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Jul 05, 2025
Ramaharitha Pusarla

The Tibetan Equation: Time for a Policy Overhaul

Considered as ‘Living Buddha’, the 14th Dalai Lama, has announced a succession plan on the eve of his 90th birthday, ending speculations over reincarnation and disbanding of the 600-year-old religious institution of Tibetan Buddhism. Bestow... wing the exclusive power to carry out the succession plan with the members of Gaden Phodrang Trust, the Dalai Lama has rejected Chinese legal jurisdiction and authority. He indicated that the next incarnation will be born in the ‘free world’ in regions not under Chinese rule. This has also put to rest decades of uncertainty about whether the Dalai Lama would reincarnate or emanate. Earlier, the Dalai Lama had signalled that he would choose not to reincarnate and be the last in the line of this tradition. He also indicated that he might pass on the mantle to someone of his choosing during his lifetime and not reincarnate. Besides profound spiritual significance, the announcement has been at the heart of complex geo-political conflict in the region. Born as Lhamo Thondup in the Amodo region of Tibet in 1935, identified as the Dalai Lama incarnate at the age of two, after the death of the 13th Dalai Lama in 1933, he was trained to become the next Dalai Lama. Conferred with the monastic name of Tenzin Gyatso, at the age of 15, he was enthroned as the spiritual and religious leader of Tibetans. Following China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950-51, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa and fled to India in 1959 and established the Tibetan government in exile or CTA (Central Tibetan Administration), in Dharamsala. In his recent book, published in March, “Voice of the Voiceless”, Dalai Lama wrote, “Since the purpose of a reincarnation is to carry on the work of the predecessor, the new Dalai Lama will be born in the free world”. It wouldn’t be a surprise if the Dalai Lama chooses to reincarnate in India, for he has lived in India for 66 years. The 4th Dalai Lama was born in Mongolia, and the 6th Dalai Lama was traced to the Tawang region of Arunachal Pradesh. After the Dalai Lama’s announcement, China insisted that the ‘Golden Urn method’ instituted by the Qing Dynasty would prevail. The Imperial Ordinance of 1793 (Better Governance of Tibet or the 29-article ordinance) of China prescribes the procedure for reincarnation of the Living Buddhas and subjects the selected candidate to the approval by Beijing. Acceding to the challenging times of the time, the ordinance was applied in the 11th, 12th Dalai Lamas and dispensed with in the 9th, 13th and 14th Dalai Lamas. China’s disapproval of the Dalai Lama’s succession plan is a painful reminder of its blatant interference in the religious matters of Tibetans. In 1995, just three days after the Dalai Lama recognised a six-year-old child reincarnate, born in Lhari County, Tibet, for the second-highest office of the 11th Panchen Lama, he was abducted along with his parents. His mysterious disappearance is still unresolved. Despite international pressure, Chinese authorities refuse to confirm his whereabouts. The Panchen Lama is historically tasked with identifying the Dalai Lama's reincarnation, and hence, the position assumes considerable significance. In 1996, China replaced the Panchen Lama with another boy whose parents were believed to be members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). China’s disapproval of the Dalai Lama’s succession plan has ascertained the prospect of Tibetans having two Dalai Lamas. Given the large population of the Tibetan exile community in India, the Tibetan question is both a foreign policy issue and a domestic affair as well. The bulk of Tibetan exiles, roughly 85,000 people, live in India. Beijing views India’s asylum of the Dalai Lama as a contentious issue. Considered as the potent symbol of non-violence, compassion and religious tolerance, his presence in India rankles China as this effectively undermines the legitimacy of Chinese claims to Tibet. Though he hasn’t alluded to independent status for Tibet, the Dalai Lama rejected China’s historical claims to Tibet by stating that ‘Chinese and Tibetan people have lived as neighbours’. He proposed a “Middle-way” approach of having a “genuine autonomy” while being a part of the PRC, frustrating Chinese dreams of reunification. Even though the CTA and Tibetan parliament have passed legislation on the “middle way solution” as a way to resolve the Sino-Tibetan issue, Tibetans haven’t forsaken the independence question. Thus, the Tibet question remains a vexatious issue for China. Getting to the heart of China’s discomfort with the Dalai Lama, Vijay Gokhale, former Indian ambassador to China, in his paper- “The Next Dalai Lama Preparing for Incarnation: Why It Matters to India?” writes that the CCP’s policy approaches the Tibet question through the lens of social stability and national security. Religion is antithetical to communism. As a natural consequence, the CCP is highly distrustful of the religious influence of the Dalai Lama over the Tibetan populace. China’s intolerance towards the Dalai Lama flows from the CCP’s inherent ideological intolerance towards religion and the disproportionate influence of the Dalai Lama on indigenous Tibetans despite over six decades of his absence from the original seat of Tibetan Buddhism, Potala Palace, Lhasa. He is revered as the embodiment of Tibetan identity, values and religious beliefs. Sadly, for Beijing, its military might and economic integration attempts have failed to erase the Dalai Lama from the collective memories of Tibetans. CCP considers the Dalai Lama a threat to social stability. After the two rounds of failed exploratory talks between the CCP and the Dalai Lama in 1982 and 1984, to build international pressure on China, the Dalai Lama has internationalised the Tibetan issue. Subsequently, the CCP, which is extremely irascible about its international image, labelled him a “splittist” and a “wolf in sheep’s clothing”. Additionally, burgeoning Western interest in the Tibetan question accentuated the CCP’s fears of religious institutions becoming conduits for foreign interference. CCP is keen on having a pliant Dalai Lama to bury the Tibetan question. The Dalai Lama’s rejection of Chinese authority on the reincarnation process has widened the existing discordance. PRC intends to quell the idea of the Dalai Lama to subdue Tibet into complete subservience. CCP believes Tibetan Buddhism has a potential destabilisation role and