Myanmar Thailand Trilateral Highway will help improve connectivity between India’s North East & ASEAN nations. This will help develop the North East while increasing trade with the ASEAN countries further strengthening the relations between all. India won’t be able to supplant China as the primary trading partner for ASEAN but chipping away at China’s lead is of paramount importance for India & also the other QUAD members. This will help to diversify ASEAN in its trading partners & reduce its overdependence on China for trade & exports. Most importantly the diversification of trade with other nations will make the ASEAN members less susceptible to economic coercion from China in times of political crisis.

China as per some reports has already the world’s biggest navy (in terms of number of surface vessels + submarines). This asymmetry with other nations is being further widened with its massive shipbuilding program which churns out new ships at an astonishing pace. Today Indian & US Navies have primacy in the Indian & Pacific Oceans respectively including technological and/or operational superiority. But in the future they risk ceding primacy to the PLAN due to the sheer number of naval vessels that China could deploy against its opponents. For e.g. Mohan Malik believes that China’s massive building program could allow them in the next 5 years to have a carrier battle group (CBG) permanently dedicated to the Indian Ocean. The strategic implications for India of a full-fledged Chinese CBG (let’s say based in Djibouti or Gwadar) would be enormous. For this new maritime strategy to succeed Indian Navy would require more resources at its disposal. Currently the India Navy has the smallest share of budget resources among the 3 armed forces which needs to be increased by to meet the maritime challenges in the Indo-Pacific. For India to become a “great power” issues related to defense acquisition, procurement & production need to be fixed otherwise India will continue to punch below her weight as a military power.

There are differences between the challenges, visions & capabilities of the various nations but they all share a common aim to create a combined mechanism against Chinese hegemony as no single country has either the political or the economic and possibly very soon military capital to stand up to China alone. In the future the balance of power in the world between the so called “Great Powers” US & China would not be simply dictated by their own relative strengths. The so called “middle powers” like QUAD members India, Australia & Japan & ASEAN regional powers like Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, etc. have an important part to play in the Great Power rivalry. These powers by aligning with the side which caters to their national interests can jointly shape the nature of the future global order. However only time will tell whether all of these steps which have been taken until now plus those which will be taken in the future by this new security architecture in the Indo-Pacific will succeed or not in countering the Chinese hegemony & aggression across the region.