Standfirst

In a flurry of remarks, President Donald Trump and his aides portrayed U.S.–India trade as a “one-sided disaster” and labelled India a “laundromat for the Kremlin.” The rhetoric is punchy—but much of it leaves out context on how the G7 oil-price-cap actually works and how India’s Russia trade compares with other major economies. This piece disentangles the claims, the law, and the numbers.

What was said—this week

Trump on tariffs and “one-sided” trade (Sept 1): On Truth Social, Trump called U.S.–India trade “totally one-sided,” adding that India had “offered to cut their tariffs to nothing,” but “it’s getting late.” Indian outlets reported the post while noting his backing for a 50% tariff on Indian goods. (mint, Anadolu Ajansı, The Economic Times)

Peter Navarro on India as a “laundromat” (Aug 31–Sep 1): Navarro told Fox and other outlets that Indian refiners were “laundering” Russian crude, and controversially said “Brahmins [are] profiteering at the expense of the Indian people.” The phrasing drew backlash in India. (www.ndtv.com, Hindustan Times)

Navarro on the SCO summit (Sept 2): Speaking to reporters, he called it “a shame” that PM Modi was “getting in bed with…Putin and Xi” and urged India to “stop buying the oil.” (Hindustan Times, The Times of India)

Tariffs, legally (late Aug): The administration first imposed a 25% “reciprocal tariff” on many imports, then added an additional 25% duty specifically on Indian-origin goods effective August 27, 2025—bringing many lines to 50%. The Federal Register notice, White House order, and CBP guidance spell out the scope, timing, and exemptions. (The White House, Federal Register, GovDelivery)

Claim 1: “It’s a one-sided disaster.”

Verdict: Misleading by omission.

Bilateral goods trade doesn’t capture the full U.S. earnings from India (services, IP, affiliate sales, etc.). Independent Indian coverage also disputes the “one-sided” framing, and the new tariff package itself is what now shifts the terms of trade. If the White House believes India truly “offered zero tariffs,” neither Washington nor New Delhi has published terms. Meanwhile, the United States unilaterally doubled duties to as much as 50% on many Indian goods on August 27, 2025. (The Times of India, Reuters, KPMG)

Claim 2: India is a “laundromat for the Kremlin.”

Verdict: Politically loaded—and legally sloppy.

India’s refiners have bought discounted Russian crude since 2022. But the G7 Price-Cap Coalition designed rules to keep oil flowing while limiting Moscow’s take. The U.S./EU/UK price-cap regime permits maritime services (insurance, finance, shipping) if buyers attest the crude or product was purchased at or below the cap and maintain records—requirements tightened on Dec 20, 2023 (per-voyage attestations; itemised costs), with a safe harbour for compliant service providers. That’s not “laundering”; it’s the enforcement framework the G7 itself wrote. (OFAC, Finance, Covington & Burling)

If a shipment exceeds the cap or uses non-compliant services, that’s a sanctions risk. But blanket slurs—especially invoking “Brahmins”—conflate social stereotypes with a technical compliance question and have rightly drawn criticism. (The Wire)

The global context India is being judged against -

Who actually buys Russian goods?

On 2024 trade data (calendar year), China was by far the biggest buyer of Russian goods; the EU still imported tens of billions after steep reductions; India rose sharply; the U.S. is near negligible. (All figures USD.)

• China: Imports from Russia $129.9B (2024) within record $237B two-way trade. (Trading Economics, Reuters)
• EU-27: Imports from Russia ~€35.9B in 2024 (≈ $38.8B at 2024 average FX). (dgciskol.gov.in, Federal Reserve)
• India: Imports from Russia $67.15B (2024). (Trading Economics)
• United States: Imports from Russia ~$3.0–3.3B (2024). (Census.gov)

The raw totals alone show why singling out India—while downplaying larger flows elsewhere—misstate the global picture.

