MyInd Interview with R K Yadav on Indian Intelligence, Missions and R&AW
- In Interviews
- 09:09 AM, Oct 15, 2019
- Myind Staff
How does a spy adhere to political diktats in a foreign country? Does a man on a secret mission face regular intervention from the political masters?
No direct political intervention. Person working in foreign country will take orders from the head of agency i.e. Chief of R&AW. Chief of R&AW interacts directly with the Prime Minister. For all practical purposes, intelligence personnel are not subjected to political diktats.
Can you share any personal experience of yours from foreign lands which was a tricky situation? There is a fine balance between what needs to remain classified and what can come out into public domain. Governments take a call on such things once the shelf life of the information has expired. What is your take on the fine balance? What sort of information can be made public?
Although there is total immunity for serving officers to reveal anything during service time some officers choose to write books after they leave the agency. Many secret things which do not harm national security, were disclosed in these books. My book “Mission R&AW” have some incidents which can be construed as secret but never related to national security. Yes, Government should take a call on such things once the shelf life of the information has expired.
I would like to cite one example which should be an eye-opener for Government and our investigative/judicial agencies. R&AW brought 1993 Mumbai blast accuse Yakub Memon to India to prove the involvement of Pakistan in these blasts. He helped investigating agencies to crack this case brilliantly whereby Pakistan stood exposed to World community as terrorism exporting nation. Mitigating circumstances deserved a leniency to Memon but he was hanged. Had the R&AW not brought him, Mumbai blast cases investigations would not have been so water-tight. Intelligence officer promised Yakub Memon on the behalf of a sovereign State, assured that his life will be spared and brought him to India. In contravention to intelligence officer’s word, judiciary pronounced death penalty. Later a former R&AW officer B. Raman admitted that Yakub Memom didn’t deserve death penalty as he came to India based on the assurances given by intelligence officer and helped with investigation of the case.
We have heard of reports of how India at different times resorted to winding down its R&AW operations (Morarji Desai and IK Gujral regimes feature prominently in such reports). What is gone is gone. No one can change the past. But with an eye on the future, is India really investing in finding new talented young people and making spies out of them? Any word of advice to youngsters who want to make a career out of Intelligence?
What former Prime Ministers Morarji Desai and I. K. Gujral did during their tenures to close down some R&AW operations, were detrimental to the national security. But I don’t think we should remind the new generation about it. However, I would suggest our talented younger generation, particularly cyber experts, to join R&AW which is a very lucrative, fascinating and innovative agency. I personally owe a lot to the agency.
It is largely believed that India doesn’t have a defined foreign policy. Unilateral political decisions in the past are reported to have taken toll on the functioning of agencies like R&AW. According to you, what kind of system should be in place to insulate these agencies from political decisions?
In so far as Indian foreign policy is concerned, R&AW is least affected by various circumstances. Its commitments are limited to certain extent in this region only though it has vast network in major countries. Indian neighborhood is the only priority. But R&AW plays vital role in formulating the foreign policy with regard to other countries much to the constrains of Foreign Ministry. But above all, political decisions are always taken into consideration by the head of agency.
What is the role of R&AW in gathering intelligence on the Pakistan nuclear program during the 80s and 90s?
Although, R&AW cracked the Kahuta nuclear plant details in the late-seventies, yet Pakistan is on the radar of the agency on priority basis. Recently, a report revealed some dubious activities near the Kahuta nuclear plant which could be augmentation of the existing plant. India and Pakistan exchange details of nuclear installations every year under a bilateral agreement which prohibits them to attack these installations. But Pakistan is a failed democracy and their Army is untrustworthy. So, these exchanges are a sham exercise for the Pakistan administration.
The title of your book, “Nuclear Bomb in The Ganga” sounds like a James Bond thriller. But in reality, it sheds light on the secret CIA-IB joint operation of planting a nuclear-powered spying device on the Nanda Devi Mountain to track the nuclear activities of China. The expedition fails, intelligence agencies unable to carry the device back, buries it in the mountain ledge. The team returns back next year to locate the device fails to trace it and aborts it after two successive expeditions. Can you please explain under what circumstances Indian government gave consent for such a mission which is fraught with dangers of nuclear fallout? Simultaneously can you share the geopolitical scenario of the cold war era which prompted India to join hands with the US?
In my book “Nuclear Bomb in Ganga”, I wrote exclusively on Indo-US thaw in the post-cold war period in view of the apprehensive Chinese hegemony in this region. This operation was planned by CIA and the nuclear device was devised in USA. It was a closely-guarded operation wherein some selective persons, including Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, were given an overview of the impending mission. Danger of nuclear fallout was never imagined at any level in Indian administration. I have analyzed all these facts and circumstances in this book particularly the reports of the scientists who tried to dilute this grave danger, which is still persisting. I have brought to the knowledge of present Indian Government all facts and circumstances of this operation vis-à-vis impending danger but I haven’t back heard from them in this regard. Geopolitical scenario has also been fully analyzed in this book as to how after 1962 conflict with China, USA helped India to create major security and combat agencies like Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Special Frontier Force (SFF), Aviation Research Centre (ARC) etc. John F. Kennedy provided all out support to India to counter Dragon Threat.
According to you, what measures can current government take to contain the dangerous effects of radioactive spillage?
In this book, I elaborately described various measures to retrieve this nuclear device including help from nuclear-deterrent agencies like International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Now, it is up to the Indian bureaucracy to act on it. I have done my job.
Both Pokhran-I and II were conducted in absolute secrecy. But India had to abort the nuclear tests in 1995 after America reportedly got a whiff of such tests. What went wrong in 1995? What measures did R&AW take to avoid such a leak in 1998?
In my book I revealed that there is no official record of Pokhran-I. It was a top-secret operation. Pokhran-II was also done with utmost secrecy and USA administration was caught napping. However, during the regime of P.V. Narsimha Rao, USA Government got information of proposed nuclear blast by India. Their Ambassador met the Indian Prime Minister Rao and “convinced” him to defer this nuclear test.Rao briefed his successor Atal Bihari Vajpayee about this meeting. So, Atal Government took all precautions and conducted this test in absolute secrecy. Rest is history now.
New age tracking mechanisms like Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and Machine Intelligence are competing with the traditional sense of Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Does HUMINT still stand a chance in this digital world?
Nowadays, concept of intelligence gathering has changed to a large extent particularly in view of the cyber formations. However, I still believe that Human Intelligence (Humint) is still the most vital, effective and reliable apparatus of intelligence operations and it is no match to the digital world.
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