U.S. Currency Monopoly and Rising Challenges - Overview

The United States economy stands at a crossroads, buoyed by robust second-quarter growth but shadowed by persistent fiscal strains and a subtle yet accelerating shift away from the U.S. dollar (USD) in global finance. Known as "de-dollarisation," this trend sees nations like CCP-occupied China offloading USD reserves through divesting investment in US debt instruments such as U.S. Treasury securities in favour of Gold and alternative currencies like the Euro.

Countries are increasingly trading in mutually convenient alternative currencies, reducing the demand for USD in the currency market. This diversification, fueled by geopolitical tensions and U.S. fiscal concerns, is subtly eroding the USD's longstanding dominance, which, though declining, presently underpins nearly 88% of international transactions and 57.8% of global central bank reserves.

USD is still the most trusted, if not trustworthy now, "haven" global currency: It allows the U.S. to borrow cheaply abroad as surplus USD reserves with countries are recycled back to US as safe and guaranteed-return investment into US debt instruments, recycled USD coming back as “low interest rate external debt” to U.S. financing its ever increasing trade deficits out of rising consumption and mounting government spending especially because of the “populist” agenda of leftist Democrats.

But as this privilege wanes due to de-dollarisation, pressures increase on the U.S. balance of payments (BoP) — a ledger tracking America’s all types of economic exchanges with the world — and the ballooning national debt, now exceeding $37.43 trillion, beyond the debt ceiling set by the U.S. Congress.

The Trump Administration has already invoked emergency powers, citing a national security crisis, leading to a Q2 BoP rebound, yet de-dollarisation's drag on capital inflows signals potential deeper vulnerabilities. Trump Administration's aggressive policy arsenal — encompassing escalated goods tariffs, migration-related fees, investment incentives, spending curbs (including on illegal immigrants, as much as to lead to government shutdown by leftists, foreign aid, wars, and NATO commitments), and pro-crypto measures like stablecoin regulation—represents a bold and unflinching counteroffensive.

These efforts aim to generate revenue, protect domestic industries, and foster innovation, potentially offsetting fallout by boosting inflows and curbing outflows, though various projections also talk of trade-offs like short-term inflation and growth drags.

This comprehensive analysis updates key metrics with the latest data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), besides other sources. It explores the BoP's three core accounts (current, capital, and financial), the unique dynamics of USD-denominated trade, the Federal Reserve's strategies, the steadfast U.S. gold holdings, debt sustainability, and the ripple effects of a potential downturn despite serial aggressive actions by the ruling right-wing conservative dispensation.

Let us begin with a look at the basic global currency structure that has led to the USD Monopoly.

USD Monopoly and USD Value in the Currency Market

Factors Boosting USD Demand in Currency Markets:

Global Reserve Currency: The U.S. dollar is the world’s reserve currency, meaning most international trade and reserves are denominated in USD. Most global trade (oil, commodities, etc.) is priced and invoiced in American Dollars. Even countries that don’t trade with the U.S. often settle payments in USD.

Foreign Exchange Reserves: Central banks around the world hold large reserves of USD to stabilise the rates of their own currencies in currency markets, to pay for imports and to service their external debt, creating consistent demand for USD.

Flight to Safety: In times of global economic uncertainty, investors flock to USD assets (like U.S. Treasury bonds), further boosting the USD demand.

USD still has a monopoly in the global financial system, and any country dealing with foreign debt or trade has to play by its rules.

When countries like India or others run a current account surplus as they trade or earn or receive remittances in USD, the excess USD they end up with (typically from exports or remittances) is often recycled back into the U.S. economy as a financial account surplus to the U.S.

1. USD Accumulation: A current account surplus means a country exports more than it imports, receives more inward remittances and sends less outward remittances, leading to an influx of foreign currency (the USD in most cases).

2. Reinvestment in U.S. Debt: Instead of holding large amounts of idle USD, these American Dollars are often used to buy U.S. treasury bonds, corporate bonds, or other securities. U.S. debt is considered a safe and stable investment with guaranteed returns, especially during global uncertainty.

3. Demand for USD: When countries purchase these debt instruments, they need USD to do so. This increases demand for the American Dollar in the currency markets, which strengthens its value.