A fairer lens: per-capita exposure in 2024

To keep this honest, we put calendar-year 2024 imports from Russia alongside the 2024 (or most recent) population. This shows economic exposure per person, not just raw totals. Sources and methods follow the table.

 

 

Imports from Russia (2024)
Economy	2024 imports from Russia (USD)	Per-capita exposure (USD/person)
Türkiye	$44.02 B	$515
China	$129.88 B	$92
EU-27	~$38.8 B*	$86**
Brazil	$12.21 B	$60
India	$67.15 B	$46
Japan	$5.68 B	$46
United States	$3.27 B	$10
South Africa	$0.56 B	$9
Canada	$0.06 B	$1–2
Australia	$0.002 B (≈$2.13 M)	~$0.08

* EU-27 figure taken from the European Commission (reported in euros) and converted at the Federal Reserve’s 2024 average exchange rate.
** Computed using Eurostat/World Bank population baselines; exact value varies by population cut (Jan-1 vs mid-year).

Sources (imports): UN Comtrade via TradingEconomics for China, EU-27 (USD view), India, U.S., Brazil, Japan, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Türkiye from Turkish Statistical Institute reporting via TASS/Oreanda and corroborating trade trackers. (Trading Economics, dgciskol.gov.in, Census.gov, Wikipedia, Oreanda News)

Sources (population & FX): World Bank population (2024 or 2023 latest) for countries; Eurostat for EU-27; Federal Reserve G.5A annual average for EUR-USD 2024 conversion. (World Bank Open Data, Federal Reserve)

What the table shows. On a per-person basis, Türkiye’s dependence on Russian supplies towers over India’s. China’s per-capita exposure is roughly double India’s; the EU’s is similar to China’s even after its sharp cuts. The U.S. exposure is tiny. That context matters when arguing whose purchases “fund” Russia.

The compliance reality Washington built

The price-cap was deliberately crafted to channel Russian barrels through transparent, declared, below-cap transactions (with attestations and cost documentation)—precisely to avoid full-blown supply shocks. That design:

1. Constrains Russia’s unit revenues;
2. Keeps barrels moving to big importers (including India) to stabilise prices; and
3. Shifts enforcement onto shipping, insurance, finance, and documentation. (OFAC, Finance)

When Indian refiners buy below the cap with compliant services, they are operating inside the system that the U.S. and its partners chose. Calling that “laundering” confuses compliance with evasion.

So what should the U.S. expect from India?

• Strategic autonomy isn’t new. India’s oil basket has always balanced cost, security, and politics. In 2024, its imports from Russia rose, but so did documented below-cap compliance actions globally as enforcement tightened. (OFAC)
• Tariffs are a blunt instrument. The new 50% tariff punishes non-oil Indian exports while doing little about oil flows, which are governed by sanctions/price-cap rules, not tariff schedules. Legally, the 50% rate comes from a 25% reciprocal tariff plus an additional 25% for India, announced on Aug 6 and implemented Aug 27. (The White House, Federal Register)

Bottom line:

1. If Washington wants fewer Russian barrels in India, the lever is price-cap enforcement and secondary-sanctions targeting of non-compliant shipments—not across-the-board tariffs on Indian textiles or gems.
2. If the goal is to reduce the Kremlin’s take from energy exports without blowing up global supply, then the answer is better, faster enforcement of the price-cap—not caricatures of India’s role or broad-brush tariffs that largely miss oil. The numbers—and the G7’s own rules—bear that out.

