India seems to have consciously forgotten 1965 war with Pakistan, until now at least. Very little is known about it and unlike 1971 war or 1962 war with China a lot remains under wraps and subject to multiple interpretations. Writing this book therefore must have been a daunting task. What prompted you to write this book about such a difficult subject?​

It was with great trepidation that I agreed in February-March 2015 to discuss the project when Lt Gen BS Nagal (retd), Director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), the official think-tank of the Indian Army, first mooted the idea of authoring a ‘reader-friendly’ history of the 1965 war. My anxiety was two-fold: First, although in the past I have written books on insurgency, Conflicts and specific military operations—Eelam War IV and Operation Meghdoot, for instance—they were penned over a longer period of time. And second, they were not done for a semi-government organization. In this case, the deadline was extremely short since the golden jubilee of the war was less than six months away. Moreover, the mandate from CLAWS was crystal clear: The book would be based on the official narrative, of course interspersed with other individual accounts as long as they didn’t contradict the official version. However, Gen Nagal’s persuasion and my own fascination for military history combined to overcome initial reservations that I harbored. Once I started reading up on the material, it was clear that the actual war account would not be complete unless the geopolitical context of the time was first explained. So many documents had to be scanned, read and understood. Some declassified American papers, detailed work by Indian, Pakistani and western scholars came in very handy but the best source turned out to be the official history published by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and of course a detailed account of the 1965 War by none other than Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, the then Western Army Commander under whose watch the entire campaign of 1965 was conducted. It is difficult to imagine today that 50 years ago India’s Western Command stretched from Kargil to Kutch! Today, that vast area is divided between the Northern Command, the Western Command and the South-Western Command.​

What was the reason for India giving up Haji Pir after holding it during the 1965 war?

​There are three main reasons: One, when the agreement was being negotiated in Tashkent, the Soviet Union was bringing tremendous pressure on India to conclude the agreement and threatening India with withdrawing the veto protection in the UN Security Council if it did not agree to the terms that were being negotiated. ​Second, the UN Security Council had passed a resolution in early September that both countries must restore status quo ante as it existed on 5 August 1965. Haji Pir was still with Pakistan on 5 August, so it had to be returned. Third, Pakistani forces were sitting very close to Akhnoor, pointing a dagger at Jammu and Kashmir's heart. If Pakistan had to be forced to withdraw, it needed something in return. Haji Pir was thus sacrificed because of this bargain.

The IAF was badly mauled in certain sectors. Did the defeat of 1962 have anything to do with preparedness and morale or did the lack of good aircraft have anything to do with it? 

​IAF was not at all used in 1962 but in 1965, it lost more aircraft on ground because it did not have the requisite infrastructure like bomb shelters and hangars to protect the aircraft. But it did creditably well in the air combat. Unfortunately, the strategic leadership did not employ IAF as well as it should have in coordinating air-land battles. Of course Pakistan had better aircrafts but our air warriors were better trained.​

The 1965 war saw the most ferocious tank battles that the world had ever seen till then, especially after World War II. In spite of Pakistan being better equipped and having American tanks at their disposal, India still won that battle. How, in your view, did that happen? What were the major factors for that?

​Ultimately, it is the man behind the machine that matters. Pakistan had acquired the sophisticated Pattons but its tank troops had not been trained well enough or long enough on those tanks and were still groping in the dark in operating the modern computerized systems. Indian tank crews on the other hand were extremely well-trained and adept at handling the tanks that were of the World War II vintage but were still in good shape. Also, Indian leadership and soldiers showed great innovation in flooding the sugar cane fields in Punjab with water by breaching the small canals that dotted the Punjab countryside. The heavy patton tanks got bogged down in the fields and were sitting ducks thereafter.

Many defense analysts say that we almost lost Amritsar during the 1965 war. Is that true? What did you come across about Amritsar in your research?

​Yes, for a while, it seemed, Pakistan's feared 1 Armoured Division would break through the defenses at the Beas river bridge but a great defensive battle fought by 4 Grenadiers (Havaldar Abdul Hamid won the Param Vir Chakra in this battle) battalion assisted by other units ensured that ​Pakistan's sword arm was decimated in the fields of Punjab.​

What was the relationship between erstwhile USSR and India during that time? Also would you admit that 1965 war got Pakistan closer to China?

​USSR was playing a neutral role in the run up to the 1965 war but when it realized US was keeping largely away from war and China was helping Pakistan, it stepped in. Moscow wasn't exactly a great friend of India that time.  ​

​And yes, Sino-Pakistan friendship began that time.

Your book comes at a time when Narendra Modi government is redrawing so called red lines with Pakistan and is hoping to press the restart button with Pakistan. Do you agree there is substantial change in Pakistan policy and do you believe we have to talk tough to earn peace?

​Indeed. I agree that Pakistan has to be dealt with differently. The new red lines are welcome and should be adhered to no matter what.​