U.S. and China hold first informal nuclear talks in 5 years, eyeing Taiwan
- In Reports
- 11:28 AM, Jun 21, 2024
- Myind Staff
The United States and China resumed semi-official nuclear arms talks in March for the first time in five years. According to two American delegates who were present, Beijing's representatives assured their U.S. counterparts that they would not employ atomic threats in relation to Taiwan. This reassurance came after U.S. officials expressed concerns that China might consider using or threatening to use nuclear weapons if confronted with potential defeat in a conflict over Taiwan.
"They told the U.S. side that they were absolutely convinced that they are able to prevail in a conventional fight over Taiwan without using nuclear weapons," said scholar David Santoro, the U.S. organiser of the Track Two talks, the details of which are being reported by Reuters for the first time.
Participants in Track Two talks typically include former officials and academics who can speak with authority about their government's positions, even if they are not directly involved in policy-setting (unlike Track One, which involves government-to-government negotiations). In the recent discussions held in a Shanghai hotel conference room over two days, Washington was represented by approximately six delegates, consisting of former officials and scholars.
Beijing dispatched a delegation of scholars and analysts to the talks, among whom were several former People's Liberation Army officers.
In response to Reuters' inquiries, a State Department spokesperson remarked that Track Two talks could potentially be advantageous. However, the spokesperson clarified that the department did not take part in the March meeting, although it was aware of its occurrence.
Such discussions cannot replace formal negotiations "that require participants to speak authoritatively on issues that are often highly compartmentalised within government circles," the spokesperson said.
Members of the Chinese delegation and representatives from Beijing's defence ministry did not respond to requests for comment. The informal discussions between the nuclear-armed powers occurred amidst significant disagreements over major economic and geopolitical matters. Leaders in Washington and Beijing have accused each other of acting in bad faith.
Track One talks on nuclear arms briefly resumed in November, but these negotiations have since stalled. A senior U.S. official publicly expressed frustration at China's lack of responsiveness in this regard.
The Pentagon, which estimates that Beijing's nuclear arsenal increased by more than 20% between 2021 and 2023, said in October that China "would also consider nuclear use to restore deterrence if a conventional military defeat in Taiwan" threatened CCP rule.
The Track Two talks are part of a two-decade-long dialogue on nuclear weapons and posture, which experienced a setback when funding was withdrawn by the Trump administration in 2019.
Following the COVID-19 pandemic, semi-official discussions resumed focusing on broader security and energy issues. However, it was the Shanghai meeting that specifically addressed nuclear weapons and posture in detail.
Nuclear policy analyst William Alberque from the Henry Stimson Centre think-tank, who was not directly involved in the March discussions, commented that Track Two negotiations were valuable during a period of tense U.S.-Chinese relations.
"It's important to continue talking with China with absolutely no expectations," he said, when nuclear arms are at issue.
The U.S. Department of Defense estimated last year that Beijing has 500 operational nuclear warheads and will probably field more than 1,000 by 2030.
In comparison, the U.S. and Russia have deployed 1,770 and 1,710 operational warheads, respectively. The Pentagon has indicated that by 2030, a significant portion of Beijing's weapons are expected to be maintained at higher readiness levels. Since 2020, China has been modernising its arsenal, including the commencement of production for its next-generation ballistic missile submarine, testing hypersonic glide vehicle warheads, and conducting regular patrols with nuclear-armed sea vessels. With weapons positioned on land, in the air, and at sea, China possesses a "nuclear triad," which is characteristic of a major nuclear power.
A focal point for the U.S. delegation, as stated by Santoro, was to ascertain whether China still adheres to its longstanding policies of no-first-use and minimal deterrence, which have been in place since the inception of its first nuclear bomb in the early 1960s.
Minimal deterrence refers to the strategy of maintaining only a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries. China, along with India, is one of two nuclear powers that have pledged not to initiate a nuclear conflict. Chinese military analysts have speculated that China's no-first-use policy may have conditions, suggesting that nuclear arms could potentially be used against countries supporting Taiwan. However, Beijing officially maintains its stated stance of no-first-use regarding nuclear weapons.
Santoro said the Chinese delegates told U.S. representatives that Beijing maintained these policies and that "we are not interested in reaching nuclear parity with you, let alone superiority."
"Nothing has changed, business as usual, you guys are exaggerating," Santoro said in summarising Beijing's position.
His account of the discussions was confirmed by fellow U.S. delegate Lyle Morris, a security scholar at the Asia Society Policy Institute. Santoro mentioned that a report on the discussions is being compiled for the U.S. government but will not be released to the public.
Top U.S. arms control official Bonnie Jenkins informed Congress in May that China had not responded to proposals aimed at reducing nuclear weapons risks, which Washington had raised during formal talks last year.
As of now, China has not agreed to additional government-to-government meetings on this matter.
Bejing's "refusal to substantively engage" in discussions over its nuclear build-up raises questions around its "already ambiguous stated "no-first-use" policy and its nuclear doctrine more broadly," the State Department spokesperson told Reuters.
China's Track Two delegation did not discuss specifics about Beijing's modernisation effort, Santoro and Morris said.
Alberque of the Henry Stimson Centre said that China relied heavily on "risk and opacity" to mitigate U.S. nuclear superiority and there was "no imperative" for Beijing to have constructive discussions.
According to Alberque, China's enhanced arsenal, encompassing anti-ship cruise missiles, bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarines, surpasses the requirements of a state advocating minimal deterrence and a no-first-use policy.
Morris indicated that Chinese discussions often centred on the "survivability" of Beijing's nuclear arsenal in the event of a preemptive strike.
The U.S. delegates stated that the Chinese portrayed their efforts as part of a modernisation programme aimed at deterrence, in response to advancements like enhanced U.S. missile defences, improved surveillance capabilities, and strengthened alliances. Last year, the U.S., Britain, and Australia signed an agreement to share nuclear submarine technology and develop a new class of submarines. Additionally, Washington is currently collaborating with Seoul to coordinate responses to potential nuclear threats.
Regarding U.S. policy on nuclear weapons, it includes the possibility of using them if deterrence fails, although the Pentagon emphasises that such a decision would only be considered in extremecircumstances. Specific details on this were not provided.
One Chinese delegate "pointed to studies that said Chinese nuclear weapons were still vulnerable to U.S. strikes - their second-strike capability was not enough", said Morris.
Image source: Economics Times
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