deems reincarnation as the cornerstone of the ‘securitisation’ of PRC. Notwithstanding several centuries of religious and cultural contacts with Tibet, India has meekly surrendered its customary rights in Tibetan territory after the Chinese invasion to avoid confrontation with the PRC. Even after ceding its extraterritorial privileges in 1954, thanks to India’s diplomatic pusillanimity, China invaded India in 1962. China acknowledges Indian influence on the Dalai Lama, but India refrained from overtly playing the ‘Tibet Card’ to avoid provoking Beijing. However, India permits the Tibetan exile community to practice and nurture their religion and culture. The CTA and the Tibetan parliament operate from India. India accords high respect to the Dalai Lama as the living legend of Tibetan Buddhism and allows foreign delegations to visit Dharmsala. “Tibet is China’s soft underbelly”, and the CCP, wary of this vulnerability, has steadily ratcheted up repressive legislative measures to obliterate its religious identity. Ushering in “Sinicisation” of Tibet, the CCP has introduced mandatory patriotic re-education for Tibetan monks and nuns and delegated CCP cadres to oversee the functioning of Buddhist monasteries in Tibet. It also approved and recognised 93 newly reincarnated Living Buddhas by 2022. While the CCP is systematically uprooting the basic foundations of Tibetan Buddhism, the institute blossomed in India. India is now the seat of Tibetan educational and cultural institutions. Despite sheltering the exiled Tibetan community, India never allowed any anti-Chinese activities on its territory. Indeed, India has been circumspect in dealing with the Dalai Lama and strictly upholds the three M’s- Mutual Respect, Mutual Sensitivities and Mutual Interests. Beijing considers all aspects related to Tibet as internal affairs and brooks no external interference. China expects India to unconditionally extend all assistance regarding Tibet, but wouldn’t extend similar reciprocity. Post- Article 370 abrogation, it backed Pakistan in internationalising the Kashmir issue. Clearly, China’s relentless anti-India campaigns, including the veto blocks at the UNSC, blatant violation of mutually agreed bilateral treaties, and continued incursions along the border, warrant a serious recalibration of India's approach. The growing list of China’s inimical unilateral anti-India actions, such as military help and intelligence support to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, withdrawal of Chinese technicians from Indian electronic manufacturing, stalling of rare earths and speciality fertilisers and infiltration of India’s military supply chains are now reaching a geopolitical inflexion point. Unlike India’s nuanced diplomacy, the US has swiftly and tactfully rechartered its Tibetan policy to align with its strategic interests. During World War II, the US never questioned China’s claims to Tibet but directed the Dalai Lama to disavow the Seventeenth Amendment after the 1950 Korean War. The CIA had assisted the Khampa Rebellion in East Tibet. After the failed rebellion, the US recognised the special status of Tibet and acknowledged its self-determination. In 1979, the Nixon administration adopted a hands-off approach to Tibet to establish diplomatic ties with China. By the late 1980s, the US Congress supported the Tibetan Buddhist cause, hosted the Dalai Lama at the White House and created a special coordinator for Tibetan affairs to oversee human rights issues of Tibetans By 2002, when US-China ties reached a new level, the US Congress passed the Tibetan Policy Act (TPA), making it a political agenda. In 2020, Trump signed the second piece of legislation, turning the Tibetan Policy and Support Act (TPSA) into a law. TPSA endorsed Tibetan rights to select their leaders and termed China’s interference in the reincarnation process as “blatant violation of the fundamental religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists”, and allowed the US administration to sanction CCP officials interfering with the identification and installation of the 15th Dalai Lama. The law mandated the special coordinator on Tibetan affairs to explore international coalitions to oppose Chinese efforts to select Tibetan Living Buddhas and protect Tibetan religious rights. Bolstering Tibetan policy, in 2024, Biden signed the third piece of legislation- the Resolve Tibet Act (Promotion of a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act), which asserted that the US government “has never taken a position that Tibet was a part of China since ancient times”. It specifically defined that the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) comprises Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan. Washington’s three-piece legislation, besides safeguarding the Tibetan Buddhist rights, can double up as a potent geopolitical tool against China’s grand reunification dream. The US has certainly played into Chinese fears of foreign interference. To ward off any external forces, Xi has tightened regulations on Tibetans and, to reassert China's legitimacy, started calling Tibet 'Xizang'. Eschewing the US administration's international coalition for the Tibetan question, India explicitly remained neutral to the US legislation on Tibet. Cognisant of the potential implications of the Tibet issue on India-China relations, New Delhi deliberately manages the Dalai Lama very cautiously. Reacting to the Dalai Lama’s succession plan, the MEA clarified, “The government of India does not take any position or speak on matters concerning beliefs and practices of faith and religion. The government has always upheld freedom of religion for all in India and will continue to do so”. However, in a significant departure, GoI will be represented by Ministers Kiren Rijiju, Rajeev Ranjan Singh, Chief Minister of Arunachal Pema Khandu, Chief Minister of Sikkim Prem Singh Tamang and Karnataka Minister Gangadaraiah at the 90th Birthday celebration of Dalai Lama on July 6th as a signal to China. As a vibrant democracy committed to upholding the religious rights of the persecuted community and their rights, India must now take a strong stance. As a home to a major chunk of Tibetan Buddhists, the reincarnation process and the interregnum period of identification of the 15th Dalai Lama can have significant security implications for India. India can leverage the exiled Tibetan community, but refrains from provoking China. But as Beijing continues to ruthlessly trample India’s ‘Red Lines’, it is time to recalibrate its Tibetan policy. References https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/dalai-lama-succession-plan-china-explained-13902303.html https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/11/the-next-dalai-lama-preparing-for-reincarnation-and-why-it-matters-to-india?lang=en https://orcasia.org/allfiles/ORCA-ISDP-Special-Issue_2023.pdf https://www.news18.com/opinion/global-watch-the-dalai-lama-at-90-a-spiritual-legacy-caught-between-faith-and-force-9417269.html more

