Will Fortress America Enable Communist China to Acquire the Republic of Taiwan?
- In Foreign Policy
- 12:27 AM, Jun 11, 2025
- Harsh Sinha & Dr. A. Adityanjee
The Shadow of Fortress America
The re-emergence of Fortress America under the Trump 2.0 administration in the 21st century is a posture of retrenchment and isolationism, and it is indeed beginning to reshape global security and deterrence architecture. While such parochialism rings true with domestic constituents weary of protracted foreign entanglements, its consequences appear more starkly in Northeast Asia, where the Republic of Taiwan becomes both a pillar of Indo-Pacific stability and a potential target of Chinese hegemonic expansion.
The more important concern is the possibility that America's gradual retreat from multilateral security obligations and its exclusive focus on mercantilism and dealmaking might create a permissive security environment for the increasingly belligerent Communist China to take unilateral action on its long-standing but legally unfounded claim over the Republic of Taiwan.
As Prof. Harsh V. Pant from the King’s College London warns, "Strategic hesitation from Washington at a time of Chinese consolidation signals opportunity to Beijing, not prudence." (ORF, 2021)
Why Does the Republic of Taiwan Matter?
The Republic of Taiwan is situated at the geographical centre of the First Island Chain, a strategic position for the containment of Chinese maritime expansion. Its geographical position gives it access to significant sea lanes, strategically significant maritime straits (like Taiwan Strait) and air routes vital to regional security and trade.
Apart from geography, the Republic of Taiwan dominates the world's semiconductor production, most importantly in cutting-edge chips for AI, military equipment, and economic infrastructure.
Renowned China scholar, Dr. Happymon Jacob notes, "Control over the Republic of Taiwan's chip industry would give China a critical edge in both the technological and military realms, and Washington knows it."(The Hindu, 2023)
In addition, the Republic of Taiwan's democratic system is an ideological check and antidote against China's authoritarian and dictatorial system. In the words of Dr. S. Jaishankar, who made this argument at the Munich Security Conference, "The Republic of Taiwan issue is not merely a bilateral matter rather it represents the contestation of values in Asia's future."(Business Standard, 2025)
Communist China’s Posture: From Strategic Ambiguity to Calculated Assertion
Communist China's intentions can no longer be read between the lines. The President of China has declared Taiwan's "reunification" as a historical mission, now as a near-term objective. The PLA's rapid buildup of its maritime presence, militarising the reclaimed islands and reefs, hypersonic missile deployments, and live-fire combat training exercises simulating blockades and decapitation attacks are methodical indicators of systematic preparation of a high tempo campaign.
At the same time, Communist China is increasing its non-military coercion. Cyberattacks, election interference, economic coercion, domestic lawfare and information warfare are modelled on the "Three Warfares" doctrine employed successfully in Hong Kong.
An American perceived strategic withdrawal from the region and lack of determination for strategic deterrence under the Trump 2.0 administration would encourage Beijing to try a fait accompli.
America’s Credibility Crisis:
America's own "strategic ambiguity" toward the Republic of Taiwan has long offered room for manoeuvre, but there are increasingly risks of being interpreted as strategic paralysis. But as Richard Haass and David Sacks argue, ambiguity now risks inviting miscalculations. “Strategic clarity,” they contend, is essential to restoring deterrence. (Foreign Affairs, 2021).
Past crises of this nature have considerably eroded U.S. credibility. For example, the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, public fatigue in Iraq, and isolationist rhetoric within the US Congress have led many scholars of Taipei to question Washington’s strategic reliability in this regard.
While the US has ambitious plans to develop a Golden Dome, space-based missile defence system to protect Fortress America, which will be operationalised by 2028, and has increased its defence budget to $ 1 trillion, it has no appetite for yet another foreign military war under the Trump 2.0 administration.
The concern is not without basis as it was visible that while India was undertaking Operation Sindoor, the American response was half-hearted and counterintuitive. With US approval, IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank loans to Pakistan continued to flow in regardless of allegations of diversion for military spending.
President Trump repeatedly took the credit for the bilaterally negotiated ceasefire and tom-toming his credentials as a dealmaker. He and people close to him made a cryptocurrency deal with Pakistan immediately after the cessation of hostilities under Operation Sindoor. America under the Trump 2.0 administration today suffers from a Diminished Giant Syndrome; its shadow looms large, but its grip is uncertain.
In contrast, President Biden’s administration had attempted reassurance in the Republic of Taiwan through arms sales, naval patrols, and deepening Quad cooperation. However, domestic fault lines and fiscal constraints continue to cast doubt on America's staying power, especially under the increasingly unpredictable Trump 2.0 administration.
Moreover, recent high-profile American visits to the Republic of Taiwan by Senator Tammy Duckworth (2025), Speaker Nancy Pelosi (2022), and Ambassador John Hennessey-Niland (2021) have attested to growing bipartisan support for the Republic of Taiwan but growing tensions with China. Pelosi's visit triggered unprecedented Chinese military drills, while Duckworth's and Hennessey-Niland's visits highlighted security and diplomatic outreach. These actions undermine the traditional U.S. policy of "strategic ambiguity," and concerns are growing that Washington's policy is shifting towards "strategic abdication" as threats in the region escalate.
During the recently concluded Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth on May 31st 2025, asserted, “any attempt by Communist China to conquer Taiwan by force would result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world. There's no reason to sugarcoat it. The threat China poses is real.”
