1. Introduction:

The Arctic region is home to almost four million inhabitants, of which approximately one-tenth are considered as indigenous people. The United States Geological Survey estimates that up to 25-30% of the world's remaining oil and natural gas resources might be held within the Arctic Region. Our academic interest in geo-political issues pertaining to the Arctic region has been there since we wrote for the first time in 2013 on China’s lust for the Arctic resources¹. The surreptitious and deceitful manner in which China was approaching the Arctic region while trying to obtain a physical toehold in that part of the world was highlighted during that earlier paper¹. In the same paper, we had predicted China’s intention to obtain military bases in Iceland and Greenland¹. Since 2013 when China successfully obtained the observer status in the Arctic Council, it has touted itself as a “near-Arctic state” in order to differentiate itself from other non-Arctic states ^{1, 2}. China released a White paper on its Arctic policy in 2018² startling not only the Arctic littoral states but also rest of the world. A recent draft document on India’s Arctic policy was released on January 5^th 2021 by the Ministry of External Affairs asking for public comments on the draft proposal by January 26^th 2021³. There has been some renewed interest and commentary on India’s role, scientific activities and putative policy towards the Arctic region^3-5.

One of the commentators justified India’s interest in the Arctic research because of her own climatic change concerns⁴. There is an intricate link between conditions in the Arctic and the monsoon and the Himalayan systems. Simultaneously, Rej articulates that China’s so-called White paper on Arctic has more pronounced geo-political assertions compared to the draft version released by India ^2,3,4. Rej minces no words while articulating: “In a characteristic display of monomania, China has also linked its involvement with the Arctic region to the “Belt and Road Initiative” and its subsidiary “Polar Silk Road” creating geo-political ripples ^2,4.  Navtej Sarna, a retired diplomat, has rightly highlighted the scientific fact that the polar icecap is shrinking fast and since 1980, the volume of the Arctic sea ice has declined as much as 75%⁵. While the northern sea route is likely to become ice-free by 2050, commercial/merchant shipping is possible even now during the summer⁵. 

We believe that besides climate change concerns, there are multiple and multi-dimensional reasons as to why India should coherently formulate its future Arctic policy grounded on pragmatic geo-political realities. India should not be left out in the global competition for Arctic resources sheerly because of strategic myopia and governmental inertia in formulating long-term policies. We also believe that India’s draft policy document should not just be based on the current scenario of Arctic geo-politics or short-term projections for the next five years or ten years but for the next hundred years.

The map above was produced by Brad Cole of Geology.com using data licensed from Map Resources. It illustrates the Arctic Ocean and bordering countries. It also shows the Arctic Circle and minimal extent of the summer sea ice cover. (This map is copyrighted)

2. India’s Arctic Policy Draft:

The policy draft released on January 5^th 2021 states that India’s Arctic Policy will rest on the following five pillars ³:

1. Science and Research
2. Economic and human development cooperation
3. Transportation and Connectivity
4. Governance and international cooperation
5. National capacity Building

The draft paper recapitulates India’s involvement with the Arctic region since 1920 when the Svalbard treaty was signed in Paris; British India being one of the signatories to the treaty. In 2007, India’s first scientific expedition to the Arctic was launched³. The Himadri station is based at Ny-Ålesund on the Svalbard island group and has been operating since 2008.  India maintains a permanent research base at Svalbard.  IndArc is the first Multi-sensor moored observatory deployed by India in Kingsfjorden in 2014. In 2016, India’s Gruvebadet atmospherics Laboratory was established at Ny-Ålesund on Svalbard³. Draft policy document highlights India’s current scientific and research activities in the Arctic region and its participation in Governance and International cooperation. While we agree with the focus on these five pillars, we do believe that additional pillars or points need to be incorporated in the final policy document.

The draft policy document, as it stands, is very weak in discussing geo-political threats that are becoming obvious and contentious in view of China’s stated and unstated geo-political objectives in the Arctic region ^2,3,4. There must be a strategic focus on threat identification & perception, threat analysis, capacity assessment and developing appropriate counter capabilities to deal with the future strategic threats.  We would recommend adopting a SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats) analysis model prior to finalizing the Arctic policy document.