Considered as ‘Living Buddha’, the 14th Dalai Lama, has announced a succession plan on the eve of his 90th birthday, ending speculations over reincarnation and disbanding of the 600-year-old religious institution of Tibetan Buddhism. Bestowing the exclusive power to carry out the succession plan with the members of Gaden Phodrang Trust, the Dalai Lama has rejected Chinese legal jurisdiction and authority. He indicated that the next incarnation will be born in the ‘free world’ in regions not under Chinese rule. This has also put to rest decades of uncertainty about whether the Dalai Lama would reincarnate or emanate. Earlier, the Dalai Lama had signalled that he would choose not to reincarnate and be the last in the line of this tradition. He also indicated that he might pass on the mantle to someone of his choosing during his lifetime and not reincarnate. Besides profound spiritual significance, the announcement has been at the heart of complex geo-political conflict in the region. Born as Lhamo Thondup in the Amodo region of Tibet in 1935, identified as the Dalai Lama incarnate at the age of two, after the death of the 13th Dalai Lama in 1933, he was trained to become the next Dalai Lama. Conferred with the monastic name of Tenzin Gyatso, at the age of 15, he was enthroned as the spiritual and religious leader of Tibetans. Following China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950-51, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa and fled to India in 1959 and established the Tibetan government in exile or CTA (Central Tibetan Administration), in Dharamsala. In his recent book, published in March, “Voice of the Voiceless”, Dalai Lama wrote, “Since the purpose of a reincarnation is to carry on the work of the predecessor, the new Dalai Lama will be born in the free world”. It wouldn’t be a surprise if the Dalai Lama chooses to reincarnate in India, for he has lived in India for 66 years. The 4th Dalai Lama was born in Mongolia, and the 6th Dalai Lama was traced to the Tawang region of Arunachal Pradesh. After the Dalai Lama’s announcement, China insisted that the ‘Golden Urn method’ instituted by the Qing Dynasty would prevail. The Imperial Ordinance of 1793 (Better Governance of Tibet or the 29-article ordinance) of China prescribes the procedure for reincarnation of the Living Buddhas and subjects the selected candidate to the approval by Beijing. Acceding to the challenging times of the time, the ordinance was applied in the 11th, 12th Dalai Lamas and dispensed with in the 9th, 13th and 14th Dalai Lamas. China’s disapproval of the Dalai Lama’s succession plan is a painful reminder of its blatant interference in the religious matters of Tibetans. In 1995, just three days after the Dalai Lama recognised a six-year-old child reincarnate, born in Lhari County, Tibet, for the second-highest office of the 11th Panchen Lama, he was abducted along with his parents. His mysterious disappearance is still unresolved. Despite international pressure, Chinese authorities refuse to confirm his whereabouts. The Panchen Lama is historically tasked with identifying the Dalai Lama's reincarnation, and hence, the position assumes considerable significance. In 1996, China replaced the Panchen Lama with another boy whose parents were believed to be members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). China’s disapproval of the Dalai Lama’s succession plan has ascertained the prospect of Tibetans having two Dalai Lamas. Given the large population of the Tibetan exile community in India, the Tibetan question is both a foreign policy issue and a domestic affair as well. The bulk of Tibetan exiles, roughly 85,000 people, live in India. Beijing views India’s asylum of the Dalai Lama as a contentious issue. Considered as the potent symbol of non-violence, compassion and religious tolerance, his presence in India rankles China as this effectively undermines the legitimacy of Chinese claims to Tibet. Though he hasn’t alluded to independent status for Tibet, the Dalai Lama rejected China’s historical claims to Tibet by stating that ‘Chinese and Tibetan people have lived as neighbours’. He proposed a “Middle-way” approach of having a “genuine autonomy” while being a part of the PRC, frustrating Chinese dreams of reunification. Even though the CTA and Tibetan parliament have passed legislation on the “middle way solution” as a way to resolve the Sino-Tibetan issue, Tibetans haven’t forsaken the independence question. Thus, the Tibet question remains a vexatious issue for China. Getting to the heart of China’s discomfort with the Dalai Lama, Vijay Gokhale, former Indian ambassador to China, in his paper- “The Next Dalai Lama Preparing for Incarnation: Why It Matters to India?” writes that the CCP’s policy approaches the Tibet question through the lens of social stability and national security. Religion is antithetical to communism. As a natural consequence, the CCP is highly distrustful of the religious influence of the Dalai Lama over the Tibetan populace. China’s intolerance towards the Dalai Lama flows from the CCP’s inherent ideological intolerance towards religion and the disproportionate influence of the Dalai Lama on indigenous Tibetans despite over six decades of his absence from the original seat of Tibetan Buddhism, Potala Palace, Lhasa. He is revered as the embodiment of Tibetan identity, values and religious beliefs. Sadly, for Beijing, its military might and economic integration attempts have failed to erase the Dalai Lama from the collective memories of Tibetans. CCP considers the Dalai Lama a threat to social stability. After the two rounds of failed exploratory talks between the CCP and the Dalai Lama in 1982 and 1984, to build international pressure on China, the Dalai Lama has internationalised the Tibetan issue. Subsequently, the CCP, which is extremely irascible about its international image, labelled him a “splittist” and a “wolf in sheep’s clothing”. Additionally, burgeoning Western interest in the Tibetan question accentuated the CCP’s fears of religious institutions becoming conduits for foreign interference. CCP is keen on having a pliant Dalai Lama to bury the Tibetan