Despite being world’s largest military, China’s People's Liberation Army (PLA) has retained much of its enigmatic nature and remains opaque. An unclassified document published by the Headquarters; US Army Department recently shed some light on the PLA's aura.

China's Communist Party (CCP) carefully reveals about the PLA to the rest of the world. According to that narrative, the PLA is a modern force for good, and its rise is inexorable and irresistible. China's neighbours, such as the Philippines, have already fallen for that portrayal.

The US Army released its "Chinese Tactics" document, coded ATP 7-100.3, last month. This comprehensive 252-page report assesses the structure, tactics, capability and limitations of the PLA in minute detail.

In its preamble, ATP 7-100.3 noted, “Territorial disputes across the Western Pacific and East Asia, aggressive cyber activities, uncooperative diplomacy, questionable trade practices and a horrendous human rights record all undermine the Chinese goal of being seen as a benevolent superpower.”

Appendices are listed in the following order- manoeuvre forces; fire support; air defence; aviation; engineer and chemical defence; networks and communications; and special operations.

As shown in the first appendix, the PLA's manoeuvre capabilities are primarily derived from its 73 combined-arms brigades and PLAAF airborne units, as well as its Marine Corps. During the PLA's unprecedented investment and modernization, "significant but decreasing numbers of older systems are expected to be fielded throughout frontline formations through 2035".

Chinese combined-arms brigades of three types- light (motorized), medium (mechanized) and heavy (armoured). Furthermore, the PLA has approximately 18 more reserve and militia divisions, although these have much lower readiness levels. The US Army assessed, "in just over 20 years, the PLA's manoeuvre capabilities evolved from a force mixture of light infantry conscripts and obsolete tanks to a nearly fully motorized and mechanized force that employs a variety of cutting-edge armoured vehicles and advanced guided munitions."

In fact, the CCP portrays in this way to the world, but the picture is incomplete. As the report stated, "a significant number of combined-arms brigades are still equipped with older systems, and they are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The manoeuvre force has also struggled with the complexities of the informationized battlefield and modern mechanized forces. The technical demands of the informationized soldier are far greater than for conscripts of past generations, and the maintenance and logistics demands of mechanized forces are much greater than those of light infantry forces."

The most significant advancement in PLA ground forces has been the development of expeditionary capabilities, primarily through the PLAN Marine Corps. "Despite these efforts, the PLA still cannot deploy or sustain a heavy mechanized force outside of shared land borders and its territorial waters, limiting the combat power of an expeditionary force."

"Chinese Tactics" next appendix addressed fire support, i.e., artillery. Incidentally, the PLA appears ready to roll out its newest and heaviest self-propelled howitzer (SPH), the PLZ-05B that boasts a 155mm gun. China's internet is flooded with photos of SPHs on truck transporters with ammunition resupply vehicles accompanying them.

The PLZ-05B uses a chassis consisting of seven road wheels per side, indicating it is a larger and heavier vehicle than preceding members of the PLZ-05 SPH family. The more spacious interior contains an estimated 60 rounds of 155mm ammunition, compared to just 30 in the PLZ-05. Eventually, every artillery brigade will receive this new SPH.

The PLA's newest artillery piece symbolizes its modernization. The US Army Headquarters said, "No other capability area within the PLA has received greater emphasis during the recent period of reform than fire support. In just over two decades, PLA fire support evolved from a collection of aging Soviet-derived equipment to a largely indigenous, sophisticated, widely varied and numerous collections of gun and rocket systems."

The next appendix examines ground-based air defence, which is used to counter shortfalls in joint air power. Mass and depth are key for Chinese air defence, with manoeuvre units protected by a layered network ranging from cannons through short-range, medium-range and long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAM), the latter owned by the PLAAF.

Next is the PLA's engineer and chemical defence capabilities. Modernized equipment and evolved tactics have been in place for a number of years, and frontline engineer units have been conducting extensive training exercises utilizing these new technologies," such as obstacle breaching, mine-clearing and fortification construction.

Importantly, "Integration between land, air, and naval assets is poor to non-existent - a major limitation in achieving an integrated joint force." Tactical units do not have advanced equipment such as troposcatter radios, so communication between them over long distances would be difficult.

Final appendix examines special operations forces (SOF), the best-trained of all Chinese ground forces. Each group army has an SOF brigade tailored to its region, though each focuses on conventional military operations such as special reconnaissance, sabotage, raids, deep targeting and search and rescue.

The report indicated "there are no PLA SOF units specially designed or equipped for long-distance expeditionary operations". Indeed, "Outside of operations in and around Chinese border areas and territorial waters, PLA SOF are generally domestically oriented." China's SOF units may be called upon to conduct foreign internal defence or unconventional warfare missions as the PLA becomes more expeditionary.

As coming from the US military, "Chinese Tactics" is authoritative. Despite its limitations, the report provides understanding into the PLA's current state, which is likely to help the US Army rehearse for a war that might one day be fought between the world's two greatest strategic competitors.

Image source: Los Angeles Times