Introduction

Bangladesh, which became independent in 1971 due to the sacrifices of the Indian army, has been in turmoil since its liberation and has been afflicted with multiple military coups without a stable democracy. From time to time, Islamist forces and pro-Pakistan elements in this nation have tried to stage a comeback under the guise of various democratic alliances. These forces were kept in check by a more secular and left-of-centre Awami League government whenever it was in power.  Brief stints of military rule and the BNP and Jatiyo Party governments saw the rehabilitation of the Islamist forces in that nation. The most unfortunate geopolitical event that possibly led to the current situation was the lapse of the India-Bangladesh Mutual Friendship Treaty in 1997 by the Sheikh Hasina government.

Regimes Fall, Playgrounds Emerge

Historically, when regimes collapse, nations often transform into playgrounds of external geopolitical players, layered with domestic unrest and uproar. This doctrine is crucial to understanding the externally engineered fall of the Sheikh Hasina government in Bangladesh and the status of this debt-ridden nation now marked by growing anti-India rhetoric, hostile actions, and a resurgent Islamist fanaticism.

Bangladesh, once a relatively stable partner in the Indian Subcontinent under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League, now finds itself at the centre of a geopolitical storm. The deep state had its eyes focused on Bangladesh for a long time. Muhammad Yunus was groomed as a deep-state agent by the Clinton Foundation that aggressively promoted his Grameen Bank project. Successful lobbying resulted in a Nobel Peace Prize for Yunus, raising his international profile.

The “Minus Two” formula was supported by the deep state during the “1/11 changeover” in 2007, when the Bangladeshi military installed a caretaker government led by Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed. The political climate at that time was also fraught with corruption, partisan governance, and street-level violence between the Awami League and the BNP. Then caretaker government’s attempt to depoliticise governance led to the arrests of both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, the leaders of the two dominant political parties. This move was intended to pave the way for a new political order (perhaps led by a Western puppet Muhammad Yunus) by sidelining the “Two Begums”, whose rivalry had long dominated Bangladeshi politics.

The last year’s regime change, more aptly widely described as an externally sponsored “coup," and the installation of an interim puppet regime raise serious questions about external influence, internal instability, and the broader strategic implications for India and the region.

The ouster of the democratically elected Awami League government and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, coupled with Dhaka’s risky pro-China and pro-West experiments at the cost of regional stability, suggests that Bangladesh is no longer just another South Asian capital. Sheikh Hasina, while in power, had insinuated that a White man from a superpower had come and met her, demanding St. Martin's Island for a military base, which she had declined. Bangladesh has now become a de facto Deep State back office. Ignoring and failing to counter the growing anti-India rhetoric risks allowing it to gain international traction, undermining India’s strategic interests, especially in its North-Eastern region. The Yunus-led interim regime has not only failed to fill the vacuum but has deepened it. Furthermore, it has repeatedly delayed the promised national elections on one pretext or the other. It is not certain if ever free and fair elections would help in Bangladesh, as Muhammad Yunus is no longer in the mood to cede power.

Notably, in an earlier February 2024 brief, this present-day scenario was well predicted months before the coup and how it was increasingly important for India to have all possible options on the cards for a post-Hasina situation.

Anti-India Rhetoric: The ‘Caretaker’ mimicking as ‘Guardian of the Ocean’

A recent statement by the interim government’s Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus, urging Chinese aggression against India and branding Bangladesh as the "guardian of the ocean" may appear strategically foolish and geopolitically immature, but it cannot be dismissed at all. With Chinese aggression already witnessed in Arunachal Pradesh, India now risks a "double front": Islamist movements from Bangladesh infiltrating under the guise of locals, and China asserting military pressure on the other flank.

While recent global alignments have particularly brought India and China a notch closer (thanks to the mercurial and transactional presidency of Trump 2.0), New Delhi must remain wary of China’s inherently expansionist posture, even if it is more predictable than the erratic behaviour of Washington in recent years.

Since the coup, Bangladesh’s interim regime has appeared to surrender to the Islamist forces, as seen in attacks on Hindu and other minority communities, and in the pursuit to impose a ban on globally respected spiritual organisations like ISKCON, which had historically led humanitarian relief efforts during floods and natural disasters in the country. The persecution of the Hindu priest ‘Chinmoya Das’ and frequent violence against Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, Tribals, Chakmas, and Tiprasas, especially in Dhaka, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and Cox Bazar, stand as grim testimony to Bangladesh’s systemic hostility toward minorities.

Besides the US and China, there are other external players that are active in instigating anti-India forces in Bangladesh. Both the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Turkiye have deepened their military collaboration with the interim caretaker government. Pakistan’s foreign minister and deputy prime minister, Ishaq Dar, visited Dhaka on August 23, 2025. It was the first time in 13 years that such a senior Pakistani official had visited Bangladesh, which had broken from Pakistan 54 years ago. There are bilateral military delegation visits between Pakistan and Bangladesh, and Muhammad Yunus and Pakistan’s Sharif have already met twice, trying to re-engineer a comprehensive strategic partnership.  Turkey has consistently supported Pakistan and has also shown backing for Bangladesh, particularly regarding the so-called Rohingya refugee crisis. Recently, a Turkish delegation led by Haluk Gorgun, president of the Defence Industry Agency, met Muhammad Yunus and had high-level discussions on defence collaboration and procurement of military equipment such as Bayraktar TB-2 drones and TRG-300 rocket systems.