Attractive Yields: With rising interest rates (like those seen in 2024-2025), U.S. debt offers better returns, further increasing demand for both USD and the debt instruments.

USD demand drives up its value in the forex market, making it stronger against other currencies. A stronger U.S. dollar can, in turn, make U.S. exports more expensive but also helps reduce inflationary pressures domestically by lowering the cost of imports, thereby “exporting” US inflation to other countries.

There is one more reason that leads to ever-rising demand for USD in the currency market.

In India’s case, the current account surplus of $13.5 billion in Q4 FY25 was largely due to falling imports and stable crude prices. On the flip side, India’s external debt (mostly dollar-denominated) rose to $736.3 billion, with over 54.2% of this debt in USD.

This shows how heavily countries rely on the U.S. dollar for global trade of goods and services, for remittances exchange, as well as for debt or loan or investment markets.

External debt denominated in USD is another major driver of the demand for the U.S. dollar in global markets.

Why Most External Debt is USD-Denominated:

1. Global Reserve Currency: The U.S. dollar is the world’s dominant currency, which makes it the go-to currency for international finance, as is the case with international trade.

2. Stability: The USD is considered a safe and stable currency, with relatively low risk of devaluation. Borrowers and lenders prefer USD over weaker or more volatile currencies.

3. Global Trust in U.S. Economy: The U.S. has a strong track record of managing its economy and debt obligations, making it a reliable anchor currency for international transactions and loans.

4. Lower Interest Rates: Historically, borrowing in USD was cheaper compared to many other currencies, making it attractive for countries or corporations to issue debt in dollars.

How External Debt Drives USD Demand:

When countries (like India) or companies borrow money in USD-denominated debt, subsequently, they need to buy U.S. Dollars to repay the principal and interest. This creates further demand for the USD.

Even if the loans are taken from non-U.S. lenders (say, a Japanese bank or European institution), the currency of choice for most international debt is still the U.S. Dollar.

As global external debt increases, so does the demand for USD — pushing the dollar’s value higher in the foreign exchange market.

The U.S. Balance of Payments

The balance of payments (BoP) is essentially the U.S. economy's international books recording inflows and outflows of money from trade, investments, and transfers.

Divided into the current account (day-to-day trade and income flows), capital account (non-financial asset shifts like debt forgiveness), and financial account (investment movements), it should theoretically balance to zero — surpluses in one offset deficits in another, with discrepancies chalked up to data gaps.

Recent BEA data for Q2 2025 (April-June) reveal a dramatic turnaround:

The current account deficit shrank by 42.9% to $251.3 billion, down from a revised $439.8 billion in Q1, thanks to a sharp decrease in goods imports (down by $184.5 billion to $820.2 billion) amid easing supply chain snarls and energy prices. Exports rose modestly by $11.3 billion to $550.2 billion. Services exports climbed $2.1 billion to $301.6 billion, buoyed by financial services and intellectual property fees. Overall, exports and income receipts hit $1.27 trillion (up $28.6 billion), while imports and payments fell to $1.53 trillion (down $159.9 billion). As a share of gross domestic product (GDP) — the total value of goods and services produced domestically — this deficit equates to about 1.7% for Q2, a stark improvement from Q1's 3.0%.

Quarter / Current Account Balance (Billion USD) / % of GDP / Key Drivers

Q4 2024 / -303.9 / 2.0% / Narrowing goods deficit

Q1 2025 (Revised) / -439.8 / 3.0% / Surging imports, firm USD

Q2 2025 / -251.3 / 1.7% / Sharp import decrease, services boost

The financial account, which logs cross-border investments like stocks, bonds, and direct stakes in companies, showed net U.S. borrowing of $406.9 billion in Q2 — indicating inflows exceeding outflows to fund the current account gap. This reflects $657.2 billion in foreign purchases of U.S. equities and long-term debt, though tempered by valuation shifts. Cumulative H1 inflows reached about $864.4 billion, still down 5% year-over-year (YOY) from pre-de-dollarisation peaks.

The capital account remains a footnote, recording minor non-investment transfers. Q2 saw a surplus of just $16 million (down from $8.5 billion in Q1), mainly from patent sales, totalling $16.016 billion for H1 — negligible at under 0.01% of GDP.

