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Apr 17, 2026
Sadhana Srivastava & Mukul Asher

India and New Zealand Must Focus on Achieving Positive Outcomes from the New Wave FTA

The Context India and New Zealand signed a new‑wave Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in December 2025 at a time of shifting geo‑economic and geo‑strategic dynamics, including the ongoing Gulf war, which is reshaping the global order. This has resulted in acute challenges in sustaining national resilience by securing markets, managing supply chains, widening technological and other options, and ensuring political support among policymakers and the population for pursuing growth-enhancing policies. The key outcome desired from the new wave FTAs is improvement in overall national resilience of the partners by carefully choosing specific complementary areas which can help fill the existing gaps in the areas noted below. A new wave FTAs involve not just merchandise trade, but also services trade (the World Trade Organisation has estimated that in 2025 services trade accounted for 27.8 percent of the total global trade of USD 35 trillion), investments, mobility clauses, technological aspects, and the orange economy which includes creative and cultural goods and services, involving both traditional knowledge and arts, including in health care, and technology-driven industries. For India, the share of services trade in total trade is around 47 per cent, highlighting the importance of including services trade in new wave trade agreements. With such specific outcomes sought from the partners, the size of the economy, per capita income, population size, global rankings in merchandise and services trade, and other aspects become less relevant than before, but trust and confidence among the partners and consistency in relationships, even as governments change, assume much greater importance. These can only be acquired gradually with experience in dealings with the partners. Such FTAs also require a more sustained focus on outcomes over the medium term from the stakeholders if the desired outcomes are to be attained. India and New Zealand: An Overview of Economy and Demography New Zealand has a far higher per capita income than India, USD 57,000 as compared to USD 13,000 in 2026 on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis. The PPP is a macroeconomic tool that compares the buying power of different countries’ currencies using a common “basket of goods1. However, as India has a much larger population than New Zealand, its overall GDP on a PPP basis in 2026 at USD 19.1 trillion far exceeds that of New Zealand (USD 0.3 trillion)1. India has been growing at about three times faster than New Zealand in recent years, and this trend is expected to sustain for some more years. IMF’s April 2026 GDP projection is for India to grow at 6.5 per cent in 2026, the corresponding growth rate for New Zealand being 2.2 per cent. If this trend continues, the gap between the two in per capita income can be expected to narrow over time. India’s total trade is also much larger than that of New Zealand, and is much more diversified. Annual international trade in goods and services of New Zealand is around USD 100 billion, while the corresponding figure for India is around USD 1800 billion. India remains a major global trader driven by its manufacturing and services exports, while New Zealand's trade is characterised by a high-value niche products in agriculture, education services, and tourism. India currently ranks 5th globally in digitally delivered services, trailing only the US, UK, Ireland, and Germany. In contrast, for New Zealand, while its tech sector (Software as a Service (SaaS) and gaming) is growing rapidly, it remains a smaller player globally. Key Provision of the New Wave India-New Zealand Agreement Merchandise Trade: The New Zealand government has summarised the FTA provisions for Merchandise trade as follows: “The Trade in Goods chapter provides the basis for the liberalisation of customs duties. The chapter text provides a mechanism for the Parties to consider accelerating, or broadening the scope of liberalisation set out in the annexed tariff schedules. It contains key provisions common across many FTAs, including incorporating key WTO provisions relating to national treatment, administrative fees and formalities, customs valuations, import and export restrictions, import licensing, and non-tariff measures. It also provides for duty-free temporary admission of goods, of commercial samples, and goods that re-enter after repair or alteration, and reiterates the parties’ commitments not to apply agricultural export subsidies. The chapter also commits to sharing data on FTA preference utilisation and establishes contact points through which a Party