3. China’s Arctic Policy White Paper with Chinese Characteristics:

China joined as an observer in the Arctic Circle in 2013 along with six other countries, including India, Singapore, South Korea and Japan¹. China’s original application for the same status was denied in 2012 owing to objections from Norway¹. In 2018 in its White paper on China’s Arctic policy China formally declared itself as “Near-Arctic” State though the rhetoric about the near-Arctic state had been floated around by China since 2013 onwards ^1,2. China’s so-called White paper is highly verbose and dense with redundancies and focuses primarily on geo-political issues while advocating China’s right to exploiting the mineral and hydrocarbon reserves and fisheries. China already controls 90% of world’s trade in rare earth and mineral resources.

China is investing heavily into projects in every Arctic country ^6,7. China has invested billions of dollars into extracting energy sources from beneath the permafrost on the Yamal peninsula in Northern Russia⁶. China attempted to buy land for dubious purposes in Iceland in 2011 but attempts were rebuffed by the Icelandic PM¹. Despite this initial setback, China persisted into buying into Icelandic economy⁷. China signed a bilateral energy accord with Iceland in 2012 and a bilateral free trade agreement in 2015 ⁷. Chinese investment of $1.2 billion into Icelandic economy during 2012-17 constituted almost 6% of its GDP during that period⁷. Chinese investments focusing on mineral extraction, including rare earth minerals, iron, copper and uranium totaled $2.0 billion, constituting 12% of the GDP of Greenland during 2012-17. China has built a satellite station in northern Sweden and invested in Finland as part of its Polar Silk Road initiative⁶. China’s growing interest in the Canadian Arctic (40% of Canadian landmass) is a calculated move to access and control the abundant deposits of oil, gas and minerals⁸. In 2017, Chinese icebreaker XueLong (aka Snow Dragon) made its first passage through the Northwest Passage which Canada recognizes as its internal waters. In 2013, China acquired Nexen, a Calgary-based oil and gas company for $15.1 billion that transferred a portion of Alberta’s oil-sands wealth to China. China is focusing on investments into mining in Canadian Arctic provinces while the joint Canada US moratorium on offshore oil and gas drilling in the Arctic ocean is due for review later in 2021⁸.

China has also insidiously inserted itself into the Arctic governance by creating parallel institutions to the Arctic Council. The day China-Iceland bilateral FTA was signed in 2013, Icelandic President also announced the creation of the Arctic Circle conference, an annual meeting in Reykjavik on Arctic governance open to all interested states and non-state actors, regardless of their country of origin or their coastal status⁷. It has grown from 1200 participants in 2013 to more than 2000 persons from more than 60 countries in 2018⁷.

China harps repetitively on the basic principles of “respect”, “cooperation” “sustainability” and win-win results” and honoring international laws especially the UN Charter, UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Laws of the Seas), treaties on climate change and the rules of the IMO (International Maritime Organization) in the so-called White paper ². China is trying to differentiate itself from US which is not a party to the UNCLOS owing to “American Exceptionalism”. What China does not acknowledge that it has flouted the rulings of the UNCLOS in other maritime theatres e.g. Scarborough Shoal in conflict with the Philippines and the EEZ norms in the South China Sea. China is likely to invoke the “concept of respect” in its future flouting of international norms related to the Arctic. China has tendency to not respect international treaties as it bides for its time to dictate the terms to others.

China’s strategic interest in the Arctic goes beyond economics and science⁹. Chinese emphasis has been to develop dual use facilities in the Arctic region under the garb of “Polar Silk Road” spun out of the Belt and Road Initiative ⁹. From security perspective, most troubling event was Chinese attempt to buy a defunct US naval base in Greenland and attempt to build or refurbish the airport outside Nuuk, Greenland’s capital and two other airfields for $550 million^6,7. The Danish government which handles the foreign and defense policy of the self-governing Greenland has openly expressed its concern at China’s interest in the autonomous territory of 57,000 population and vast array of natural resources ⁶. The US government and the government of Denmark finally blocked Chinese investment in Greenland in dual use facilities ^{6, 7}.