question. The Dalai Lama’s rejection of Chinese authority on the reincarnation process has widened the existing discordance. PRC intends to quell the idea of the Dalai Lama to subdue Tibet into complete subservience. CCP believes Tibetan Buddhism has a potential destabilisation role and deems reincarnation as the cornerstone of the ‘securitisation’ of PRC. Notwithstanding several centuries of religious and cultural contacts with Tibet, India has meekly surrendered its customary rights in Tibetan territory after the Chinese invasion to avoid confrontation with the PRC. Even after ceding its extraterritorial privileges in 1954, thanks to India’s diplomatic pusillanimity, China invaded India in 1962. China acknowledges Indian influence on the Dalai Lama, but India refrained from overtly playing the ‘Tibet Card’ to avoid provoking Beijing. However, India permits the Tibetan exile community to practice and nurture their religion and culture. The CTA and the Tibetan parliament operate from India. India accords high respect to the Dalai Lama as the living legend of Tibetan Buddhism and allows foreign delegations to visit Dharmsala. “Tibet is China’s soft underbelly”, and the CCP, wary of this vulnerability, has steadily ratcheted up repressive legislative measures to obliterate its religious identity. Ushering in “Sinicisation” of Tibet, the CCP has introduced mandatory patriotic re-education for Tibetan monks and nuns and delegated CCP cadres to oversee the functioning of Buddhist monasteries in Tibet. It also approved and recognised 93 newly reincarnated Living Buddhas by 2022. While the CCP is systematically uprooting the basic foundations of Tibetan Buddhism, the institute blossomed in India. India is now the seat of Tibetan educational and cultural institutions. Despite sheltering the exiled Tibetan community, India never allowed any anti-Chinese activities on its territory. Indeed, India has been circumspect in dealing with the Dalai Lama and strictly upholds the three M’s- Mutual Respect, Mutual Sensitivities and Mutual Interests. Beijing considers all aspects related to Tibet as internal affairs and brooks no external interference. China expects India to unconditionally extend all assistance regarding Tibet, but wouldn’t extend similar reciprocity. Post- Article 370 abrogation, it backed Pakistan in internationalising the Kashmir issue. Clearly, China’s relentless anti-India campaigns, including the veto blocks at the UNSC, blatant violation of mutually agreed bilateral treaties, and continued incursions along the border, warrant a serious recalibration of India's approach. The growing list of China’s inimical unilateral anti-India actions, such as military help and intelligence support to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, withdrawal of Chinese technicians from Indian electronic manufacturing, stalling of rare earths and speciality fertilisers and infiltration of India’s military supply chains are now reaching a geopolitical inflexion point. Unlike India’s nuanced diplomacy, the US has swiftly and tactfully rechartered its Tibetan policy to align with its strategic interests. During World War II, the US never questioned China’s claims to Tibet but directed the Dalai Lama to disavow the Seventeenth Amendment after the 1950 Korean War. The CIA had assisted the Khampa Rebellion in East Tibet. After the failed rebellion, the US recognised the special status of Tibet and acknowledged its self-determination. In 1979, the Nixon administration adopted a hands-off approach to Tibet to establish diplomatic ties with China. By the late 1980s, the US Congress supported the Tibetan Buddhist cause, hosted the Dalai Lama at the White House and created a special coordinator for Tibetan affairs to oversee human rights issues of Tibetans By 2002, when US-China ties reached a new level, the US Congress passed the Tibetan Policy Act (TPA), making it a political agenda. In 2020, Trump signed the second piece of legislation, turning the Tibetan Policy and Support Act (TPSA) into a law. TPSA endorsed Tibetan rights to select their leaders and termed China’s interference in the reincarnation process as “blatant violation of the fundamental religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists”, and allowed the US administration to sanction CCP officials interfering with the identification and installation of the 15th Dalai Lama. The law mandated the special coordinator on Tibetan affairs to explore international coalitions to oppose Chinese efforts to select Tibetan Living Buddhas and protect Tibetan religious rights. Bolstering Tibetan policy, in 2024, Biden signed the third piece of legislation- the Resolve Tibet Act (Promotion of a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act), which asserted that the US government “has never taken a position that Tibet was a part of China since ancient times”. It specifically defined that the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) comprises Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan. Washington’s three-piece legislation, besides safeguarding the Tibetan Buddhist rights, can double up as a potent geopolitical tool against China’s grand reunification dream. The US has certainly played into Chinese fears of foreign interference. To ward off any external forces, Xi has tightened regulations on Tibetans and, to reassert China's legitimacy, started calling Tibet 'Xizang'. Eschewing the US administration's international coalition for the Tibetan question, India explicitly remained neutral to the US legislation on Tibet. Cognisant of the potential implications of the Tibet issue on India-China relations, New Delhi deliberately manages the Dalai Lama very cautiously. Reacting to the Dalai Lama’s succession plan, the MEA clarified, “The government of India does not take any position or speak on matters concerning beliefs and practices of faith and religion. The government has always upheld freedom of religion for all in India and will continue to do so”. However, in a significant departure, GoI will be represented by Ministers Kiren Rijiju, Rajeev Ranjan Singh, Chief Minister of Arunachal Pema Khandu, Chief Minister of Sikkim Prem Singh Tamang and Karnataka Minister Gangadaraiah at the 90th Birthday celebration of Dalai Lama on July 6th as a signal to China. As a vibrant democracy committed to upholding the religious rights of the persecuted community and their rights, India must now take a strong stance. As a home to a major chunk of Tibetan Buddhists, the reincarnation process and the interregnum period of identification of the 15th Dalai Lama can have significant security implications for India. India can leverage the exiled Tibetan community, but refrains from provoking China. But as Beijing continues to ruthlessly trample India’s ‘Red Lines’, it is time to recalibrate its Tibetan policy. References https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/dalai-lama-succession-plan-china-explained-13902303.html https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/11/the-next-dalai-lama-preparing-for-reincarnation-and-why-it-matters-to-india?lang=en https://orcasia.org/allfiles/ORCA-ISDP-Special-Issue_2023.pdf https://www.news18.com/opinion/global-watch-the-dalai-lama-at-90-a-spiritual-legacy-caught-between-faith-and-force-9417269.html

