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Mar 19, 2026
Dr. Vineet Singh & Dr. A. Adityanjee

The Great Indo-Canadian Tango: Canada’s soul-searching and Diplomatic Catharsis Beckons to New Possibilities

The Great Indo-Canadian Tango: Canada’s soul-searching and diplomatic catharsis beckons to new possibilities Introduction India and Canada are two democratic, pluralistic nations sharing common values such as vibrant democracy, rule of law, and freedom of speech and expression. This bilateral relationship is further strengthened by the large Indian diaspora, which is estimated at around 3.6 million in Canada. Theoretically, it appears that they could be natural allies; however, history does not support that assessment. Despite the shared foundations, relations between the two countries have experienced several periods of strain. The first major challenge emerged in 1974 when India conducted its first nuclear test, allegedly using plutonium derived from the Canadian-supplied reactor CIRUS, culminating in the test known as Smiling Buddha in May 1974. Canada suspended all cooperation and imposed harsh sanctions. Another major turning point was the bombing of Air India Flight 182 bombing in June 1985, by Sikh Canadian terrorists, leading to the deaths of more than 300 innocent victims. This created long-lasting tensions and mistrust. Canada failed to prosecute the terror perpetrators despite several exhortations by successive Indian administrations. India has consistently expressed concern about Canada's perceived tolerance of extremist and separatist activities related to the so-called Khalistan movement. Since the early 1980s, India has argued that some elements within the Sikh-Canadian community have provided financial and ideological support to separatist and terrorist groups in India. Relations improved somewhat during the tenure of former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, whose government maintained a more pragmatic engagement with India and developed a cordial working relationship with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. However, the election of Justin Trudeau in 2015 marked a shift in tone and optics. Trudeau’s government, influenced partly by domestic political considerations and Sikh diaspora politics, often found itself navigating a complex balance between civil liberties and security concerns raised by India. Trudeau, through much of his political career as the Prime Minister, needed the parliamentary support of the National Democratic Party (NDP) led by Jagmeet Singh for his political survival. Trudeau’s controversial visit to India in 2018 strained bilateral relations further as he was publicly hobnobbing with shady individuals who had serious charges in India as part of his vote-bank politics. This visit had minimal diplomatic engagements but extensive political tourism with many photo-ops in different Sikh shrines along with his whole family. Tensions escalated dramatically in 2023 when Trudeau publicly and on the floor of Canadian parliament alleged that Indian government agents may have been involved in the killing of Sikh-Canadian terrorist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Surrey, British Columbia. He claimed that he had “credible intelligence” obtained from the Five Eyes Alliance but refused to share that intelligence or the evidence with the Government of India. Background: The 2023 Allegation In 2023, Canada formally alleged that individuals linked to the Indian government may have been involved in the killing of Nijjar, who was wanted in India for terrorism charges. India strongly rejected the accusations, calling them politically motivated and accusing Canada of failing to curb separatist and terrorist activities directed against India by Sikh Canadian Khalistan supporters. This dispute quickly escalated into a major diplomatic crisis: There was a tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats from both countries and suspension of visa services. The Indian government told Canada to downsize its large diplomatic presence in New Delhi by declaring several Canadian diplomats persona non grata. Trudeau and his ministers behaved like a judge, jury, prosecutor and executioner combination in one go. The Trudeau government continued to throw public tantrums without further sharing of information, making threats of sanctions, and the case in Canadian courts did not go anywhere. Furthermore, Trudeau’s conduct in multilateral meetings was less than diplomatic. This whole sequence of events led to mutual distrust and suspicion. It resulted in the stalling of trade negotiations and diplomatic engagement. The Indian High Commission and diplomats were targeted and issued death threats. The killers of a late Indian Prime Minister were publicly eulogised. Open threats were made against the current Indian PM and other cabinet