Government of India, meanwhile, has adopted a "wait, watch, and respond rather than overreact" strategy. On one hand, it granted refuge to Sheikh Hasina; on the other, Prime Minister Modi met Yunus during BIMSTEC in Bangkok, maintaining diplomatic neutrality. Yet, India has begun signalling displeasure by cutting off $700 million worth of imports from Bangladesh, worsening its already fragile, debt-burdened economy. Future governments of India may not have this luxury of a ‘wait and watch’ approach as the situation deteriorates and may be forced to intervene by sanitising and securing its eastern flanks of the Indian nation.

Finlandisation or Balkanisation: The Way Forward?

The term "Finlandisation" describes the influence exerted by a larger power on a smaller neighbour to ensure its alignment with the former’s security and foreign policy interests, without direct annexation. In Bangladesh’s case, Finlandisation could serve as a stabilising tool if India manages to prevent Dhaka from becoming a disruptive actor in the region.

However, given the deepening anti-India and anti-minority rhetoric, coupled with support from global lobbies, the spectre of "Balkanisation" also looms.

A pathway to Finlandisation would require strengthening the Awami League and facilitating its return to power, aided by public anger over Yunus’s misgovernance, India’s economic pressure, and strategic balancing to keep China at bay. A longer-term India-Bangladesh Mutual Friendship and Assistance Treaty, perhaps operational for more than one hundred years, will have to be negotiated with a friendly Bangladesh government to make this a permanent option and avoid future geopolitical surprises.

Perhaps, Bangladesh could be granted the status of “Protectorate” of India. This option would shield Bangladesh from pernicious external players, focus on economic prosperity, development and regional integration, avoid future military coups, and force a stable reset. Yet, even under favourable regimes, anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh remains deeply ingrained, driven by Islamist indoctrination. The vandalism of statues of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Rabindranath Tagore, the founder of Bangladesh and the composer of the National Anthem of Bangladesh, respectively, underscores how deep the rot runs.

Strictly geopolitically, the only other alternative remains Balkanisation of this transitional entity, which historically has been part of British India, Pakistan and independent into three parts:

1. Incorporation of Chittagong Hill Tracts, Cox Bazar, and minority-dominated areas into India’s North-East.
2. Creation of a small, friendly nation in Northern Bangladesh akin to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia and Southern Sudan’s independence from Sudan.
3. A reduced, radical rump of Bangladesh incapable of mounting a threat to India or the region.

While theoretically neat, this path risks international backlash, Western sanctions, and inevitably, war. Bangladesh’s military and economy cannot withstand such conflict, but external involvement could complicate the calculus. With Dhaka simultaneously courting Washington DC, Beijing, Istanbul and Islamabad, it risks being reduced to an impoverished battleground for superpower influence, especially given the mineral-rich proximity of Myanmar.

The Elephant’s Pick

Under Prime Minister Modi, New Delhi has opted for cautious neutrality, balancing relations with both China and the West, as seen during the SCO summit and the online skirmishes between Trump and India. Given the duplicitous record of the West and the expansionist nature of China, India has resisted choosing sides outright.

In this context, Balkanisation is risky although ideal. Any direct military intervention in Bangladesh risks antagonising Washington, DC and provoking Beijing, an unnecessary gamble that India is not comfortable with now.

In case of Finlandisation, India’s non-negotiables in this strategy would be:

1. Granting treaty-bound ally status to Bangladesh
2. Blocking Bangladesh’s tilt toward China by warming up ties with China itself.
3. Preventing illegal infiltration from Bangladesh into India with an iron fist, which could otherwise alter demographics and security dynamics.
4. Weakening and vaporising U.S. interest in Dhaka to reduce external meddling and support.

However, as the best-case scenarios only work well in theory, realistically speaking, India must forcefully:

1. Deal with illegal immigration into India with an iron-fist approach.
2. Identify illegal immigrants and deport them back to Bangladesh.
3. Strengthen military posts on the Eastern Flank.
4. Cut off trade ties with Bangladesh, crippling it economically. As of today, 3 ports are shut down
5. Reset the water-sharing Ganga treaty to promote Indian interests and deny concessions to Bangladesh.
6. Reset of major trade and resource-driven policies to cripple the economy.
7. Keep China at bay by warming up ties with Beijing through strategic cooperation.
8. Ensure that American interests in Dhaka gradually vaporise.
9. Publicise the human rights violations and anti-minority stance of the Yunus regime globally for the continuous acts of violence against minorities.
10. Deepen the network with pro-India parties and leaders in Bangladesh through financial assistance and moral support.

All of these interventions could lead to an internal unrest, protest, and domestic political reset and a comeback of an alternative government in Bangladesh, which could be managed into a Finlandisation option, given the survival needs of the country.

Strictly geopolitically and geographically speaking, according to certain experts, the Chittagong region can bolster India’s national security and North-East India’s economy, given the opening of the ocean, port, and trade access.  Perhaps reclaiming this region should also be an option on the cards in the near future. This option may not be optically appealing internationally; however, serious consideration should be given to bring lasting regional peace with ease. India must guard its strategic interests in its own backyard without being cowed down by the superpowers, pretenders of the Caliphate and Islamist players.

References:

1. India limits 42% of imports from Bangladesh, targeting $770 million in goods: GTRI
2. A month since Sheikh Hasina was forced out, Dhaka’s new rulers ask for ‘patience’
3. PM Modi meets Yunus
4. Condition of Minorities in Bangladesh
5. ISKCON Ban
6. '7 states of India are landlocked': Yunus says Bangladesh 'only guardian of ocean', invites China to make 'extension'