Now, let us look at the intentional and unintentional de-dollarisation phenomenon turning into a norm and how it affects the USD-dominated system, and how the Trump Administration is dealing with it.

De-Dollarisation's Creep

De-dollarisation isn't a sudden storm but a steady erosion.

First, the impact of de-dollarisation on the U.S. finance account, as part of the impact on the BoP accounts. Central banks added 500 tonnes of gold in H1 2025, pushing the USD's reserve share to 57.8% (from 59% in 2023), per International Monetary Fund (IMF) data. Opaque CCP-occupied China amassed ~200 tonnes (total ~2,300 tonnes), while foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries dipped to $9.13 trillion in Q2 (from $9.25 trillion in Q1), with CCP-occupied China at ~$750 billion and Japan trimming to ~$1.1 trillion. Total foreign U.S. securities? $31.29 trillion at end-June, but Treasury-specific divestments signal caution.

This hits the financial account hardest: Inflows slowed to $657.2 billion in Q2 (down 8% YOY), reduced demand forcing the federal borrowers to raise interest rates, lifting 10-year Treasury yields to 3.6% and adding $40 billion to annual interest costs. IMF models link every $100 billion in USD divestment by central banks to a $50-70 billion inflow drop, straining borrowers' attain deficit financing targets.

On the other hand, while the current account benefits indirectly from lower import demand at present, but risks a stronger USD (up 4% YOY), curbing exports.

The capital account? Unaffected, as it ignores currency flows.

Year-to-date, de-dollarisation has shaved 0.1-0.2% off GDP growth projections, per CBO, amid BRICS-led yuan trade pushes (e.g., 20% of CCP-occupied China's oil imports are now yuan-denominated).

USD Trade Paradox: Privilege Under Siege

With 88% of global trade in USD, the U.S. enjoys an "exorbitant privilege": Imports are paid in dollars that boomerang back as foreign investments, keeping rates low (~3.42% average on marketable debt).

De-dollarisation disrupts this loop — fewer recycled dollars mean higher interest rates and higher yields and a firmer USD, widening trade gaps long-term.

While Q2's import decrease masked this, exports too lagged (down 1% H1 YOY), per the Census Bureau’s International Trade Data.

A 5-10% USD depreciation by 2026 could flip this, inflating imports but aiding exporters.

Remittances — money sent by workers abroad to families, a key current account component — rose 8% YOY to ~$83 billion in outflows for H1 2025 (from $76.9 billion in H1 2024), per World Bank estimates. Inflows to the U.S. ticked up to ~$10 billion (from $9.3 billion), but net outflows dominate, reflecting 35 million foreign-born residents wiring funds amid post-pandemic migration surges and wage gaps. This 8% uptick, equating to $6.1 billion more than last year, stems from stronger U.S. job markets (unemployment at 4.2%) and digital transfer booms, though it drains the account slightly.

The Fed's Reserve Playbook: Light on Forex, Heavy on Domestic Tools

The Federal Reserve (Fed), the U.S. central bank, manages reserves uniquely, holding $39 billion in foreign exchange (forex) — currencies like euros and yen — for rare interventions, dwarfed by CCP-occupied China's $3.2 trillion hoard.

The Treasury's Exchange Stabilisation Fund adds ~$2-3 billion.

Domestic reserves ($3-4 trillion in bank balances) are tweaked via open market operations — buying/selling securities to steer interest rates and liquidity.

With zero reserve requirements since 2020, the Fed pays interest on excess reserves to fine-tune the money supply.

De-dollarisation nibbles at USD demand, but swap lines with peers (e.g., European Central Bank) and a $7 trillion balance sheet provide buffers, unlike forex-dependent emerging markets.

Gold Reserves: The Untouched Anchor

U.S. gold reserves — physical bullion held as a crisis hedge — stand firm at 8,133.46 tonnes (261.5 million troy ounces), the largest, vaulted at Fort Knox and Federal Reserve sites. Booked at $42.22 per ounce ($11.04 billion), their market value soars almost 100 times to ~$1.01 trillion at October 3's $3,875.36/ounce price (up 47% YOY). Backing 74% of total reserves, these unchanged holdings (since the 1970s) contrast with global buying sprees, offering inflation-proof stability amid de-dollarisation.