Jul 04, 2025
Viren S Doshi

Elon Musk - The Other Side of 'The Rocket Man'

Elon Musk (Chief Executive Officer of Tesla, SpaceX and Chairman of X Corp) is a heady cocktail of visionary entrepreneurship, political lightning rod and geopolitical flashpoint. His typical American-looking business empire, particularly ... Tesla, Inc. and Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX), paradoxically thrives on deep ties with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-occupied China, leveraging the CCP's markets and supply chains for extraordinary growth. These connections, however, have sparked concerns about Musk’s reliance on CCP-controlled industries and potential national security risks, especially under the second Trump administration, led by Donald Trump (47th President of the United States), which has taken up cudgels against CCP-occupied China. The administration’s decision to relieve Musk from his role as co-head of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) and sever his access, preceded by Vivek Ramaswamy’s (Republican presidential primary contestant and biotech entrepreneur) smartly well-timed dissociation from Musk and DOGE, underscores the red lines. This report explores Musk’s operations in CCP-occupied China, their dependence on its supply chains, the Trump administration’s actions and Musk’s political journey and prospects; weaving a narrative of profit, influence, and geopolitical complexity. Musk’s Business Ventures, specifically about CCP-Occupied China Tesla Tesla Inc. is deeply integrated into CCP-occupied China. The Shanghai Gigafactory, Tesla’s largest manufacturing facility, produces over 50% of its global vehicle output (approximately 900,000 vehicles annually) and drives significant profits. Opened in 2019 as the first wholly foreign-owned automotive plant in CCP-occupied China, it received $1.4 billion in low-interest loans from CCP-occupied China's state-owned banks and a reduced 15% corporate tax rate (compared to the standard 25%) from 2019 to 2023, facilitated by Li Qiang (current Premier of CCP-occupied China), then Shanghai’s Communist Party Secretary. In February 2025, Tesla opened a second Shanghai factory for 10,000 Megapack batteries annually, its first such facility outside the United States. CCP-occupied China accounts for about 40% of Tesla’s global sales, making it the second-largest market. Tesla’s showroom in Xinjiang, a region tied to human rights abuses, has drawn criticism from Marco Rubio (current U.S. Secretary of State and acting National Security Adviser). Partnerships with CCP firms like Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL) for batteries and another CCP company, Baidu, for self-driving technology further embed Tesla in CCP-occupied China’s opaque ecosystem. Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) SpaceX is a major U.S. military contractor with $22 billion in federal contracts. While it lacks direct manufacturing in CCP-occupied China, reportedly, some records show investments in SpaceX from entities of CCP-occupied China via secret hubs like the Cayman Islands. Musk’s suggestion that Taiwan become a “special administrative zone” of CCP-occupied China lent credence to speculation that the CCP views him as a conduit for influencing U.S. policy on Taiwan and other issues. Other Ventures Musk’s other companies, The Boring Company and Neuralink, have minimal direct ties to CCP-occupied China. The social media platform X is blocked in CCP-occupied China, but its algorithms are still debated to have a hangover of its past leftist avatar. However, Tesla’s financial success in CCP-occupied China indirectly funds these ventures, forming the backbone of Musk’s wealth. Tesla's Dependence on CCP-Occupied China’s Supply Chains Tesla’s operations rely heavily on supply chains in CCP-occupied China, often described as monopolistic due to the CCP’s control over strategic industries. About 40% of Tesla’s battery supply chain comes from companies like CATL, which dominates global lithium-ion battery production through CCP subsidies and control over materials like lithium, cobalt, and graphite. The Shanghai Gigafactory’s nearly fully localised supply chain, designed to meet the CCP’s “generous” incentives, ties Tesla’s cost efficiency to CCP-controlled suppliers, making it vulnerable to disruptions or price manipulations that could give the CCP leverage over Musk. U.S.-CCP trade tensions, including a 10% tariff on imports from CCP-occupied China imposed by the Trump administration in February 2025, highlight Tesla’s exposure. While Tesla’s localised supply chain in CCP-occupied China may mitigate some tariff impacts, a broader U.S.-CCP economic decoupling could disrupt operations, given its reliance on CCP-controlled suppliers. Trump Administration’s Confrontation and Musk’s Removal from DOGE The Trump administration has confronted Musk with the background of his ties to CCP-occupied China, culminating in his removal from DOGE and loss of access to the administration. Key developments include- Vivek Ramaswamy’s Dissociation from Musk and DOGE: Vivek Ramaswamy, initially appointed to co-lead DOGE with Musk, distanced himself from both Musk and the initiative in January 2025 with his shift toward a gubernatorial bid in Ohio. But Vivek cited disagreements over Musk’s technology-based approach as against his legal legislative approach and reportedly also expressed concerns about his ties to CCP-occupied China, stating in a January 2025 interview, “The influence of (CCP-occupied China) Beijing on any leader with such extensive business interests there cannot be ignored.” Pentagon Briefing Incident: In March 2025, reports surfaced that Musk was slated for a Pentagon briefing on U.S. military plans regarding CCP-occupied China, raising concerns due to his business ties with the CCP. Trump cancelled the briefing, stating, “Elon has businesses