1. Introduction:

The year 2020 has witnessed significant developments in the field of space weaponization and militarization. The US created a new space command in 2020. The concept of space wars or star-wars is no longer a figment of imagination.  The outer space has already been militarized and weaponized. There have been vigorous strategic activities by three super-powers to maintain the military supremacy and edge in the space. Currently, there are no comprehensive international measures that prevent proliferation of space weapons except for one treaty that was signed in 1967. The new year brings early indicators that the race for space weaponization is not going to slow down. NATO became a strong player with recent announcement on Feb 4^th 2021 about creation of a new NATO center of excellence in military space in France. We are now witnessing the beginning of a new arms race in the outer space in the third millennium with the US, China, Russia and the NATO, all, beefing up their space military programs.

2.  Partial Test Ban Treaty, NPT and CTBT:

Partial test ban treaty was signed in 1963 and bans nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. It bans all nuclear testing except for those conducted underground. Both US and Russia conducted numerous atmospheric/space nuclear tests prior to the signing of the partial test ban treaty. China has neither signed, nor ratified this treaty. Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty (NPT) was negotiated and signed in 1967 and extended indefinitely in 1995. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signatures in September 1996 and has been signed by 185 countries and ratified by 169 countries. The treaty cannot enter into force until it is ratified by 44 specific nations, eight of which have yet to do so: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States. The US Senate had rejected the ratification of the CTBT in 1999. The United States and China are the only remaining NPT Nuclear Weapon States that have not ratified the CTBT.

3. Outer Space Treaty, PAROS, PPWT and NFP:

The Outer Space Treaty signed in 1967 bans placement of nuclear weapons in space but does not prohibit ground-based jammers and anti-satellite missiles (ASAT). A comprehensive, international, multi-lateral treaty is yet to be negotiated and signed for Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (Adityanjee 2008a, Adityanjee 2008b). A draft proposal for PAROS has been under discussions within the United Nations since 1982. Both Russia and China have pushed for signing such a treaty and have advanced their own draft for consideration in the United Nations in 2008. The Russians and Chinese proposed treaty entitled “Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects,” otherwise known as the PPWT. The proposed treaty defined space weapons somewhat narrowly to only apply to space-to-space and space-to-Earth weapons, both kinetic and non-kinetic. It would not prohibit Earth-to-space kinetic weapons or Earth-to-space non-kinetic forms of attack, which China and Russia both possess. A revised draft of PPWT was submitted in 2014. The US has consistently rejected signing of the proposed PAROS or PPWT treaty every year in the UN on the flimsy arguments that an arms race in outer space does not exist, and therefore, it is unnecessary to take action on the issue. The US also questions the definition of space weapons and physical verifiability of such a proposed treaty. The US does not wish to give its superiority and advantage in space weapons capability by capping it up as part of international treaty obligations analogous to the lack of ratification of the CTBT by the US senate.  The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has discussed ways to prevent weaponization of the outer space and has created multiple working groups. Russia has also submitted a proposal for “No First Placement” (NFP) initiative in which countries are expected to voluntarily agree not to be the first to place weapons in the outer space (Rajagopalan 2020), akin to the “No First Use” doctrines of India and China pertaining to nuclear Weapons (Adityanjee 2013).

4. Definition of Space Weapons:

There is no universally agreed definition of space weapons. What constitutes a space weapon was reviewed critically by Harrison (2020) who has attempted to create an exhaustive taxonomy of space weapons. In an excellent brief, Mehta (2020) summarizes the Harrison (2020) report as to what constitutes a space weapon.

The Harrison (2020) paper organizes space-based weapons into six categories, featuring kinetic and non-kinetic versions of Earth-to-space, space-to-space and space-to-Earth systems. Of those, three categories have been proven through testing, deployment or operational use

1. Earth-to-space kinetic: 

Physical systems launched from Earth, such as the anti-satellite missiles. Such weapons risk leaving behind fields of space debris, and they could be conventional or, in theory, nuclear warheads. The United States, Russia, China and India have shown such capability, with the U.S and Russia having performed nuclear tests in space in the 1960s.