Reserves are okay, and there is no imminent BoP crisis, but what about ever-rising debt? Can it precipitate a crisis?

Debt Dilemma: Sustainable for Now, But Teetering?

The national debt — total government borrowings — hit $37.43 trillion by early October 2025 (126% of GDP), up from $37 trillion in September, per Treasury data. Interest costs? $881 billion projected for 2025. CBO sees debt at 118% of GDP by 2035 under current laws, with deficits at 5-6% annually. Yet, it's manageable short-term: Markets lend at 3.42%, and Q2 GDP surged 3.8% annualised (beating Q1's -0.6% contraction). Full-year growth? 1.9%, per CBO, with inflation at 2%.

Management paths include tax/tariff/visa fees hikes, entitlement trims (Social Security/Medicare, 50% of the budget), and immigration reforms. Revaluing gold could yield $1 trillion; longer bonds that lock in rates may help stabilise Treasury bill market fluctuations.

But if this debt spiral goes on without counteraction, Penn Wharton warns of a crisis in ~20 years. If at all, who gets affected and how much is the next point?

Who Bears the Brunt of a Potential U.S. Tumble?

A recession or default — say, debt ceiling gridlock — could slash GDP 4-6%, erase $10-12 trillion in wealth, and spike unemployment to 8%, per Moody's/CBO.

Domestic Front:

Vulnerable Households: Low/middle-income families face 15% wage hits, 8.4% mortgages, and slashed benefits; minorities/service workers hit hardest as spending (70% of GDP) craters.

Retirees/Savers: S&P 500 drops 20-45%, gutting $10 trillion in pensions.

Sectors: Exports (agriculture/tech) tank; small firms freeze on credit.

Feds/Taxpayers: Crowded budgets may lead to a hike in taxes, 20-30% may be through tariffs, raising inflation.

Global Front:

CCP-occupied China and Japan lose billions on U.S. Treasury holdings, and further, their export-dominant GDP could fall 2-3% from U.S. demand drops.

Impact on CCP-occupied China

For opaque CCP-occupied China, already grappling with sluggish domestic growth (projected at 3-4.5% for 2025 amid property crises and deflationary pressures), a U.S. recession or default would exacerbate vulnerabilities, potentially slashing exports to the U.S. (which account for 16% of total exports) by 30-40% and more due to reduced American consumption and heightened tariffs (e.g., Trump's 60% levies could shave another 2% off GDP). This would compound CCP-occupied China's fiscal strains, with foreign-held U.S. assets ($750 billion in Treasuries) devaluing by 10-15%, triggering capital outflows, a sharper yuan depreciation (5-10%), and heightened social unrest risks as unemployment rises amid factory slowdowns. Stimulus efforts, like AI investments (e.g., DeepSeek), might mitigate some damage but couldn't fully offset a global demand shock, pushing growth below 2% and risking a "tipping point" for the regime's stability.

Impact on Japan

Japan, with its export-heavy economy and massive $1.1 trillion Treasury exposure, would suffer acutely from a U.S. downturn, facing a potential technical recession (two consecutive quarters of negative growth) as auto and electronics exports (20% of total to the U.S.) plummet 20-25% or more amid tariffs (24% on Japanese goods) and waning demand. This could drag GDP down 1.5-2.5%, exacerbating Japan's 240% debt-to-GDP ratio and yen weakness (potentially depreciating another 10%), while inflating import costs for energy and food. A silver lining: Global flight to safety leading to divestment of held bills might lower bond yields, easing Japan's debt servicing ($50 billion annual hit avoided), but stagnant consumption (flat in Q1 2025) would amplify job losses (up to 2 million in manufacturing), straining fiscal buffers and forcing Bank of Japan interventions, per Deloitte and Reuters analyses.

Impact on Global Institutions

$9.13 trillion foreign Treasuries devalue, sparking credit crunches; global GDP falls 1-2%.