can request detailed information and consultations relating to any measure it considers may materially affect trade in goods between the Parties, with a view to resolving any concerns about the measure…The FTA will also help reduce transaction costs of conducting bilateral trade.”2 The FTA addresses India’s critical need to improve productivity in agriculture, an area where New Zealand is globally competitive. The FTA includes the " Agriculture Productivity Partnership”, designed to drive cooperation activities across multiple sectors. A Committee on Economic Cooperation and Technical Assistance has also been created to accelerate cooperation in non-agricultural areas”. Services Trade and Investment Commitments Two key outcomes are of economic and strategic significance for both countries. First, in the FTA, MFN (Most Favoured Nation) access has been provided to over 100 services sectors from both countries. From India’s perspective, investments in agri-businesses, renewable energy, infrastructure, and digital technologies from New Zealand are of significance. Further, the FTA allows Indian service providers MFN access to 118 service sectors across 139 sub-sectors in New Zealand, including Computer Related Services, Professional Services, Audio Visual Services, Other Business Services, Telecommunication Services, Construction Services, Distribution Services, Education Services, Environmental Services, Financial Services, Tourism and Travel related Services. As noted, in India’s total global trade, services account for around 47 per cent of the total, nearly twice the global average. Service provisions in the FTA, therefore, bring much-needed balance and fairness to the FTA. An aspirational longer-term provision in the FTA is the USD $20 billion investment commitment by New Zealand private businesses over the next 15 years. A bespoke investment desk, like that for the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) countries, is expected to be set up by Invest India for this purpose. Invest India is the National Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agency of India, set up as a non-profit venture under the aegis of the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.3 Companies such as Zespri from New Zealand have been proactive, as indicated by them setting up a Kiwifruit Action Plan (KAP) launched as a flagship deliverable under the FTA, with the New Zealand Institute for Bioeconomy Science Ltd (BSI) and the New Zealand kiwifruit industry working alongside Indian kiwifruit growers in rural communities to support improved production and supply chain performance. This is just one example of how New Zealand investments in India can be mutually beneficial. The technological know-how of New Zealand companies could find mutually beneficial investment opportunities in other areas of horticulture and selected industrial goods. For realising investment commitments envisioned under the FTA, states, such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, and others, who are pursuing development-oriented policies and whose economies have complementarities with New Zealand, should take proactive initiatives with a medium-term focus. Labour Mobility Provisions: India’s demographic dividend and being one of the world’s fastest-growing economies mean a rapidly expanding supply of young, educated workers. The median age in India is around 28 years, while that of New Zealand is around 34 years. New Zealand is also likely to exhibit more rapid ageing than India. India’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR), which estimates the number of children an average woman is expected to produce, is around 2.0 (Replacement rate TFR is 2.15), while that of New Zealand is between 1.6 and 1.8. New Zealand’s net migration recorded a net gain of 14,200 in 2025, down from a net gain of 23,800 in 2024. The net migration gain in 2025 was the lowest for a calendar year since 2013 (excluding 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic).4 India’s population of around 1400 million is expected to continue to create a large pool of relatively young and increasingly skilled workers, driven by policy emphasis on the digital economy and start-up culture. For New Zealand, this demographic complementarity implies that India is well-suited as a long‑term economic partner in emerging areas of technology, and in the Orange Economy activities. The bilateral FTA provides new visa pathways for 5,000 skilled occupations and STEM graduates, which in turn could address skill shortages being experienced by New Zealand in many areas. The new visa quotas, specifically the Temporary Employment Entry (TEE) pathway, are designed to solve New Zealand's labour shortages while leveraging India’s surplus of high-tech and skilled human capital. The