2. Earth-to-space non-kinetic:

Jammers, laser dazzlers or cyberattacks launched from Earth, upward. The effects can vary wildly, but over-all the goal is to interfere, temporarily or permanently, with satellite capability. Many nations have this capability, including the US, Russia, China and Iran.

3. Space-to-space kinetic:

Satellites physically intercepting other satellites to disrupt or destroy them, or weapons put specifically in space for this purpose. Debris is once again an issue here, as is the potential for use of a nuclear weapon, which could have fallout on a number of systems. The former Soviet Union repeatedly tested co-orbital, kinetic anti-satellite weapons during the Cold War. There are allegations that Russia has done such tests as recently as 2020.

4. Space-to-space non-kinetic:

A satellite is placed into orbit and uses non-kinetic, high-powered microwaves, jammers or some other means to disrupt another space-based system. There are no open-source cases of such a system being used. France directly accused Russia of performing this kind of action in 2018, in what Paris described as an attempt to intercept military communications (Mehta 2020).

5. Space-to-Earth kinetic:

The ability to bombard a terrestrial target from space would give a true upper hand to whatever nation perfected it. Damage can be inflicted using the kinetic energy of the weapon itself (such as dropping a bunch of rods off a satellite and letting them build power during descent), or a warhead could be deployed on a reentry vehicle. The U.S. military has contemplated it in the past, but there are no open-source examples of such a system being tested.

6. Space-to-earth non-kinetic:

A system that could target down, whether through jamming of signals or through targeting spacecraft or ballistic missiles. The US has talked about a desire for space-based laser systems for missile defense, but there are no open-source examples of such a system being used.

Four of the six categories listed above involve weapons designed to attack satellites—commonly referred to as counterspace weapons. Not all counterspace weapons, however, are included in this framework. Weapons that are based on Earth and have effects on Earth are not considered space weapons under this framework, even if they may affect the ability to use space systems (Harrison 2020).  

5. Creation of US Space Force and US Space Command:

In December 2019, Trump created the US space force with a focus to protect US’s satellites and other space assets. The new US administration under Biden has ratified the decision to continue with the space command. US claims that both Russia and China already have separate space commands even before the creation of the US space command (Weeden and Sampson 2019).  The US action has already spurred the race for space weaponization and space militarization as there is no treaty at this time to prevent space weapons proliferation. The US space command has started working with a close-knit group of US allies and private companies. During the Trump administration, the re-vitalized National Space Council led by Vice President Mike Pence was prolific: issuing seven Space Policy Directives on issues ranging from commercial space traffic management (SPD-3) to protection of GPS (SPD-7).  The decision to locate the new U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) headquarters in Alabama by the outgoing administration has caused some rumblings in the US and the new administration has been asked to reopen, review and assure that this decision is rational (Nelson 2021). US Air Force Chief General Charles Brown tweeted on January 27, 2021, “Let me be clear, the U.S. Air Force is committed to providing Electromagnetic Spectrum [EMS] superior Air Forces to achieve victory in all domain competitions and conflicts (Haller & Pry, 2021).

6. Countries with ASAT Capabilities:

Currently there are four countries that have demonstrated ASAT kinetic kill capabilities. Both US and Russia (former Soviet Union) conducted multiple ASAT tests in the 1970s and 1980s and stopped doing such tests in 1990s.

US:

The US conducted its last ASAT test in 2008 following the Chinese ASAT test in 2007 although it criticized China for creating space debris. Though it was deceptively disguised as necessary safety measure to avoid damage to the earth by a lost and wayward ageing spying satellite (USA 193), it was de facto an ASAT test.

Russia:

Per US Space command, Russia conducted three ASAT weapon tests in the year 2020.  On April 15^th 2020 Russia tested a directed ascent antisatellite missile (ASAT) which did not involve the destruction of a satellite that could produce space debris (Kimball 2020). SPACECOM chief Gen. Jay Raymond commented: “Russia’s DA-ASAT test provides yet another example that the threats to U.S. and allied space systems are real, serious, and growing” (Cohen 2020). One of the anti-satellite missile tests done in low earth orbit by Russia in April 2020 is considered to be a “space torpedo”. Per US space Command, Russia conducted a non-destructive test of a space based anti-satellite weapon on July15^th 2020 when it injected a new object from Cosmos 2543, currently Satellite catalog number 45915 in spaceTrack.org (US Space Command 2020). Russia released this object in proximity to another Russian satellite which is similar to on-orbit activity conducted by Russia in 2017 and inconsistent with the system’s stated mission as an inspector satellite (US Space Command 2020). Per US space Commands report, on December 15^th 2020, Russia tested a space-based anti-satellite weapon in orbit (Rajagoplan 2020, Rej 2020). In February 2020, according to the US space command, two Russian COSMOS satellites “which behaved similar to previous Russian Satellites that exhibited characteristics of space weapons’, conducted maneuvers near a US government satellite that would be Interpreted as irresponsible and potentially threating in any domain (Rej 2020).