Impact on Europe

Europe, particularly the euro area, would endure a compounded shock from a U.S. recession, with growth forecasts already downgraded to 0.9% for 2025 (from 1.1% pre-tariff hikes) amid 20% U.S. tariffs on EU goods, per European Commission data. Export-dependent nations like Germany (1% of GDP tied to U.S. trade) could see GDP contract 0.5-1%, with manufacturing output dropping 15-20% due to auto and machinery slumps, while broader financial contagion from $2 trillion in EU-held Treasuries erodes bank capital by 5-10%. Uncertainty would stall investment (down 1-2% across the bloc), pushing unemployment to 7-8% in southern Europe and forcing ECB rate cuts to 1.5% by year-end, though fiscal tightening (e.g., Stability and Growth Pact constraints) limits stimulus, it raises recession odds to 30%, according to Goldman Sachs and Citi Research. Retaliatory measures might soften blows but risk escalating trade wars, amplifying inflation pass-through (up 0.3-0.5%) and widening north-south divides.

Partners: Eurozone/UK shrink 1-2%; markets tumble 15-20%.

Impact on India

India, as a major U.S. trade partner and holder of $240 billion in U.S. Treasuries, would face fallout from a U.S. economic collapse, but the impact would be relatively minimal compared to CCP-occupied China, Japan, or Europe due to India's lower USD exposure and more diversified economic structure. While its export economy — where the U.S. accounts for 18% of shipments ($80 billion annually in IT services, pharmaceuticals, and textiles) — could contract GDP by 1.0%, this is milder than CCP-occupied China's potential 2-3% hit (from deeper manufacturing ties and $750 billion Treasury stakes) or Japan's 1.5-2.5% drag (amplified by 240% debt ratios and yen volatility).

Remittances from the 4.5 million-strong Indian diaspora in the U.S. (25% of global inflows) might plummet 20-30% amid job losses — less severe than Europe's broader financial contagion — but exacerbating fiscal strains.

Foreign direct investment from the U.S. ($50 billion annually) would dry up, hitting tech hubs like Bengaluru, while a paradoxically surging USD may depreciate the rupee by 10-15%, inflating oil imports (70% of needs) and stoking inflation to 8-10%; however, this pales against Europe's 0.5-1% GDP contraction in export powerhouses like Germany, where $2 trillion in Treasuries risks 5-10% bank capital erosion.

The Bombay Stock Exchange could tumble 25-35%, eroding $1-2 trillion in market cap, yet India's robust forex reserves ($700 billion, diversified beyond USD) and gold holdings (800 tonnes) provide stronger buffers than Japan's yen-dependent imports or CCP-occupied China's yuan fragility, enabling quicker recovery via domestic consumption (60% of GDP) and rupee internationalisation efforts, per Reserve Bank of India projections.

Emerging Markets: Oil/commodity prices crash 20-30%; dollarised spots like Ecuador may hyperinflate.

Default erodes USD status (59% reserves), elevating the euro but unleashing chaos — recovery may take years, per the IMF.

But, is it a free fall? Probably NO. Conservative Nationalist America First Trump Administration is on to it vigorously, and it is doing all our efforts for mitigation.

Trump Policies: Bold Mitigations and Fiscal Overhauls

At the heart of the Trump Administration's strategy to avert economic fallout from de-dollarisation and BoP imbalances lies a multifaceted policy blitz, designed to fortify U.S. sovereignty, generate revenue, and redirect resources toward domestic priorities. Since January 2025, these measures — rooted in the "America First" doctrine — have aimed to shrink the $1 trillion goods trade deficit, bolster manufacturing, and counter global shifts away from the USD by incentivising innovation and curbing outflows.

While critics decry short-term disruptions, proponents project long-term resilience, with revenue windfalls potentially trimming deficits by 0.5-1% of GDP through 2027, per Tax Foundation estimates.

Central to this counteroffensive are escalated goods tariffs, invoked under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Section 232 national security probes. On April 2, termed as "Liberation Day," President Trump declared a trade deficit "national emergency," imposing a baseline 10% tariff on all imports effective April 5, with reciprocal rates up to 50% on 57 deficit-heavy nations (e.g., 60% on CCP-occupied China, doubled from February's 10%; 35% on Canada, up from 25%; 24% on Japan). Exemptions cover critical sectors like semiconductors and pharmaceuticals under investigation, but additions include 50% on copper (August 1) and lumber (pending November). These have generated $171.3 billion in FY2025 revenue (0.56% of GDP, the largest tax hike since 1993), with monthly collections hitting $25 billion (1.0% of GDP) by July, per Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. Projections from Penn Wharton indicate $5.2 trillion over 10 years conventionally ($4.5 trillion dynamically, accounting for behavioural shifts), potentially reducing the trade deficit by 15-20% via import curbs. However, retaliatory tariffs from CCP-occupied China, Canada, and the EU (covering $223 billion in U.S. exports) could shave 0.23% off 2025 GDP and 0.62% in 2026, per Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), with household costs rising $1,300 annually and long-run GDP down 8% from distorted supply chains.

