The most striking difference between the book Nehru, Tibet and China, and any other book on this subject is that it has a fresh outlook on the theme. A study of the India-China relationship during the Nehru regime using documents from the Nehru credentials and the papers from Union Ministry of External Affairs makes it an interesting and authentic account from the author, Avtar Singh Bhasin is a former director of the Union Ministry of External Affairs’ historical division. Bhasin is well-versed in the subject as is evident in this 400-page book, published by Penguin Viking which covers the relationship between India and China. Twelve chapters make up the book. A historical perspective is introduced in the first chapter, focusing on Nehru's personal assessment and the conventions that created disasters.

Despite international recognition as an emerging power, India has not been able to establish friendly relations with China. The book helps us better understand the Indian policy of mutual tolerance, caution and patience.  Along with the historic significance of Tibetan territory to China, and the 1857 treaty, it also reviews the matters that led to the occupation of Tibet by the Government of India by examining the 17 point Agreement and the instances that led to its occupation. It outlines the shift in perceptions that has occurred since China has emerged as the sole power in the region following its aggressive actions. Despite having an old, disordered, delimited boundary, India did not supervise the Mac Mohan line is what the reader comes to know.  

As India transformed into a free country after independence, the book takes a closer look at Nehru's China policy in relation to Tibet. Prior to emergence of modern nation-states, India and China showed signs of tensions. Bhasin investigates these growing tensions back to that early eon.  

Along with many other issues, three broad issues that find place in the book is an overview of Nehru's treatment of Tibet and the Dalai Lama's exile. China humiliated India and stunned the world in 1962 when it took full control of the whole Tibetan plateau and Greater Tibet. By allowing Tibetans to settle in the areas between India's then-existing North-eastern border and the new McMahon Line, Tibet left a vacuum in this area. Tibet, however, argued that Sikkim, Bhutan, Darjeeling, Ladakh, and other widespread   territory "which had been gradually absorbed by India" should be returned.  Beijing still mentions Lhasa's demand, according to the author, in Sino-Indian border talks even today. The Dalai Lama was forced to reject the demands and declare Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh as a part of India. 

Secondly, the longstanding Sino-Indian border dispute is an issue that has dogged Nehru's foreign policy.  It would have been a history lesson had Nehru consulted his advisers on border issue. It would have saved the country from the disgrace of 1962. Nehru did not listen to Nikita Khrushchev about the merits of peaceful boundary lines which Khrushchev had experienced for his own country.  During his tenure as India's foreign policy chief for almost one and half a decade, Nehru was unchallenged. Chinese military activity on several thousand square miles of Indian Territory began in 1958 and led to China's open claims to that area. Though after Zhou Enlai's proposal to change the rubric in 1960, the unchallenging Nehru refused to accept it and missed the opportunity. Even distant neighbors of China have border disputes and territorial disputes with it. Interesting enough, China had offered to accept the McMahon Line in 1960 if India agreed to China's position in the West. Putting these options together, the best option would be to return to the Chinese position of 1960, which Enlai repeated in 1979 to Atal Bihari Vajpayee, then Union minister of external affairs He repeated the same the following year, in 1980 to an Indian journalist who took his interview. Due to Chinese counter-action, settlements are more difficult today than ever.

Finally, there was Nehru's misguided view of Communist China and his belief that India would not be attacked until the end. Nehru continued to hold this misconception, although Mao and Enlai had taken over power in Communist China shortly after Chiang Kai-shek was toppled.  In 1962, Nehru was shattered after the Chinese attack. Almost as if he had asked the U.S. to join the war, he wrote a letter to John F. Kennedy requesting military assistance. It was Nehru's inability to understand modern China that was the problem. Nehru insisted on continuing to build his relationship with the new China on the old foundation even after the old China was dead. His regret was that it took a long time to find out that contemporary China was very different from the old China he had known. By doing so, he failed to achieve neither peace nor solidarity among Asian nations. 

In the book, the author also expounds on how India became the first non-Communist Asian country to acknowledge the new government in Beijing. As evidenced by documents, Sino-Indian relations deteriorated further and reached a new level of low. According to the author, the Chinese attack did not have anything to do with territorial disputes or border disputes but more so, as Liu Shaoqi, then Chairman of the People's Republic of China had stated, that China wanted to demolish India’s arrogance and the illusion of grandeur. He quotes Enlai’s explanation in 1972 to President Richard Nixon, “He (Nehru) was so discourteous; he wouldn’t even do us the courtesy of replying, so we had no choice but to drive him out. We had gone to war, justifiably in 1962, to teach India a lesson.” 

This book sheds light on the chain of events that led to the painful war of 1962 in the history of India-China relations during that critical decade. It is a book written by an expert in the field, well researched and persuasively written to interest all, who want to know the recurrent border standoff issues going on for over a century between two of the most populous nations of the world.

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