However, simultaneously, he gave a mixed message to China when he said, “The United States, especially under President Trump, does not seek war. We do not seek to dominate or strangle China. To encircle or provoke. We do not seek regime change, nor will we instigate or disrespect a proud and historic culture.” This kind of empty rhetoric by the US will be perceived as an admission of weakness by the CCP, the PLA, along with Xi Jinping, who follow the classic Sun Tzu doctrine of winning the war without fighting any battle.
The credibility of U.S. assurances to the Republic of Taiwan is now in question. Very important question arises whether the increasingly mercantilist US under the Trump 2.0 administration will barter away the rights of the Republic of Taiwan in the process of making a trade deal with Communist China.
Thucydides Trap or Peaking Power Syndrome?
America's desire to contain China tends to remind us of most times of the Thucydides Trap and the inevitability of multi-frontal economic and technological war between the rising hegemon China and the reigning hegemon America. But China's actions are better explained by Michael Beckley's "Peaking Power" thesis.
In The Peril of Peaking Powers, Beckley posits that countries whose economic growth has begun to slow down after a high-speed rise tend to behave assertively to retain power.
"Peak powers," he explains, "are more likely to fight because they fear losing hard-won gains." Communist China's property bubble, demographic downturn, and high youth unemployment might be domestic causes of its outward belligerence, and the Republic of Taiwan is the most obvious target for deflecting attention from domestic problems.
Geostrategic Fallout for India and the Indo-Pacific
A Chinese takeover of the Republic of Taiwan would irreversibly alter Asia's balance of power. The so-called South China Sea could become a Chinese-dominated private economic corridor. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands would be surrounded, and the Indian Ocean Region could see more PLA-Navy activity.
India has every reason to be careful. India is currently a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region. With the 16th Lok Sabha Standing Committee on External Affairs, headed by the Honourable member of parliament Shashi Tharoor, sounding an alarm after Doklam, "China's policy of deliberate encirclement, supported by salami slicing, wolf warrior diplomacy, and deep pocket diplomacy, requires constant strategic vigilance."
Communist China's growing presence in Nepal, its reactions to Operation Sindoor, and its growing cyber presence in the Indian subcontinent, aka South Asia, need a comprehensive and multidimensional Indian response, which is not just military, but economic and diplomatic.
India does not have to be a junior partner of Communist China or a spectator tolerating the increasing belligerence of Communist China. Indian strategy can use coercion (danda), inducement (dama), persuasion (sama), and strategic division (bheda) to shape its surroundings or near abroad, according to pragmaticism offered in Kautilya’s Arthshastra and idealism highlighted in Kamandaka's Nitisara. There may be a thin line of balance between the optics of ‘Vasudhaiv Kutumbakam’, capability projection and indigenous technology demonstration, considering barriers and irritants like adhocism in policy leading to irrational exuberance of China and the U.S.
As the EAM Dr. Jaishankar explains, "Strategic autonomy is not about being neutral; it is about making decisions on the basis of national interest." India’s pragmatic engagement with the Republic of Taiwan through academia, semiconductor dialogue, and cultural and economic ties offers low-key but strategic insights for India.
The joint publication India and Taiwan: A Reality Check by the Chennai Centre for China Studies (C3S) and the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Center (TECC) highlights such avenues. (C3S, 2022)
Possible Scenarios:
Under the shadow of the American retrenchment, one or more of the following would probably be considered by China:
Scenario 1: Creeping Encroachment: Hybrid warfare, cyberattacks, and interference in offshore Taiwanese territories to provoke without provoking open war.
Scenario 2: Maritime Blockade: A de facto quarantine to cripple the economy of the Republic of Taiwan, prompting the West to act.
Scenario 3: Lightning Invasion: A rapid strike to decapitate Taiwanese leadership before allies react.
Scenario 4: Multi-Theatre Diversion: Simultaneous crises with Russia or Iran to stretch U.S. bandwidth while China plays.
All these options rest on one core thing: Washington's perceived strategic resolve.
Between Will and Withdrawal lies the key
Between Will and Withdrawal, Fortress America is not a policy shift. It's a test of Western resolve and the future viability of the post-World War II rules-based order. The Taiwan question is no longer a regional issue; it is a civilisational one that the world will follow tomorrow. The stakes are higher than sovereignty; they hang on the future of rules-based order and democratic pluralism.
When America fails, it is not merely the collapse of the Republic of Taiwan, but the collapse of the international democratic consensus over decades.
As James Mattis rightly said, "Deterrence is only credible if your opponent believes you will fight." India, in this new era, must tread a middle path of Omni Alignment and strategic autonomy i.e. a path that equilibrates pragmatism and principle, power and subtlety, and coalitions and independence.
References
- Beckley, Michael. "The Peril of Peaking Powers: Economic Slowdowns and Implications for China’s Next Decade." International Security, vol. 48, no. 1, 2023.
- Haass, Richard & Sacks, David. "The Growing Danger of U.S. Ambiguity on Taiwan." Foreign Affairs, December 2021.
- India and Taiwan: A Reality Check. Edited by Ambassador Charles Li. C3S & TECC, 2022.
- Jacob, Happymon. "Taiwan’s Importance for Global Technology and India’s Security." The Hindu, 2023.
- Jaishankar, S. Remarks at Munich Security Conference. Business Standard & The Tribune, February 2025.
- Pant, Harsh V. "Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific." Observer Research Foundation, 2021.
- Standing Committee on External Affairs. 16th Lok Sabha Report on China Policy.
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