It is estimated that China has 410 nuclear warheads at present. As per the international assessment, this figure is likely to go up to 1500 hundred warheads by 2035. That’s more than a triple jump in just a decade and represents a quantum increase. The country is also building more than 200 silos at multiple locations. In addition to silo-based ICBMs, China is building more road-mobile ICBMs, and strategic nuclear submarines and also increasing its air-delivered nuclear capabilities.

China possesses one of the world’s largest missile forces. Its land-based missiles which can carry nuclear warheads include variants of DF-4, DF-5, DF-21, DF-26, DF-31, and DF-41 ICBMs. In particular, the DF-41 is capable of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV). China is concentrating on longer-range, road-mobile, solid-fuel, quicker-launching missiles. Its nuclear submarine fleet normally carries the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The newer JL-3 SLBM with a potential range of 9,000 km could also be carried on its latest nuclear submarines.

China’s H-6 bomber and a potential future stealth bomber are both nuclear-capable. It also has air-launched land-attack cruise missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles with nuclear or dual-use capabilities. Overall, it has a robust second-strike ability which is being strengthened manifold. With the development and demonstration of a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle capability that can be nuclear-tipped, China has acquired an offensive edge that can no more be couched in mere reactive/defensive policies of “no first use”.

The Chinese are also investing heavily in space, cyber systems, communication networks, a nuclear recce surveillance system and a targeting philosophy as part of their system-based warfare. It will also do us well to understand that the Chinese have organised their nuclear forces into a Strategic Support Force with a clear line of command and control and integration with the CMC and apex leadership. The Chinese also have demonstrated ASAT capability to hit the enemy’s military satellites, which support their space-based ballistic missile defence systems. They are developing their own BMD in addition to the deception which Silos provide to increase the survivability of their nuclear forces. When seen holistically this expansion will transform China’s current nuclear arsenal into one of full spectrum capability including a fully operational triad.

Hitherto fore, China’s nuclear arsenal was a weapon of political choice with a declared “no first use” policy. It was accompanied by a stated capacity of minimum credible deterrence. However, as China has risen globally, it has an unstated nuclear policy that it has put into effect. It has become more ambiguous. The change is based on the threat it perceives from the USA and the need to seek parity as an emerging superpower. Till some time back it was believed that the Chinese lacked the technical ability to detect an incoming first strike.

Accordingly, it was felt that China does not have a “launch on tactical warning” or “launch on attack” capability. However, that seems to have changed. Recently during the 20 Party Congress Xi Jinping, stated China seeks to ‘establish a strong system of strategic deterrence’ and also called for a boost to ‘new-domain forces with new combat capabilities’. Very clearly the Chinese are developing an expanded nuclear capability to seek parity with USA and impose deterrence on it. Axiomatically, as China increases its nuclear arsenal, ostensibly against USA, the threat to India is inherent and also increases manifold. The asymmetry in capability is also changing equally fast. One needs to understand that as capabilities change intent can also change. Nuclear coercion to settle the Sino-Indian issues cannot be ruled out in the future.

In addition to the implicit threat from China, one cannot forget Pakistan. The latter might be down economically or be in one of its episodic bouts of chaos. However, Pakistan, its military, its intelligentsia, and its people are prepared to eat grass to expand their nuclear capabilities and are doing so despite being near bankrupt. One must also factor in that the Chinese have long used Pakistan as the catspaw to deal with India. Their iron brother status though rusted has a core of steel when it comes to collusivity against India. This is an additional factor in our nuclear calculations.

So, the question is, what does India do in these circumstances? Very clearly from the perspective of numbers alone, India will find itself outmatched. However, that is only half the problem. The force multiplication due to MIRVs, multiple silos, hypersonic capability and an effective triad in a networked mode puts the slightly dated Indian nuclear capability on the mat. The entire issue needs a rethink. At the outset, it must be mentioned that India still has 164 nuclear warheads with a triad capability in its nascent stage. There would be a networking capability to go along with it and we do have a nuclear command set up. However, there are a number of deficiencies in the structure. Some of our delivery systems and warheads could be of an older generation. Having said that there is a need to examine things de-novo in the light of Chinese nuclear expansion and come up with an appropriate response and a road map.

The first thing is that India should not get into a nuclear arms race with China cum Pakistan combine. However, that should not prevent us from expanding our arsenal, to the extent that we possess minimum credible deterrence against China and Pakistan in the new paradigm. We should take stock of issues involved and embark on a program of modernisation and right sizing our arsenal to achieve minimum credible deterrence.

Secondly, India must put in place adequate deception and safety measures that will ensure that our delivery systems and warheads sidestep any first strike and leave us with adequate capability for an assured second strike. A lot of this capability will stem from being able to monitor Chinese activity and gauge political temperatures. It will also mean that we need to have vectors that will be able to penetrate Chinese countermeasures. This means building up a strong space-based surveillance capability with adequate back-ups. It will have to be both active and passive in nature. The fundamental nature of our response and posturing will be political and hence we must eschew any loose talk of counterforce capability and stick to countervalue effects.

Operationalisation of a triad capability will be invaluable in our context. Expansion of the capability by developing underwater launch capacities will be invaluable. Fast-tracking MIRV and hypersonic capabilities must be given priority. In turn, this implies a closer degree of civil-military fusion of the entire command and execution chain. Rather than counting the number of warheads it would be more prudent to expand dual-use delivery systems including hypersonic systems. Very importantly, the government will have to generate interdepartmental and inter-ministerial synergies to ensure that desired outcomes are achieved in the correct time frames. If one has to put it in succinct terms, the need is to make our nuclear response ‘smart’ based on modern technologies.

In this process it is possible that we might have to do some more simulative testing to have better warheads of latest design. In this endeavour utilising AI-based simulation will be beneficial. In this connection we might have to take into account the sensitivities and the leeway our strategic partnerships afford us so that we do not end up with sanctions.

There is also a necessity to take a hard relook at our “no first use” policy. It is not set in stone. With our Western adversary openly professing the “right of first use” and our Northern adversary virtually abandoning “no first use” it will be wise on our part to reassess our own policy. It needs to be tweaked in such a manner that our adversaries get the message. At the core, there must be a policy shift. Our nuclear programs are all based on “peaceful nuclear science” and its connected activities. The outlook is largely civilian in nature. Whilst this has served us well in the past, there is a requirement now to ensure that the weapons program stops being a poor second cousin on all counts. There is no doubt that the core nuclear science research can continue on its traditional path. However, aspects pertaining to modernisation, system integration, weaponization, deployment and operations go beyond the realm of civilians’ thinking and need to be addressed differently.

In summation, it can be said that India cannot wait and watch idly when China is openly increasing its nuclear arsenal and related capabilities. Whatever increment it does to counter the USA will prove to be an overmatch for India hereafter. In this connection, it is reiterated that India does not have to even endeavour to match China, weapon to weapon. However, India will have to resort to “smart” technologies to modernise our nuclear arsenal and make it more potent and diverse. If it involves incrementally increasing our numbers, so be it. The need to do so is here and now. We cannot afford to hesitate. A growing power like India should reserve the right to defend itself and her people in the best way it can.

Image source: Foreign Policy