Chinese analysts have suggested a four-point action plan to incrementally expand Beijing’s strategic security footprint in the Arctic ⁹:

1. Creation of dual-use instead of purely military logistics support facilities
2. Persistent development of polar military technologies, especially through scientific research on the unique climatic and geomagnetic characteristics of the Arctic.
3. Training of military personnel capable of operating under extreme cold conditions.
4. Provision of humanitarian “public goods” services such as maritime and aeronautical search-and-rescue and disaster relief to Arctic littoral and user states.

Chinese economic investments are always predatory and mercantile in nature as has been seen in the examples of Sri Lanka, Maldives and some debt-ridden African countries. China’s investments in cash-strapped Iceland, vulnerable Greenland and Canadian Arctic communities will be no different. True to Chinese behavior patterns and strategic thinking, the so-called White paper on Chinese Arctic Policy is more opaque than white. It tends to camouflage Chinese geopolitical intentions in a façade of verbosity, dense prose and ambiguities that tout international cooperation but will give deniability to China for future flouting of the international norms.

4. Strategic Policy Directions:

Resource competition and human migration will become facts of life in the Arctic region as the snow melts. Currently, India does not have any physical anchor points in the Arctic region except for her Polar Research Station Himadri in Norway. We should understand what our strategic rivals are doing in that part of the world and our responses should be credible, meaningful and targeted. For example, China has heavily invested in developing indigenous ice-breaker technology. Its second commercial research ice-breaker Xuelong2 (Snow Dragon 2) became fully operational in 2019¹⁰. China is in the process of developing a nuclear-powered ice-breaker ^10,11. So far, this technology has been perfected only by Russia ¹⁰. Perhaps, India should consider collaboration with Russia in developing its own nuclear-powered ice-breaker to increase the speed in ice-packed waters.

For purposes of policy planning and future engagement, India should divide Arctic region into the following segments:

1. Arctic Littoral States:

These five states include Canada, Russia, USA (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland) and Norway and have competing claims over the Arctic. From a strategic perspective, we should seriously engage and target our investments primarily into Greenland, Russia (Siberia region) and in the Canadian Arctic regions. The USA will not cooperate with any other country, Russia may allow investments and infra-structure development in the Siberian region. Canada currently has very strained relationship with China. While Canadian Arctic communities are yearning for Chinese investments, the Trudeau Government is not inclined to invest monies into the Canadian Arctic provinces opening an opportunity for India ⁸. Mining sector, hydrocarbons, fisheries and arctic tourism sectors are open for India in the Canadian Arctic provinces. Svalbard islands of Norway near Barents Sea should be considered for investments.

2. Arctic Regional States:

Together with the five Arctic littoral states, these three regional states, Finland, Iceland and Sweden, constitute the eight Arctic Council members. Finland and Sweden are resource rich, therefore, our limited fiscal resources and investments should be targeted to Iceland only which is dealing with Chinese onslaught of investments and land acquisition¹. Iceland can also be a launchpad for Arctic tourism industry. Iceland also has very strong national health registry making easy genetic research and ICMR should focus conducting collaborative genetic research with Iceland.

3. Near-Arctic States:

China invented the very contentious and derisive oxy-moron “Near-Arctic” state in 2013 for itself and formalized claiming this status in 2018.The northernmost point in China is at least 5000 kilometers away from the center of the Arctic Circle. If Chinese rationale for “Near-Arctic State” is accepted, then, four additional states will qualify this distinction besides China: Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and North Korea. India should selectively engage Taiwan and North Korea for investments and development of port infra-structures in Taiwan and North Korea while partnering with Japan and South Korea for enhanced connectivity in the Arctic Region.

4. Non-Arctic States:

Rest of the world including India are in the category of Non-Arctic states. Countries that thrive on international commerce like Singapore, Germany and UK are deeply interested in the Arctic commerce and connectivity and can be partners for India in exploring joint commercial projects in the Arctic region.