in [CCP-occupied] China, and he would be susceptible, perhaps, to that,” signalling direct worry about Musk’s CCP connections. Musk’s Removal from DOGE: On May 29, 2025, Musk announced his departure from DOGE, citing the end of his 130-day term as a special government employee. A White House official confirmed his offboarding, severing his access to the administration. Public Feud: By June 2025, Trump and Musk’s relationship deteriorated to open spats. Musk criticised Trump’s “Big Beautiful Bill,” a tax and budget legislation, as deficit-increasing, prompting Trump to threaten to cut Musk’s government contracts. Musk countered that Trump’s 2024 victory relied on his $275–$300 million in campaign donations. The feud, coupled with concerns about Musk’s CCP ties, contributed to Musk's further isolation. Congressional Criticism: Lawmakers like John Moolenaar (current Republican Chairman of the House Select Committee on the CCP) and Raja Krishnamoorthi (current Democratic Ranking Member of the House Select Committee on the CCP) warned that the CCP viewed Musk as an asset to bypass China hawks like Rubio. Steve Bannon (former White House Chief Strategist) called Musk a “CCP puppet,” citing Tesla’s Shanghai operations as “100% controlled” by the CCP. Ron Wyden (current Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member) flagged Musk’s access to sensitive U.S. data via DOGE as a security risk. Jim McGovern (current U.S. Representative) accused Musk of prioritising CCP-occupied China’s interests during a December 2024 spending bill debate. Past Connections and CCP Meetings: Musk’s April 2024 meeting with Li Qiang to secure Tesla’s Full Self-Driving approvals, coinciding with CCP-occupied China’s approval of Tesla’s data security compliance, heightened concerns about his influenceability. To sum up, despite Musk’s significant campaign and consequent support for Trump, overshadowing CCP ties led to his removal from DOGE on May 29, 2025, leaving him without formal access to the administration. Is the CCP “Dead Against” Conservative Nationalist Trump? The CCP’s stance toward Trump, shaped by his trade policies, is reportedly hostile. Trump’s first term, marked by the “Wuhan virus” label and trade wars, set a confrontational tone. His second term’s tariff on imports from CCP-occupied China and appointments of CCP hawks like Rubio signal continued tension. Xi Jinping (current President of CCP-occupied China) has expressed disdain for U.S. policies, and diplomats have praised Musk while criticising Trump’s tariffs, suggesting the CCP now aims to leverage Musk to counter Trump’s conservative nationalist agenda. Musk’s Political Journey and Prospects Musk’s political evolution has been a heady cocktail of ambition, controversy, and faltering influence. Early Neutrality: Musk voted for Democrats like Hillary Clinton (2016) and Joe Biden (2020), aligning with progressive causes like climate change via Tesla. Shift to Conservatism: By 2024, Musk became the largest Republican donor, contributing $275–$300 million to Trump’s campaign and others through the America PAC. He campaigned for Trump and proposed DOGE, but his embrace of far-right causes, including support for Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party on one hand, with CCP ties on the other, drew criticism. Inauguration Gesture Controversy: On January 20, 2025, at Trump’s inauguration rally at Capital One Arena in Washington, D.C., Musk made gestures that sparked widespread controversy. After thanking the crowd for electing Trump, Musk slapped his right hand on his chest and extended his arm upward, palm down, repeating the gesture to the crowd behind him while saying, “My heart goes out to you.” Historians Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Claire Aubin labelled the gestures as Nazi or fascist salutes, citing their resemblance to the “Sieg Heil” gesture used in Nazi Germany. Democratic lawmakers like Jerry Nadler (current U.S. Representative) condemned the gesture as antisemitic, with Nadler stating on X, “This abhorrent gesture has no place in our society.” Far-right groups, including neo-Nazi leader Christopher Pohlhaus and Gab founder Andrew Torba, celebrated the gesture, with posts on Telegram calling it a “Hail Trump” moment. Musk dismissed the criticism but later posted Nazi-themed puns, escalating the controversy. In Germany, where such gestures are illegal, the gesture prompted investigations and outrage, with Die Zeit stating, “A Hitler salute is a Hitler salute.” The controversy, amplified by Musk’s AfD support and prior antisemitic posts (e.g. endorsing a 2023 claim that Jews hate white people), coupled with CCP ties, further damaged his public image, with only a 35% approval rating in April 2025. Future Prospects: As reported, Musk is exploring a new party for “moderate voters” to counter Trump; this becomes important against the backdrop of his CCP ties. However, his failure to secure a Wisconsin Supreme Court candidate despite spending a hefty $25 million and declining Tesla sales signal challenges. His wealth and X platform could sustain his influence, but the inauguration controversy and CCP ties complicate his prospects, potentially alienating moderates and conservatives. Musk’s Efforts and Results in India Musk’s engagement with India has been ambitious but limited: Tesla’s Market Entry: Musk met PM Narendra Modi in April 2024, announcing plans for a Tesla factory in Gujarat or Maharashtra. High import duties (up to 100% on electric vehicles) and India’s “Make in India” policy have stalled progress, with no factory groundbreaking as of July 2025, amid competition from Tata Motors. Starlink Expansion: Starlink registered in India in 2021 but faced delays over spectrum and security concerns. Conditional approval in 2025 has led to pilot projects in rural areas, but rollout remains limited. Outcomes: Musk’s tweet in June 2024 about a “significant investment” in India contrasts with slow progress, unlike his success in CCP-occupied China. Conclusion Elon Musk’s heady cocktail of innovation, controversy and geopolitical entanglement thrives on CCP-occupied China’s markets and supply chains, creating a web of profit and dependency that critics argue gives the CCP leverage over him. Trump administration’s removal of Musk from DOGE on May 29, 2025, severing his access, reflects concerns over his CCP ties, amplified by Ramaswamy’s January 2025 dissociation due to strategic disagreements and Musk’s CCP-occupied China connections. The CCP’s opposition to Trump’s policies is clear, yet its supposed strategic use of Musk raises concerns. Musk’s political shift from neutrality to conservative activism, punctuated by the January 2025 inauguration gesture controversy criticised as Nazi salutes, faces uncertainty post-DOGE, with his India ventures lagging behind CCP successes. As Musk refocuses on his businesses, his role in global geopolitics remains a flashpoint, balancing wealth with questions of loyalty and influence. more

