Over the past eight years, China has constructed at least 22 villages and settlements within areas traditionally belonging to Bhutan. Since 2020, eight of these villages have been built near the strategic Doklam plateau, as revealed by satellite images.

Eight villages in Bhutan's western sector, near Doklam, are strategically positioned either in valleys or on ridges overlooking valleys claimed by China. Some of these villages are located close to Chinese military outposts or bases. The largest of the 22 observed villages, Jiwu, has been built on a traditional Bhutanese pastureland called Tshethangkha and is also in the western sector. The placement of these villages has worried China watchers in New Delhi, particularly because the Siliguri Corridor, also known as the "chicken's neck," is a narrow strip of land that connects the northeastern states to the mainland of India. The strengthening of the Chinese position in this strategic area could make it more vulnerable.

In 2017, Indian and Chinese troops faced off for 73 days in Doklam after India intervened to stop China from building a road and other facilities that would provide access to the southernmost part of the plateau. Although both sides pulled back their frontline troops after the standoff, satellite images in recent years have revealed increased Chinese construction activity near Doklam. India’s external affairs ministry has not responded to requests for comments on the situation. The presence of Chinese communities on Bhutanese soil has been denied by Bhutanese authorities in recent years. In 2023, former prime minister Lotay Tshering caused a stir when he stated to a Belgian journalist that the Chinese facilities "are not in Bhutan." 

Bhutan has not responded to questions about the issue. Since 2016, China has built 22 villages in areas considered part of Bhutan. This includes 2,284 residential units, housing nearly 7,000 people in previously uninhabited parts of Bhutan. The information comes from a recent report by Robert Barnett, a research associate at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). According to the article "Forceful Diplomacy: China's cross-border villages in Bhutan," China has seized roughly 825 sq km "that was formerly within Bhutan," making up little more than 2% of the nation's land. China has also moved an unknown number of officials, construction workers, border police and military personnel into these villages. All the villages are also linked by roads to Chinese towns.  

According to the report, three villages will soon be transformed into towns, and seven settlements have been constructed since the beginning of 2023, "signalling a marked increase in the speed and extent of construction in the annexed areas." Barnett mentioned in his report that China’s goal in Bhutan’s western region has been to take control of the Doklam plateau and nearby areas. Eight villages have been built in this region, forming a 36km line from north to south, with an average gap of 5.3km between each village. Historians say this area was handed over to Bhutan by Tibet’s ruler in 1913.

Ashok Kantha, a former Indian ambassador to China and now an honorary fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, stated that China building villages on Bhutanese land violates the 1998 agreement between the two countries, which aimed to maintain peace and harmony in border areas. "Agree to maintain peace and tranquillity in their border areas pending a final settlement of the boundary question, and to maintain status quo on the boundary as before March 1959," according to the China-Bhutan agreement. Additionally, it declares that neither party will "take any unilateral action to change the status quo of the boundary."

According to Kantha, these settlements were constructed in regions that, according to Bhutanese maps, were on the country's side of the traditional or customary border. “In 2017, there was a pullback from the standoff point [at Doklam] but the Chinese kept entrenching their presence in different ways – villages, road construction and patrolling. They are essentially creating a fait accompli,” he said. The villages, he said, are part of a pattern of China “changing facts on the ground incrementally and systematically”. This is similar to the pattern in the South China Sea, where China created artificial features and militarised them. “The Bhutanese are not in a position to challenge them because of the power asymmetry,” he said. “This is all part of China’s characteristic of pursuing its claims while disregarding past commitments and the position of other countries, and getting away with it,” Kantha said. “For us, it matters because it is in a sensitive area close to the Siliguri Corridor.”

According to Barnett, the Doklam problem is India's main concern in light of these developments.“But Bhutan, which is treaty-bound to respect India’s security interests, has said the Doklam issue will be decided on a trilateral basis, not by Bhutan. So, it seems very unlikely that any decision on Doklam would be made without India’s involvement,” he said.

“In the long term, the larger issue is whether China’s use of extreme pressure – or more precisely, force – will succeed in pushing Bhutan away from India’s sphere of influence and into that of Beijing. It now seems Bhutan has already had to give up significant territory to China, and that India was unable to help prevent that,” Barnett said.

“In the near future, it seems inevitable that Bhutan will have to allow China to open an embassy in Thimphu, leading to increased trade with China. So overall this issue between Chinese and Indian influence in Bhutan is going to be decided by which side can win over the Bhutanese people, and which can bring them real benefit,” he said.

Over the past four years, relations between India and China hit their lowest point since the 1962 border war due to a military standoff in the Ladakh region of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that began in April-May 2020. On October 21, both countries reached an agreement to disengage frontline forces at Demchok and Depsang, the last two “friction points” on the LAC. Two days later, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping met during a BRICS Summit in Russia and decided to restart several mechanisms to address the border issue and restore normal relations.