5. Economic Dimensions:

Indian government should immediately apply for observer status as a non-voting member with the Arctic Economic Council (AEC). The AEC is open to corporations, partnerships and indigenous groups that have an economic interest in the Arctic. Since the AEC welcomes the participation of other stakeholders from across the globe as non-voting members, organizations like FICCI, ASSOCHAM and other business chambers should be encouraged to join as observers with the AEC.Top of Form India should follow a public-private-partnership (PPP) model while engaging Arctic economies. India should encourage exports and investment of human resources into the Arctic economies. Using a PPP model, the Government of India should encourage investments in Russia (Siberia region), Canadian Arctic region, Iceland and Greenland specifically because these distressed and vulnerable communities are susceptible to the debt trap that has come with Chinese investments elsewhere. Without investments, India will not be able to harvest the Arctic natural resources.

6. Commercial & Mercantile issues:

In order to promote commercial and mercantile interests, India should follow a public-private partnership model for investments into the Arctic littoral states and regional states. For example, Indian mining companies should be given tax incentive to invest in mining in Greenland and Iceland. Public sector companies like Metal and Minerals Trading Corporation of India should take lead in mining investment in the Arctic region. Airport Authority of India, Inland waterways Authority of along with Land Port Authority of India must leverage with private Indian companies in developing infra-structure in the Arctic region. The Ministries of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways and Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways must develop a joint Arctic Infrastructure Group that seeks out opportunities for infra-structure development in the Arctics. Ministry of Fisheries, Animal husbandry and Dairying should prepare a blue-print for fishing and use of marine mammals and livestock in the Arctic region as it slowly melts during the summers.

7. Scientific and Climate Change Research:

Indian policy document on the Arctic is very strong on scientific and climate change research. The National Center for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR), the nodal agency for India’s Arctic Studies and research should consider getting into partnership agreement with the International Arctic Science Committee. Indian scientists and researchers working on “Arctic Science” issue should be encouraged to participate in the Arctic Science Summit Week (ASSW) on a regular basis. There is a need to participate in all the international institutions on Arctic Science studies to build bilateral and multilateral partnerships amongst institutions, research groups and academicians. International academic exchange programs, fellowship program and application for research grants should be encouraged.

8. National Capacity Building:

The draft acknowledges the need for development of appropriate human resources multi-sectoral capabilities in India. It states the obvious need for expanding India’s trained manpower in the services sector backed by English speaking skills in maritime insurance, chartering, arbitration and brokerage activities. It is suggested that Indian Universities and technological institutions (e.g., Indian Institute of Technology) start degree courses and Ph.D. programs on “Arctic Studies” in conjunction with the National Center for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR), the nodal agency for India’s Arctic Studies and research programs to create a highly trained pool of English-speaking professionals and scientists.

9. Transportation and Connectivity:

As the polar ice melts, the northern shipping routes will become commercially viable. Arctic shipping routes comprise of the Northeast Passage, Northwest Passage and the Central Passage ². India has a strong sea-faring tradition and Indian merchant navy personnel have been employed world-wide. Even now for the last decade, between July and Winter, commercial shipping is possible through Northern Sea Routes (NSR)⁵. Transportation and connectivity will be harbinger of tourism to the Arctic Region as a normative phenomenon. Tourism revenues are an important part of the national GDP. With China’s emphasis on developing “Polar Silk Road”, India needs to remain vigilant about access to navigational and shipping infra-structure in the Arctic region. The draft policy document does articulate the need to strengthen nautical training institutions for training polar/ice navigation and build region specific hydrography capacity and skills necessary to undertake Arctic transits. Perhaps, there will be a need to enhance the technical capabilities for India’s NavIC navigational system to assist with accurate real-time positioning in the Arctic seas.

10. Inter-national Governance:

The draft policy document is fairly strong in this aspect. India should participate in all the global, intergovernmental, bilateral, multi-lateral institutions on governance of the Arctic region as a matter of policy. India should not accept the hegemony of the “Polar Silk Road” and should plan to counter Anti-Access Area Denial strategies employed by the adversaries in the Arctic region. India should host a subsidiary meeting of the Arctic Circle conference in one of our northern states like Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh or UT of Ladakh, UT of J&K. India must invite Prime Ministers of Iceland and Greenland specifically in year 2021 once the COVID pandemic is over for developing stronger bilateral political, economic and commercial ties with these nations. India should also consider the utility of a sectoral approach to engagement with our Arctic partners and foster five plus one, three plus one and eight plus one meeting formats in various international fora.