China:  

China’s space industry has been historically managed by the PLA like any other military asset. China conducted its first ASAT test in 2007. The Chinese test created nearly 800 debris fragments of size 10 centimeters or larger, nearly 40,000 debris fragments of a size between one and 10 centimeters and perhaps two million fragments of a size of one millimeter or larger in the space. Large pieces of space debris are expected to orbit the earth for years preventing other spacecraft from using same or similar orbits (Adityanjee 2008a).   The higher altitude of the Chinese test resulted in more than 3000 pieces of long-lived debris that will remain in the orbit for several decades (Weeden and Sampson 2019). Despite its rhetoric against militarization of the space, China has been building space weapons capacity- both ground-based and in space. China’s ASAT and other space weapons capabilities have been reviewed in depth earlier (Weeden, 2013, Weeden, 2014, Adityanjee, 2015). China is rapidly expanding its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), navigation and communication satellite constellations.  Space war and counter-space capabilities developed by China include kinetic kill missiles, ground based lasers, orbiting space robots and space surveillance systems. China is developing missiles and electromagnetic weapons that could target satellites in the low and high earth orbits. Electronic weapons like satellite jammers, cyber capabilities and directed energy weapons are also part of China’s space weapons program. Recently, China informally claimed that they roasted “Indian soldiers” in the Ladakh sector using electromagnetic waves making them sick. The novel “Area Denial” weapons which use microwaves avoided the use of the fire-power although the report was denied by India’s armed forces.

India:

Following China’s successful ASAT test in 2007, this analyst had exhorted India’s policy establishment and Indian government to follow suit (Adityanjee 2008a, Adityanjee 2008b) India finally conducted its first ASAT test in the low earth orbit in March 2019 as part of Mission Shakti. There were hostile and negative reactions to India’s ASAT demonstration by entities that are allied to the US government (Tellis 2019, Weeden and Sampson 2019). Criticism was made about production of space debris as a result of India’s direct ascent kinetic kill test (Weeden and Sampson 2019). However, this was denied by India. Considering the huge asymmetry between China’s counterspace capabilities, and India’s ASAT test, Tellis (2019) termed it as an incomplete success as India would not be able to sustain competition with China (Tellis 2019). India asserted that there had been no violation of the 1967 outer space treaty or any other agreement. “The Outer Space Treaty prohibits only weapons of mass destruction in outer space, not ordinary weapons” (Mitra 2019). The ministry of external affairs asserted that India has no intention of entering into an arms race in outer space (Mitra 2019). India, unlike US, China and Russia still does not have a separate space command. India’s defense space agency (DSA) was created in as late as 2018.

7. Countries with Space Weapons Programs:

Countries like Canada, France, Iran, Japan, North Korea and South Korea have extensive space weapons programs although these countries have not conducted ASAT tests. Everyone wants a space force; no one wants a war in the space.

The French city of Toulouse is to be NATO’s new center for excellence in military space. The decision was taken by NATO on Jan. 28 but was officially announced Feb. 4.Germany had also lobbied to host the center, which will be set up at the CST (Centre Spatial de Toulouse), which is also to be the headquarters of France’s Military Space Command, on the site of France’s national space studies center known as CNES. France has vociferously advocated creation of space command for that country.  And in 2019 issued a new space defense strategy.