Trade deals mitigate some pain: The EU's $750 billion energy purchase and $600 billion investment (by 2028) at 15% tariffs; Japan's $550 billion U.S. infusion for 15% rates; and similar pacts with the UK and Indonesia, fostering $1.4 trillion in pledged FDI since January (e.g., Apple's $600 billion manufacturing, SoftBank's $500 billion AI infrastructure).

Complementing tariffs, high migration fees target legal inflows to protect U.S. labour amid 4.2% unemployment. H-1B visas now incur a $100,000 annual fee (up from $1,500, effective February 2026 lottery for new applicants outside the U.S.), halving applications (from 359,000 in FY2024) and projecting $10-15 billion in revenue by 2027, per U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).

Adjustment-of-status fees near $3,000 (with inflation adjustments from October 2025) and Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) appeals up 400% aim to deter "abuse," but risks include 20-30% tech hiring slowdowns (e.g., Amazon, Google sponsoring 10,000+ annually) and 10-15% labour shortages in agriculture/construction, per Economic Policy Institute — potentially dragging GDP 0.1-0.2% via reduced innovation, though offsetting wage gains for natives (up 1-2% in skilled sectors).

Investment flows are supercharged through incentives and deals, countering de-dollarisation's inflow chill. Pledges total $1.4 trillion (e.g., Micron's $200 billion chips, Johnson & Johnson's $55 billion R&D, Saudi Arabia's $600 billion energy/tech), lifting foreign direct investment (FDI) to $400 billion in 2025 (up from $300 billion in 2024), per Commerce Department. These could add 0.5% to GDP growth by 2027 via manufacturing resurgence, but tariffs risk deterring $100-200 billion in emerging market inflows, per PIIE.

Spending curbs, spearheaded by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), target "wasteful" outlays, projecting $165 billion in FY2025 savings from non-defence cuts ($163 billion proposed for FY2026, e.g., shuttering USAID, green programs, DEI training, PBS/NPR funding). House passage of a $9.4 billion rescissions package (July 2025) claws back foreign aid and public broadcasting, codifying DOGE actions amid legal challenges. On defence, an 8% annual Pentagon cut (~$50 billion/year from $850 billion FY2024 base, totalling $250 billion over five years) redirects to drones and border tech, trimming deficits 0.5-0.7% of GDP by 2027 but risking 0.3-0.5% inflation from instability. NATO demands escalate to 5% GDP spending (up from 2%, adding $1 trillion alliance-wide by 2030; 18/31 members hit 2% in 2025), with the U.S. at 3.4% ($860 billion) — saving $50 billion/year domestically while pressuring allies (e.g., Poland nearing 5%, Spain rejecting).

War curbs include Ukraine aid cuts and Russia sanctions, potentially averting $100-200 billion in future outlays.

Crypto measures via the GENIUS Act (signed July 18, 2025) — the first major digital asset law—regulate stablecoins with 1:1 reserve requirements, Bank Secrecy Act compliance, and anti-money laundering rules, projecting $28 trillion in annual transactions (surpassing Visa/Mastercard) and trillions in Treasury demand (backing issuers). Trump's Strategic Bitcoin Reserve (March EO) and pro-crypto EO (January) position the U.S. as the "crypto capital," offsetting de-dollarisation by 5-10% of reserves via USD-pegged stablecoins — potentially adding $50-100 billion in annual revenue by 2027, per industry estimates.

These policies project a 0.5-1% GDP uplift short term via revenue/investment.

Charting a Resilient Path Forward

Q2's BoP relief and 3.8% GDP pop signal resilience, but de-dollarisation's $120 billion Treasury exodus and 8% remittance drain underscore urgency.

With debt at 126% GDP and gold at record highs, the U.S. must wield fiscal reforms and innovation to reclaim balance.

Ignore the cracks and the crown slips; address them, and America's economic fortress endures.