agreement moves away from "ad-hoc" immigration toward a predictable, quota-based system for Indian professionals. These include: Primary Quota: 5,000 visas available at any given time for skilled Indian professionals. Duration: Valid for a stay of up to 3 years. Annual Entry: Includes a provision for 1,667 new entries per year to maintain the 5,000-person cap. Working Holiday Scheme: An additional 1,000 slots per year for young Indians (aged 18–30) to work and travel, modelled after the Australia-India (ECTA) deal. The mobility provisions are also aimed at prioritising Service Liberalisation. India is the world's fifth-largest digital service exporter. The new visa rules allow Indian tech firms to send "On-site" consultants to Auckland and Wellington more easily. This will reduce compliance costs for Indian SaaS and IT firms. These will benefit Software engineers, cybersecurity experts, and data scientists from India. Furthermore, for the first time, New Zealand has created a specific sub-category for traditional Indian services, which were previously difficult to classify under standard work visas. These include: New Pathways for: AYUSH Practitioners (Ayurveda/Yoga), Indian Chefs, Music/Dance, and Yoga Teachers. This professionalises the "Wellness Tourism" and "Ethnic Food" sectors in New Zealand, directly boosting India’s soft power and service revenue. The above thus incorporates the Orange economy elements in the labour mobility clauses of the FTA. In addition, healthcare and education services also provided a fast-track entry for Nurses and Caregivers. This could help support New Zealand’s ageing population. In education services, a significant breakthrough is the removal of numerical caps on Indian students. STEM Graduates: get a 3-year post-study work visa, and PhD Scholars a 4-year post-study work visa. Guaranteed Work Rights for 20 hours per week during study, regardless of future policy changes, is also of economic significance. The "Pacific Gateway" Strategy India is using these visa quotas to establish New Zealand as its Oceania Service Hub by embedding 5,000 professionals in the NZ economy. Indian firms can more easily service the wider Pacific Island markets (Fiji, Samoa, etc.), where New Zealand has deep logistical and financial ties, thereby integrating into regional value chains. How ready is New Zealand to utilise this opportunity that presents in India? An early survey of 74 business respondents from Auckland suggests that there is increasing awareness of these opportunities, but dominance of export-led and distributor-based models suggests a preference for low-risk, low-control entry strategies by NZ in India. The state-specific knowledge seems limited largely to the NCR region, Mumbai, Pune, Bangalore, and Chennai. In the intangible economy, cross-border exchange depends less on how far countries are apart and more on political trust, security alignment, and institutional compatibility, including shared norms around governance, data, and the rule of law. As the FTA moves toward full ratification before the New Zealand elections in late 2026, the message is clear: Trade is no longer just about shipping containers but exchanging data, ideas, services, intellectual property, and collaborating across borders in advanced technologies. These flows are reconfiguring global trade relationships in the process. Effective implementation and utilisation of any trade agreements requires market knowledge and intelligence about specific niche opportunities. Comprehensive research around this within New Zealand, around the Indian economy, is therefore critical. The following represents a good summary of the India-New Zealand new wave FTA. “The FTA creates a rules-based, long-term economic partnership that enhances market certainty for exporters, service providers, and investors on both sides. … Beyond trade flows, the agreement integrates investment promotion, skilled mobility, regulatory cooperation, and MSME engagement – positioning it as a strategic commercial platform rather than a narrow tariff pact.”5 Both sides are strongly urged to establish key sectoral-level task forces to monitor utilisation rates of the FTA, and, where needed, to take corrective actions. References https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-per-capita/?source=imf&year=2026&metric=ppp&region=worldwide Accessed on 28 March 2026 https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-concluded-but-not-in-force/new-zealand-india-free-trade-agreement/key-outcomes Accessed on 15 April 2026 https://www.investindia.gov.in/ https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/net-migration-gain-of-14200/ Accessed on 15 April 2026 https://www.india-briefing.com/news/india-new-zealand-fta-business-trade-faqs-41527.html/ Accessed on 16 April 2026