11. Soft Power and People to People Relations:

Out of four million inhabitants of the Arctic region, one tenth are indigenous people who are very vulnerable. India must spend political capital by investing India’s soft power in the Arctic and littoral states. Civil society organizations with world-wide presence like Art of Living, Patanjali Yogapeeth, RK Mission, ICCS, Vanavasi Kalyan Parishad etc. should be encouraged to foster people to people relations with these indigenous communities whose way of life and survival itself is at stake. India’s soft power generally carries a message of sustainable development to the distressed communities. India’s civil society and business communities/chambers must take greater interest in the Arctic Circle conference. Such interest is lacking at the moment. For example, at present, only one Indian person Milind Deora is on the Advisory committee of the Arctic circle conference. Ministry of Education, Ministry of Culture, Indian Council for Cultural Relations, Indian Council for Social Sciences Research, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan must jointly organize an annual conference highlighting the challenges faced by the indigenous communities in the Arctic region and solutions based on people to people contacts.

12. Geo-Political Dimensions:

Economic and mercantile competition among nation states for natural resources is bound to result in strife and conflict at some point in time. Every nation must secure its strategic interests. There is concern in the Arctic states about China’s geo-political intentions⁹.  With US support, the Danish government prevented China from purchasing an old military base in Greenland ^{6, 7}. Whether we acknowledge or not, a great game power competition is going on in the Arctic Region and a strategic rivalry is manifesting between the US and China ¹¹. The US policy establishment is now in the process of defining Chinese strategic threats in the Arctic ¹¹. Almost all branches of the US armed forces have released their Arctic Strategy documents. Even the US is grappling with the threat perception from China in the Arctic and is taking counter measures to repurpose, retool and retrain the forces for Arctic conditions as the Arctic is considered the final frontier for the human to conquer¹².

China’s history of engagement with the Arctic reveals a longstanding ambition to be recognized as a great power in circumpolar politics¹³. For all practical purposes since 2014, Russia and China have entered into a marriage of convenience¹⁴.  It is noted that Chinese geo-political involvement in the Arctic has led to renewed interest of US in the Arctic region¹⁵. Former US President Donald Trump had offered to purchase Greenland from Denmark which was rebuffed strongly. The ostensible purpose was part of a broader US strategy to enhance nuclear deterrence envisaging the installation of a network of missile defense and post-INF Treaty offensive missile systems in the Arctic to counter both China and Russia¹⁵. Recognizing that the situation in Arctic region is changing, the US Army has been training to develop appropriate capabilities to compete and deter conflict in the Arctic region¹⁶. U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville discussed the recently completed Arctic strategy and emphasizing it would provide the U.S. with capabilities to compete and deter conflict in the Arctic region¹⁶.

Though Indian White paper is light on the subject of Arctic geopolitics, the joint statement between PM Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Valdivostok in September 2019 included India’s wish to play a greater role in the Arctic Council, and to cooperate more closely with Moscow in the Arctic Affairs¹⁷. India has affirmed that it would continue to seek out new means of improving multilateral cooperation with the Arctic States in various areas¹⁷.

13. Recommendations for Future:

Despite fiscal resource crunch, India will have to take the strategic threat of China controlling Arctic region’s natural resources very seriously. India must develop a coherent and cogent long-term policy for future that provides India a physical toe-hold and stake in the development and utilization of natural mineral, hydrocarbons and live-stock resources in the Arctic region. Besides establishing research stations, India’s private sector must be encouraged to invest in mining, hydrocarbons, fisheries, tourism and infra-structure development in the Arctic region. Investments have to be targeted in Iceland, Greenland and Canadian Arctic region. Ministry of External Affairs must create a separate desk for Arctic states and north pole region. India must develop a de jure and de facto presence on the ground in the Arctic in order to have a locus standi.