Elon Musk (Chief Executive Officer of Tesla, SpaceX and Chairman of X Corp) is a heady cocktail of visionary entrepreneurship, political lightning rod and geopolitical flashpoint. His typical American-looking business empire, particularly Tesla, Inc. and Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX), paradoxically thrives on deep ties with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-occupied China, leveraging the CCP's markets and supply chains for extraordinary growth. These connections, however, have sparked concerns about Musk’s reliance on CCP-controlled industries and potential national security risks, especially under the second Trump administration, led by Donald Trump (47th President of the United States), which has taken up cudgels against CCP-occupied China. The administration’s decision to relieve Musk from his role as co-head of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) and sever his access, preceded by Vivek Ramaswamy’s (Republican presidential primary contestant and biotech entrepreneur) smartly well-timed dissociation from Musk and DOGE, underscores the red lines. This report explores Musk’s operations in CCP-occupied China, their dependence on its supply chains, the Trump administration’s actions and Musk’s political journey and prospects; weaving a narrative of profit, influence, and geopolitical complexity. Musk’s Business Ventures, specifically about CCP-Occupied China Tesla Tesla Inc. is deeply integrated into CCP-occupied China. The Shanghai Gigafactory, Tesla’s largest manufacturing facility, produces over 50% of its global vehicle output (approximately 900,000 vehicles annually) and drives significant profits. Opened in 2019 as the first wholly foreign-owned automotive plant in CCP-occupied China, it received $1.4 billion in low-interest loans from CCP-occupied China's state-owned banks and a reduced 15% corporate tax rate (compared to the standard 25%) from 2019 to 2023, facilitated by Li Qiang (current Premier of CCP-occupied China), then Shanghai’s Communist Party Secretary. In February 2025, Tesla opened a second Shanghai factory for 10,000 Megapack batteries annually, its first such facility outside the United States. CCP-occupied China accounts for about 40% of Tesla’s global sales, making it the second-largest market. Tesla’s showroom in Xinjiang, a region tied to human rights abuses, has drawn criticism from Marco Rubio (current U.S. Secretary of State and acting National Security Adviser). Partnerships with CCP firms like Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL) for batteries and another CCP company, Baidu, for self-driving technology further embed Tesla in CCP-occupied China’s opaque ecosystem. Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) SpaceX is a major U.S. military contractor with $22 billion in federal contracts. While it lacks direct manufacturing in CCP-occupied China, reportedly, some records show investments in SpaceX from entities of CCP-occupied China via secret hubs like the Cayman Islands. Musk’s suggestion that Taiwan become a “special administrative zone” of CCP-occupied China lent credence to speculation that the CCP views him as a conduit for influencing U.S. policy on Taiwan and other issues. Other Ventures Musk’s other companies, The Boring Company and Neuralink, have minimal direct ties to CCP-occupied China. The social media platform X is blocked in CCP-occupied China, but its algorithms are still debated to have a hangover of its past leftist avatar. However, Tesla’s financial success in CCP-occupied China indirectly funds these ventures, forming the backbone of Musk’s wealth. Tesla's Dependence on CCP-Occupied China’s Supply Chains Tesla’s operations rely heavily on supply chains in CCP-occupied China, often described as monopolistic due to the CCP’s control over strategic industries. About 40% of Tesla’s battery supply chain comes from companies like CATL, which dominates global lithium-ion battery production through CCP subsidies and control over materials like lithium, cobalt, and graphite. The Shanghai Gigafactory’s nearly fully localised supply chain, designed to meet the CCP’s “generous” incentives, ties Tesla’s cost efficiency to CCP-controlled suppliers, making it vulnerable to disruptions or price manipulations that could give the CCP leverage over Musk. U.S.-CCP trade tensions, including a 10% tariff on imports from CCP-occupied China imposed by the Trump administration in February 2025, highlight Tesla’s exposure. While Tesla’s localised supply chain in CCP-occupied China may mitigate some tariff impacts, a broader U.S.-CCP economic decoupling could disrupt operations, given its reliance on CCP-controlled suppliers. Trump Administration’s Confrontation and Musk’s Removal from DOGE The Trump administration has confronted Musk with the background of his ties to CCP-occupied China, culminating in his removal from DOGE and loss of access to the administration. Key developments include- Vivek Ramaswamy’s Dissociation from Musk and DOGE: Vivek Ramaswamy, initially appointed to co-lead DOGE with Musk, distanced himself from both Musk and the initiative in January 2025 with his shift toward a gubernatorial bid in Ohio. But Vivek cited disagreements over Musk’s technology-based approach as against his legal legislative approach and reportedly also expressed concerns about his ties to CCP-occupied China, stating in a January 2025 interview, “The influence of (CCP-occupied China) Beijing on any leader with such extensive business interests there cannot be ignored.” Pentagon Briefing Incident: In March 2025, reports surfaced that Musk was slated for a Pentagon briefing on U.S. military plans regarding CCP-occupied China, raising concerns due to his business ties with the CCP. Trump cancelled the briefing, stating, “Elon has businesses in [CCP-occupied] China, and he would be susceptible, perhaps, to that,” signalling direct worry about Musk’s CCP connections. Musk’s Removal from DOGE: On May 29, 2025, Musk announced his departure from DOGE, citing the end of his 130-day term as a special government employee. A White House official confirmed his offboarding, severing his access to the administration. Public Feud: By