Japan has also taken a more proactive approach to space defense, largely driven by threats it perceives from China’s space activities. In its 2019 defense white paper, the Japanese Ministry of Defense discusses various means of improving space control, such as bolstering its space situational awareness capabilities and passive defenses (Japan MOD 2019). Japan is also creating a Space Domain Mission Unit within the Air Self-Defense Force. Japan has contemplated whether or not to develop a co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) system using robotic arms, electronic attack, or cyberattack. According to the article, the former Abe government had concluded that such a co-orbital ASAT system would be within the principals enshrined in Japan’s 2008 Aerospace Basic Law (Japan MOD 2019).

8. Space and Commercial Interests:

The strategic focus of spacefaring states like the U.S, Russia, China, India and Japan is the Moon, and cislunar space (Goswami 2020). This growing focus on deep space, beyond orbital space, implies an expansion of the space economy from purely satellite information services of use to Earth, weaponization and militarization of space, to sectors that include space mining and manufacturing (Goswami 2020).  This race to the Moon and its resources is the beginning of a long-term strategic shift regarding the conception of outer space; from short term presence (flags and footprints) and mysterious awe, to long term habitats and familiarity. China has the most advanced lunar industrialization vision so far, operationalized, by a well-constructed strategy (Goswami 2020). In 2018, Russia announced its refocus on the Moon with resource extraction ambitions backed by a three phase base construction plan between 2025 and 2040 (Moscow times 2018). The competition for harvesting the natural resources from the celestial objects in the outer space opens a pandora’s box for legal issues and problems as well as international conflict.

9. Implications for India:

China and Russia are working synergistically in advancing their space capabilities. Cash-strapped Russia has been proliferating every type of technology to China which in turn proliferates to Pakistan to counter-balance India. There is an emerging RCP (Russia-China-Pakistan) axis that may lead to transfer of technology and deployment of space weapons by Pakistan. Russia has resumed direct weapons sale to Pakistan and joint military exercises are being conducted between Russia and Pakistan. Russia’s cozy relationship with India is under tremendous strain. India's 700 kg cartography satellite Cartosat-2F and Russia's 450 kg Kanopus-V remote sensing satellite had a near miss in the outer space on November 27th 2020, said Roscosmos, Russia's state space corporation (Business Standard 2020). Both the satellites were as close as 224 meters per Russian reports. However, Dr. Sivan, the ISRO chief reported that the distance was 420 meters (Kumar 2020). While Russian agency Roscosmos blamed India for this near miss, ISRO refused to comment upon the incident. We are not sure if this was part of Russian space weapons program as a similar incident happened earlier when the US blamed Russia for maneuvering a Russian satellite too close to a US satellite.

India burnt her strategic interests by not testing nuclear devices early enough despite having technological knowhow to join the NPT as a nuclear weapons state. As early as 2008, we suggested that India acquire the ASAT capabilities to avoid repeating the same mistakes (Adityanjee 2008, Adityanjee 2008).  India is in a uniquely unhelpful situation where it has no technological allies. US will not help India with advancing her military space capabilities. US has rapidly advanced its own space military capability and superiority by formally creating a new space force command, advancing the EMP superiority and encouraging NATO countries to improve on military space capability. Therefore, India is left to fend for herself. There is a need for upgrading the DSA into a formal and separate Space Force and Command. India’s needs to invest heavily into counterspace capabilities since India is committed to peaceful use of space for national advancement and development. India has helped in the peaceful development of the neighboring nations in the Indian subcontinent by gifting and launching a multi-dimensional “South Asia Satellite” (designated GSAT-9) in 2017 for communications, meteorology, tele-medicine, tele-education, banking and television broadcasting purposes. India has consistently supported the “No First Placement” initiative in the UN (Mitra 2019, Rajagopalan 2019). It is better to deter any attacks on Indian space assets by our adversaries from position of strength and have a massive retaliatory and second-strike capability directed at the adversary’s space assets. India needs to develop a formal “National Space Assets Policy and Posture” that needs to be upgraded every couple of years.

India has no choice but to develop her own space war deterrent capability as well as other offensive counter-space capabilities for second strikes if needed. With India’s burgeoning space program, the nation will also have to focus on commercial interests including harvesting of natural resources on her own strength. Meanwhile, India should continue to work for an international space war prevention treaty whether PAROS or PPWT or “NFP” or any similar proposal from the position of strength and as an equal participant and partner on the negotiating table.

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