members. Sikh Canadian terror groups issued an ultimatum to Hindu Canadians and against Air India. The Canadian government refused to act, hiding behind the fig leaf of freedom of expression. The Canadian government arrogantly tried to play the US card and the “Five Eyes” card against India without sharing the so-called “credible intelligence”. Threats of international sanctions were made. Luckily, Trudeau’s political career was cut short by Donald Trump's electoral victory in November 2024 and his repeated humiliation of Trudeau as the Governor of the great 51st State of Canada. Trudeau’s frequent brandishing of the US card and flaunting the “Five Eyes” Alliance stopped following this predicament at the hands of the US President. The Carney Approach and the 2026 India Visit After assuming office, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney adopted a more pragmatic approach toward rebuilding relations with India. This was forced more by the downward trajectory of the Canada-US relationship. Canada became the target of vitriolic rhetoric from Donald Trump and was tariffed repeatedly. Canadian sovereignty was challenged by Trump, who did not back down from his desire to make Canada the 51st state of the US. Canada was losing its giant US market and needed market access elsewhere. Canada started to distance itself from its formerly close ally, the US, in various public platforms, most recently at the Munich Security Conference. There was an honest acknowledgement publicly by Carney that the so-called “Rules-Based-Order” post-World War II was a charade by the Western nations, and Canada was complicit in this neo-colonial order led by the US. Carney visited India from 27 February to 2 March 2026 with the objective of resetting bilateral ties. The visit focused on expanding cooperation in several areas, including trade and investment, energy and climate transition, technology and artificial intelligence, higher education and professional mobility. Bilateral trade between the two countries already exceeds $21 billion annually, and both sides are keen to revive negotiations toward a broader trade agreement. The visit was widely interpreted as a diplomatic effort to stabilise relations following the Nijjar controversy. Why Some Observers Say Canada Is “Backtracking” Some analysts argue that Canada appears to be softening its earlier stance for several reasons- Canadian officials have suggested they are not currently seeing any evidence of ongoing Indian government-linked violent activities in Canada. PM Carney has avoided repeating direct accusations publicly, instead emphasising the independence of the ongoing legal investigation. Diplomatic engagement has shifted toward multi-dimensional economic cooperation rather than public confrontation and neo-colonial power projection. These developments have created a perception that Canada is quietly stepping back from its earlier position as a US lackey trying to embarrass the Indian government at the behest of its southern Master, even though the investigation itself has not been officially withdrawn. Why the Shift Is Happening The change in tone appears to be driven largely by the contemporary geopolitical and geo-economic realities in the brave new world of the Trumpian Rogue-Led-Order that has substituted the previous Rules-Based-Order. Several factors are shaping this recalibration 1. Strategic importance of India- India is one of the fastest-growing major economies and a key partner in global supply chains. 2. Trade diversification- Canada is seeking to diversify its economic partnerships beyond heavy dependence on the United States. 3. Diaspora and education links- Canada hosts a large Indian diaspora and tens of thousands of Indian students annually, making stable relations important for both societies. 4. Economic pragmatism- Diplomatic confrontation was beginning to harm trade, business partnerships, and visa flows between the two countries. Conclusions Canada has not formally withdrawn Trudeau’s allegations related to the Nijjar killing. However, the formerly accusatory tone of its diplomatic engagement with India has clearly softened. Under Prime Minister Mark Carney, Canada appears to be pursuing a pragmatic strategy aimed at repairing bilateral economic, strategic and diplomatic relations while allowing legal investigations to proceed independently. There is growing recognition that the dispute cannot be allowed to permanently damage relations with India, the world’s most populous country and one of the fastest-growing major economies. Balancing transient domestic vote-bank advantage against the possibility of long-term strategic and economic cooperation with a rising behemoth is likely to define the next phase of India–Canada relations. Canada has taken an initiative in introspecting on its diplomatic follies and taken a new path in correcting course.