Methodology & notes

1. Timeframe. All trade figures are calendar-year 2024, where available. India’s official FY (Apr–Mar) data are higher-frequency but not used here to keep cross-country comparability. (Trading Economics)
2. EU conversion. The European Commission publishes EU imports from Russia in euros; we convert using the Federal Reserve’s 2024 average EUR-USD rate (≈ 1 € = $1.08). (dgciskol.gov.in, Federal Reserve)
3. Türkiye. TUIK reports and trade trackers place Turkey’s 2024 imports from Russia in the low-to-mid $40 B range; we use $44.02B as reported via TASS/Oreanda; this aligns with monthly TUIK bulletins naming Russia the top import source early in 2024. (TASS, Oreanda News, data.tuik.gov.tr)
4. Population. World Bank 2024 (or most recent) populations; EU population from Eurostat. Per-capita figures are rounded to the nearest dollar. (World Bank Open Data)

 

References (for further reading)

Legal & policy

1. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. Guidance on Implementation of the Price Cap Policy for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin (Revised), December 20, 2023. https://ofac.treasury.gov/ (PDF). (OFAC)
2. European Commission. “Price Cap Coalition Statements and Guidance.” February 1, 2024 (and prior statements). https://finance.ec.europa.eu/. (Finance)
3. Federal Register. “Notice of Implementation of Additional Duties on Products of India Pursuant to the President’s Executive Order,” August 27, 2025. https://www.federalregister.gov/. (Federal Register)
4. The White House. “Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation,” Executive Order (Aug 6, 2025); and “Further Modifying the Reciprocal Tariff Rates” (Jul 31, 2025). https://www.whitehouse.gov/. (The White House)
5. U.S. Customs and Border Protection. “CSMS #66027027—Guidance: Additional Duties on Imports from India,” August 25, 2025. https://www.cbp.gov/. (GovDelivery)

Trade data

6. TradingEconomics (UN Comtrade). “China Imports from Russia (2024),” “India Imports from Russia (2024),” “European Union Imports from Russia (2024),” “United States Imports from Russia (2024),” “Brazil Imports from Russia (2024),” “Japan Imports from Russia (2024),” “Canada Imports from Russia (2024),” “Australia Imports from Russia (2024),” “South Africa Imports by Country—Russia (2024).” https://tradingeconomics.com/. (Trading Economics, Census.gov, Wikipedia)
7. Turkish Statistical Institute (via TASS/Oreanda). “Turkey’s Imports from Russia Reach $35.5 B (Jan–Oct 2024),” Nov 28, 2024; “In 2024, Imports of Russian Goods to Turkey Reached $44.02 B,” Jan 31, 2025. https://tass.com/; https://www.oreanda-news.com/. (TASS, Oreanda News)
8. European Commission, DG Trade. “EU Trade with Russia (2024).” https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/. (dgciskol.gov.in)
9. Reuters. “China–Russia 2024 Trade Value Hits Record High,” Jan 13, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/. (Reuters)
10. U.S. Census Bureau. “Trade in Goods with Russia (2024).” https://www.census.gov/. (Census.gov)

Population & FX

11. World Bank Open Data. “Population, Total” (China, India, United States, Brazil, Türkiye, Japan, Canada, Australia, South Africa), most recent values (2023/2024). https://data.worldbank.org/. (World Bank Open Data)
12. Federal Reserve Board. “Foreign Exchange Rates—G.5A Annual (2024 Averages).” January 6, 2025. https://www.federalreserve.gov/. (Federal Reserve)

Reporting on the week’s remarks

13. Hindustan Times. “India Has Offered to Cut Its Tariffs to Zero, Donald Trump Claims,” September 1, 2025. https://www.hindustantimes.com/. (Hindustan Times)
14. NDTV. “‘Brahmins Profiteering…’: Top Trump Aide on India’s Russian Oil Trade,” September 1, 2025. https://www.ndtv.com/. (www.ndtv.com)
15. Hindustan Times. “‘Shame to See Modi Getting in Bed with Putin, Xi’: Navarro,” September 2, 2025. https://www.hindustantimes.com/. (Hindustan Times)
16. Reuters. “U.S. Doubling of Tariffs on India Takes Effect,” August 27, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/. (Reuters)
17. “Donald Trump claimed India offered to cut tariff to nothing”, mint,
17. 18.Trump describes US-India trade ties as 'one sided disaster'Anadolu Ajansı,
19. Trump backs 50% tariff on India, calls relationship with New Delhi “one-sided” The Economic Times