Apr 17, 2026
Digital Nomad

The Evolution of K. Annamalai: From Disapproving Coalition to NDA Force Multiplier

The entry of K. Annamalai into the Tamil Nadu political arena represented a departure from traditional recruitment patterns. An engineering graduate from PSG College of Technology and an MBA holder from IIM Lucknow, Annamalai’s transition from a decorated career in the Indian Police Service to the presidency of the Tamil Nadu BJP was swift. His tenure leading up to the 2024 Lok Sabha elections was defined by an aggressive, high-visibility style of opposition, exemplified by his En Mann En Makkal yatra. Although he failed to make a mark in the 2024 election from Coimbatore, his performance cemented his role as the primary ideological challenger to the Dravidian establishment. Strategic Realignment and the Non-Contest Decision A significant recalibration of BJP tactics has marked the lead-up to the 2026 Assembly elections, as the high command pursued a broader alliance strategy that at times conflicted with the assertive brand of politics Annamalai cultivated. His decision not to contest the 2026 elections was framed as a pivot to act as a statewide campaign overseer, yet underlying this move was evident dissatisfaction regarding constituency allocation. Reports indicated that Annamalai was unhappy that the BJP was consulted on preferred seats only after the AIADMK had finalised arrangements with other allies, leaving the national party with geographical segments that limited its election prospects. His supporters expressed profound anguish, perceiving his exclusion from the candidate list as a tactical sidelining despite his willingness to contest from Coimbatore North or Tiruppur North. The Disciplined Karyakarta and the Campaign Trail Annamalai has publicly subordinated these personal grievances to the dictates of party discipline, articulating his role as a loyal karyakarta committed to the singular objective of securing victory for all NDA candidates. This pivot has manifested in a relentless, high-velocity campaign schedule that functions as a force multiplier across the state. His itinerary reveals an intense focus on the western belt and southern strongholds, frequently covering five to seven constituencies in a single day. A clear pattern emerges where he maintains a saturation presence in regions like Coimbatore, Madurai, and Erode, often transitioning from morning sessions in rural segments to late-evening rallies in urban centres. The scale of his meticulous coverage of a vast majority of the 234 assembly seats often outpaces the traditional campaign rhythm of other front-line leaders. While major figures like M.K. Stalin and Edappadi K. Palaniswami typically focus on broader regional rallies, Annamalai has adopted a granular approach, blanket-campaigning through specific neighbourhoods and villages to ensure the NDA's visibility. His preferred constituencies of Coimbatore North, Singanallur, and Kinathukadavu remain central to his logistics, with his programme ensuring multiple appearances in these segments during the critical final weeks of April 2026. His focused effort in the Kongu region suggests a tactical decision to weaponise his personal resonance in territories where the NDA requires a decisive breakthrough. By blanketing these specific geographies, he is not merely campaigning; he is physically anchoring the alliance’s presence in the most contested electoral theatres of the state. Structural Eloquence and Local Resonance The effectiveness of Annamalai’s 2026 campaign speeches lies in their unique structural composition and fearless delivery. Unlike the generic rhetoric often seen in state-level campaigning, his addresses are clinically prepared, blending sharp critiques of the DMK leadership with highly localised data points. He typically arrives prepared with the specific administrative lapses within a constituency, the antecedents of the rival INDI alliance candidate, and a detailed profile of the NDA candidate’s achievements. By weaving together the salient points of both the BJP and AIADMK manifestos while simultaneously highlighting the perceived failures of the incumbent administration, he creates a compelling narrative. This is often laced with a sharp, relatable humour and anecdotes to resonate with the public. Crucially, he concludes every address by explicitly naming and thanking every local leader from all alliance parties within that specific constituency. This ritual serves a dual strategic purpose: it ensures the logistical cohesion of the various alliance machineries and systematically endears him to the second and third level leadership across the entire NDA front. By publicly validating these grassroots workers, Annamalai is effectively building a personal loyalist base that transcends party lines, ensuring that the alliance operates as a singular force rather than a collection of disparate interests. This granular recognition acts as a powerful motivator for the cadre, as it transforms abstract state-level alliances into a tangible, shared mission at the booth level. Such a strategy not only mitigates the risk of internal friction during the high-pressure final phase of polling but also positions Annamalai as the unifying bridge for a post-2026 political landscape where regional and national interests must increasingly align. Reconciliation with the AIADMK Old Guard The most striking feature of the current campaign is the reception Annamalai has received from senior AIADMK leaders who were previously his most vocal critics. During a rally in Madurai West, Sellur Raju, who once engaged in bitter public spats with Annamalai, was seen praising his campaign energy and oratorical skills profusely. In the western heartland, Pollachi Jayaraman has proactively acknowledged the necessity of the alliance, marking a sharp departure from his earlier scepticism. In Coimbatore, the integration of Annamalai with the AIADMK machinery is particularly evident. Amman K. Arjunan has leveraged Annamalai’s presence to bolster the campaign in Coimbatore South. In Singanallur, K.R. Jayaram has coordinated closely with the former IPS officer, while P.R.G. Arunkumar in Goundampalayam and S.P. Velumani in Thondamuthur have similarly roped in Annamalai into their high-decibel campaign events. This pragmatic truce suggests that the 2026 contest has forced a reconciliation between the regional veterans and Annamalai, as both realise that their mutual survival depends on a unified offensive. A Force to Reckon With With only seven days remaining until the polling date, Annamalai has successfully transitioned from a controversial firebrand into a formidable political asset. Regardless of the final seat tally in this unpredictable election, his performance has established him as a force that cannot be ignored by either the central BJP leadership or the Dravidian majors. He has demonstrated an ability to command the public imagination and mobilise cadres across traditional party lines, cementing his place as a force to reckon with. The clinical reality is that Annamalai has achieved what few outsiders have managed in the history of the state: he has successfully inserted himself into the very marrow of the Dravidian political discourse. By subordinating his individual ego to the mechanical demands of the alliance while simultaneously outworking every veteran on the trail, he has rendered himself indispensable to the immediate survival of his partners and for the long-term ambitions of his party. Whether the arithmetic of the ballot box reflects it or not, the post-2026 political landscape will be defined not just by those who hold office, but by the shadow of a leader who proved he could lead from the streets as effectively as from the headquarters. Annamalai has not merely cemented his place as a force to be reckoned with; he has fundamentally rewritten the rules of political engagement in Tamil Nadu.

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India and New Zealand Must Focus on Achieving Positive Outcomes from the New Wave FTA

The Evolution of K. Annamalai: From Disapproving Coalition to NDA Force Multiplier

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