Mar 17, 2026
Dr. A. Adityanjee

The Hormuz Dilemma

Introduction We are in the third week of the regional war in the Persian Gulf involving Iran, Israel and the US but with collateral damage and attacks on the US military bases in almost all the Gulf countries, Iraq, Jordan and Türkiye. Israel’s attacks on Lebanon have made this war intractable. The price of Brent crude oil has spiked up from $72 per barrel to $102 per barrel in a short period of time. Very few oil tankers are being allowed to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s stated goal is to effect an increase in the price of Brent crude to $200 per barrel. Protection & Indemnity insurance clubs have cancelled the coverage for oil tankers and merchant ships. The captains of these Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) are reluctant to sail through the Strait of Hormuz owing to the possibility of mines exploding. The US President initially toyed with the idea of providing $20 billion from the US Federal Government for insurance coverage. For the last couple of days, he has tried to cobble together a coalition of the willing to escort the merchant vessels through the Strait of Hormuz without any success. He named seven or eight countries, including China, Japan, North Korea, UK, Australia, France, Germany and Switzerland. None of these countries has expressed any eagerness and has given polite, avoidant, but cautious responses. If this regional war continues for a longer period, as it has already entered an escalation dominance ladder, the Asian economies, namely, India, China, Japan, South Korea, Bangladesh, etc. will suffer heavily as they are not energy sufficient. In contrast, some of the Western economies like Canada, Norway, the UK and the US may not have that detrimental effect because they are net producers of hydrocarbons. Similarly, Indonesia and Malaysia are net exporters of hydrocarbons and will not have a significant impact on their economies in the long run. Meanwhile, the GCC countries face a serious shortage of vegetables, fruits and staple foods as the stocks are running low during the third week of the regional war. The Malacca Dilemma China has faced the Malacca dilemma for centuries, as the Strait of Malacca is a maritime chokepoint for Chinese oil imports and merchandise exports. China’s oil imports pass through two maritime chokepoints, the Strait of Hormuz, where 90% of Chinese crude oil imported from Iran and GCC countries originates, and the Strait of Malacca, from where it goes to the Chinese mainland. For the last two centuries, the Thai Royal family has toyed with the idea of building the Kra Canal to bypass the Strait of Malacca to allow merchant vessels to go directly from the Gulf of Thailand (East Coast of Thailand) to the Andaman Sea (West Coast of Thailand) by a canal dug across the Kra Isthmus in the Thai peninsula. However, the rugged mountainous terrain defies the engineering marvel. In the last couple of years, China and Thailand have toyed with the idea of a $28 billion land bridge traversing the Thai peninsula by train and roadways, carrying merchandise by dry containers. This solution is very cumbersome and requires labour-intensive loading and reloading of merchandise from merchant vessels to trucks and train wagons. The Hormuz Dilemma Western Europe, the US and the GCC countries have similarly dealt with the Hormuz dilemma since 1979 when the Islamic regime in Iran took over power and weaponised the transport of shipping vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. In September 2023, there was a proposal to provide an alternative multimodal trade route in the form of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic (IMEC) corridor. However, owing to a lack of political will in some countries, this proposal has not materialised concretely. Perhaps, with the shock therapy of closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the recent war, the thinking will change, and this project may materialise. Hormuz Bypass Canal Hence, one ponders over the idea of creating a Hormuz bypass canal in the Peninsular Oman and the UAE to link the Gulf of Oman with the Persian Gulf, totally bypassing the chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz. We have previous examples of enhancing trade connectivity and achieving significant gains in both time and economic efficiencies by creating manmade canals and waterways. The Suez Canal is a 120.1-mile-long (193.3-km) artificial sea-level waterway in Egypt, connecting the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. The Panama Canal is an artificial waterway approximately 51 miles (82 kilometers) long that connects the Atlantic Ocean (via the Caribbean Sea) and the Pacific Ocean. If one studies the regional maps and geography, there are several competing candidate routes for building a man-made waterway between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, cutting across the land while bypassing the maritime chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz. Channel 1 Proposed channel 1 is the shortest and the cheapest route for a putative candidate canal to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. The Musandam Peninsula is shared between Oman and the UAE. The peninsula lies to the south of the Strait of Hormuz, between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The Musandam peninsula is generally about 22 miles (35 km) wide. The mountains slope steeply seaward, forming an extremely rugged and rocky coast that makes Musandam a serious hazard for navigation. Some fjords are 10 miles long but not suitable for container ship movements. Possibly, a canal can be dug between Ras Al Khaymah on the West coast, connecting the Persian Gulf and Hisn Dibba on the east coast in the Gulf of Oman. The distance between Dibba Al-Hisn and Ras al-Khaimah is only 24 miles (38 kilometres). This manmade canal will avoid the maritime chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz but still will be within the reach of Iranian ballistic missiles and drones. Channel 2 The second proposed route is from Khawr Al Fakkan on the east, connecting the Gulf of Oman to Umm Al Qaywayn. The distance between Umm Al Quwain and Khawr Al Fakkan is 50.29 miles (80.93 km). This will double the cost of construction but will be a relatively safer route. Channel 3 The longest solution will be to dig a canal between Sharjah on the west coast of the Persian Gulf and Al Fujayrah on the East coast of the Gulf of Oman. This will be the safest route but also the most expensive. The distance between Al Fujayrah and Sharjah is 62.15 miles (100.02 km). Cost of Construction A geographical survey of these three proposed routes can give the most cost-efficient and strategically optimal engineering solution to the Hormuz dilemma. The cost of this engineering marvel could be shared by the six monarchies constituting the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Incidentally, Iran is not a member of the GCC. Once the Hormuz Bypass canal is operational, the transit fee paid by the VLCCs and the merchant ships will generate revenue for the investors forever in future, making it a very profitable venture. Sovereignty The sovereignty of the Hormuz bypass canal can be shared between the Sultanate of Oman and the Government of the United Arab Emirates. However, for operational issues, a multinational Board of Governors and Directors giving representation to all the investor countries can be created. The contract to manage the operations of this man-made canal can be awarded to a neutral and multi-aligned country that can manage diplomatic issues without ruffling the feathers of the regional countries. Conclusion An engineering solution to the Hormuz dilemma is possible but requires visionary planning, fiscal resources, and multi-state cooperation to avoid future weaponisation of merchant shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. We have discussed several solutions to this problem that may not be mutually exclusive. In other words, more than one solution may be effectuated to provide redundancies in connectivity to avoid future logjams in shipping goods and energy transport. Ultimately, it is left to the wisdom and the will of the countries representing the GCC whether they opt for any of these solutions.