India’s armed forces should look into the possibility of creating an integrated Arctic command as the time for this will definitely come when India has to guard its commercial interests in the Arctic region. Indian Army’s cash-starved mountain strike corps should be fully funded in order to become “Arctic-capable” corps! Since we are fond of saying that Himalayas are like the third pole besides the north pole and the south pole; polar warfare capability for the armed forces would be an important asset for the future. Opportunities to train jointly with other Arctic nations’ armies should be sought. Incidentally, Indian army did train with the US Army in November 2010 in Alaska as part of the annual Yudh Abhyas joint military exercises. Indian coast guard must participate in the Arctic Coast Guard Forum on a regular basis. We recommend that the Ministry of Defense and the Indian Armed forces produce a separate strategic and security policy document to define and meet challenges in the Arctic Geopolitics.

14. Conclusions:

Our Arctic region policy must be based on accurate definition of the challenges, opportunities, capabilities and lacunae. It should foster multi-dimensional engagement with all the actors (state or non-state) in the Arctic region. It should include fostering global, regional, multilateral and numerous bilateral alliances with Arctic littoral states, Arctic regional states and friendly near-Arctic States specifically. The policy document must not neglect the ongoing geopolitical competition and great power rivalry in the Arctic region and prepare India for future challenges in the Arctic. Militarization of the Arctic is a reality and can not be swept under the carpet by wishful thinking.

References

1. A. Adityanjee:  The Dragon Covets the Arctic; https://www.boloji.com/articles/14232/the-dragon-covets-the-arctic
2. Full Text: China’s Arctic Policy: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm
3. India’s Arctic Policy: https://journalsofindia.com/indias-arctic-policy/
4. Abhijnan Rej: India Releases Draft Arctic Policy: https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/india-releases-draft-arctic-policy/
5. Navtej Sarna: When the Arctic Warms. It will affect the sea levels and precipitation patterns globally   https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/global-warming-arctic-region-warms-climatic-changes-7129249/#:~:text=The%20loss%20of%20ice%20and,and%20current%20and%20precipitation%20patterns.
6. Marissa R Lino: Understanding China’s Arctic Activities: https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/02/china-arctic
7. David Aueswald: China’s Multifaceted Arctic Strategy  https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/chinas-multifaceted-arctic-strategy/#:~:text=China's%20Arctic%20Strategy&text=The%20Arctic%20Policy%20prioritizes%20Chinese,security%2C%20and%20better%20Arctic%20governance.
8. Gloria Dickie: China wants to invest in the Arctic: Why doesn’t Canada: https://thewalrus.ca/china-wants-to-invest-in-the-arctic-why-doesnt-canada/
9. Swee LC Koh: China’s strategic interest in the Arctic Goes Beyond Economics: https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/11/chinas-strategic-interest-in-the-arctic-goes-beyond-economics/
10. Jim Danoy: China’s Arctic Ambitions: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/chinas-arctic-ambitions
11.  Yun Sun: Defining the Chinese Threat in the Arctic: https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/defining-the-chinese-threat-in-the-arctic/
12. Joshua Thallis: Focusing the military services’ Arctic Strategies: https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/focusing-the-military-services-arctic-strategies/
13. Presence Before Power: Why China became a near-Arctic State: https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2020/presence-before-power/2-presence-before-power-why-china-became-a-near-arctic-state/
14.  Ling Guo & Steven L Wilson: China, Russia and Arctic Geopolitics https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/china-russia-and-arctic-geopolitics/
15. Mary K Magstad: China’s Arctic ambitions have revived US interest in the region- https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-10-12/chinas-arctic-ambitions-have-revived-us-interest-region
16. Jen Judson: US Army chief teases new Arctic strategy- https://www.defensenews.com/land/2021/01/21/army-chief-teases-new-arctic-strategy/    
17. Over the circle: Pole to Pole: India’s Arctic White paper: https://overthecircle.com/2021/01/08/pole-to-pole-indias-arctic-white-paper/

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