June 2025, Trump and Musk’s relationship deteriorated to open spats. Musk criticised Trump’s “Big Beautiful Bill,” a tax and budget legislation, as deficit-increasing, prompting Trump to threaten to cut Musk’s government contracts. Musk countered that Trump’s 2024 victory relied on his $275–$300 million in campaign donations. The feud, coupled with concerns about Musk’s CCP ties, contributed to Musk's further isolation. Congressional Criticism: Lawmakers like John Moolenaar (current Republican Chairman of the House Select Committee on the CCP) and Raja Krishnamoorthi (current Democratic Ranking Member of the House Select Committee on the CCP) warned that the CCP viewed Musk as an asset to bypass China hawks like Rubio. Steve Bannon (former White House Chief Strategist) called Musk a “CCP puppet,” citing Tesla’s Shanghai operations as “100% controlled” by the CCP. Ron Wyden (current Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member) flagged Musk’s access to sensitive U.S. data via DOGE as a security risk. Jim McGovern (current U.S. Representative) accused Musk of prioritising CCP-occupied China’s interests during a December 2024 spending bill debate. Past Connections and CCP Meetings: Musk’s April 2024 meeting with Li Qiang to secure Tesla’s Full Self-Driving approvals, coinciding with CCP-occupied China’s approval of Tesla’s data security compliance, heightened concerns about his influenceability. To sum up, despite Musk’s significant campaign and consequent support for Trump, overshadowing CCP ties led to his removal from DOGE on May 29, 2025, leaving him without formal access to the administration. Is the CCP “Dead Against” Conservative Nationalist Trump? The CCP’s stance toward Trump, shaped by his trade policies, is reportedly hostile. Trump’s first term, marked by the “Wuhan virus” label and trade wars, set a confrontational tone. His second term’s tariff on imports from CCP-occupied China and appointments of CCP hawks like Rubio signal continued tension. Xi Jinping (current President of CCP-occupied China) has expressed disdain for U.S. policies, and diplomats have praised Musk while criticising Trump’s tariffs, suggesting the CCP now aims to leverage Musk to counter Trump’s conservative nationalist agenda. Musk’s Political Journey and Prospects Musk’s political evolution has been a heady cocktail of ambition, controversy, and faltering influence. Early Neutrality: Musk voted for Democrats like Hillary Clinton (2016) and Joe Biden (2020), aligning with progressive causes like climate change via Tesla. Shift to Conservatism: By 2024, Musk became the largest Republican donor, contributing $275–$300 million to Trump’s campaign and others through the America PAC. He campaigned for Trump and proposed DOGE, but his embrace of far-right causes, including support for Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party on one hand, with CCP ties on the other, drew criticism. Inauguration Gesture Controversy: On January 20, 2025, at Trump’s inauguration rally at Capital One Arena in Washington, D.C., Musk made gestures that sparked widespread controversy. After thanking the crowd for electing Trump, Musk slapped his right hand on his chest and extended his arm upward, palm down, repeating the gesture to the crowd behind him while saying, “My heart goes out to you.” Historians Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Claire Aubin labelled the gestures as Nazi or fascist salutes, citing their resemblance to the “Sieg Heil” gesture used in Nazi Germany. Democratic lawmakers like Jerry Nadler (current U.S. Representative) condemned the gesture as antisemitic, with Nadler stating on X, “This abhorrent gesture has no place in our society.” Far-right groups, including neo-Nazi leader Christopher Pohlhaus and Gab founder Andrew Torba, celebrated the gesture, with posts on Telegram calling it a “Hail Trump” moment. Musk dismissed the criticism but later posted Nazi-themed puns, escalating the controversy. In Germany, where such gestures are illegal, the gesture prompted investigations and outrage, with Die Zeit stating, “A Hitler salute is a Hitler salute.” The controversy, amplified by Musk’s AfD support and prior antisemitic posts (e.g. endorsing a 2023 claim that Jews hate white people), coupled with CCP ties, further damaged his public image, with only a 35% approval rating in April 2025. Future Prospects: As reported, Musk is exploring a new party for “moderate voters” to counter Trump; this becomes important against the backdrop of his CCP ties. However, his failure to secure a Wisconsin Supreme Court candidate despite spending a hefty $25 million and declining Tesla sales signal challenges. His wealth and X platform could sustain his influence, but the inauguration controversy and CCP ties complicate his prospects, potentially alienating moderates and conservatives. Musk’s Efforts and Results in India Musk’s engagement with India has been ambitious but limited: Tesla’s Market Entry: Musk met PM Narendra Modi in April 2024, announcing plans for a Tesla factory in Gujarat or Maharashtra. High import duties (up to 100% on electric vehicles) and India’s “Make in India” policy have stalled progress, with no factory groundbreaking as of July 2025, amid competition from Tata Motors. Starlink Expansion: Starlink registered in India in 2021 but faced delays over spectrum and security concerns. Conditional approval in 2025 has led to pilot projects in rural areas, but rollout remains limited. Outcomes: Musk’s tweet in June 2024 about a “significant investment” in India contrasts with slow progress, unlike his success in CCP-occupied China. Conclusion Elon Musk’s heady cocktail of innovation, controversy and geopolitical entanglement thrives on CCP-occupied China’s markets and supply chains, creating a web of profit and dependency that critics argue gives the CCP leverage over him. Trump administration’s removal of Musk from DOGE on May 29, 2025, severing his access, reflects concerns over his CCP ties, amplified by Ramaswamy’s January 2025 dissociation due to strategic disagreements and Musk’s CCP-occupied China connections. The CCP’s opposition to Trump’s policies is clear, yet its supposed strategic use of Musk raises concerns. Musk’s political shift from neutrality to conservative activism, punctuated by the January 2025 inauguration gesture controversy criticised as Nazi salutes, faces uncertainty post-DOGE, with his India ventures lagging behind CCP successes. As Musk refocuses on his businesses, his role in global geopolitics remains a flashpoint, balancing wealth with questions of loyalty and influence.