I was pleasantly surprised on the morning of August 15 this year. One of my friends who recently joined her new posting at a Govenment college in Barpeta district of Lower Assam had sent me several pictures of the Independence Day celebrations at her workplace. This is the same district which has been through some of the worst effects of the religious demographic change witnessed by Assam over the past several decades.

The pictures from her college or rather what I would prefer to call them ‘institutional’ celebrations of Independence Day, struck in me. I was nostalgic and happy at the same time. For a moment, I did not understand how to react; because, this was indeed a fresh change that had come about gradually in a state like Assam marred by some of the worst episodes of violence in the past.

As a child whose father would come home and narrate his election-duty experiences amid calls for poll boycott, re-polling in booths, etc. the dark past that my state has been a witness to is still fresh in the minds of its people and will continue to remain ever so. August 15 was about enjoyment and celebration in the rest of India. But we the people of Assam, were confined to the four corridors of our homes because of 48-hour bandhs declared by the gun-trotting dreaded militant outfit United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), which has now been declared a ‘banned organisation’ by the Government of India. It was a day of complete boycott of all pro-India activities by any group, organisation or institution.

In one of the most gruesome massacres carried out by the ULFA in the year 2004 in Dhemaji district of Upper Assam, a huge bomb explosion during the Independence Day celebrations on August 15 had resulted in the death of 18 people, mostly school-going children. The sight of the dead bodies of those little kids was horrific! The ULFA immediately claimed full responsibility for this attack on innocent civilians. It was especially after this brutal incident that the common Assamese people feared stepping out of their homes on this day for several years thereafter.

Assam is a state that has burned and suffered because of many such unfortunate acts of dastardly violence time and again, giving further traction to the mainstream media’s one-sided narrative of projecting the entire North-East as an ‘insurgency-infested region’. In a recent initiative, Assam CM Dr. Himanta Biswa Sarma has been entrusted by the Union Home Ministry to open up talks with Paresh Baruah alias Paresh Asom, the chief of the ULFA (Independent) or ULFA (Swadhin). The objective is to re-start the process of negotiations with the banned organisation. As per the decision, the Central Government would involve itself a later stage if things progress smoothly as expected.

It needs to be recalled here that immediately after assuming the reins of power at Dispur, the CM himself made a call to the ULFA (I) to come forward and engage in talks with the Government. Interestingly, it reciprocated the CM’s call. A unilateral ceasefire was declared for a period of three months, which was later extended by another three months. Indeed, this is a much-needed positive gesture and welcome development on the part of the ULFA (I), that has definitely raised our hopes for a credible solution to a four-decade long problem.

In fact, for the first time since its formation in April 1979, the ULFA (I) refrained from giving a call for bandh on this year’s Independence Day celebrations across the state. A slow yet definite change of mindset of the leaders of the banned outfit cannot be denied in this context. In all possibilities, one of the most important factors behind such a changed state of affairs has been the signing of peace accords with all the four factions of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) last year at the behest of the Government of India, and as well as the Peace Accord that was recently signed by the Government with Karbi militant groups.

These developments have played a role of strategic importance in the way of facilitating confidence-building among the top leaders of the ULFA (I). Instead of trying to initiate talks with Paresh Baruah through mediators appointed for the purpose, the fact that this time, the CM himself has expressed his intent of looking after the job is praiseworthy and commendable in itself. Whether the demands of the ULFA (I) can be met by the State Government without the Centre getting involved is something which only time can say. But the ray of hope here is that when a person of the stature of a Chief Minister attempt to re-launch the process of negotiation, wouldn’t it be easier for the Government to break the ice?

Several attempts have been made in the past to bring the elusive leader of the ULFA (I) Paresh Baruah to the discussion table through mediators. Once, the ULFA had even constituted a people’s consultative group to hold preliminary talks with the Government. Noted litterateur the late Dr. Indira Goswami had also made an effort to bring Baruah to the talks, but all such attempts have failed time and again. But this time, the ULFA (I) is showing positive intent and the Government too, is serious about bringing the outfit for the talks. At present, its cadres are believed to be residing mostly in small camps in the dense jungles of Myanmar or in some remote villages.

It was especially after the occupation of the ULFA (I) headquarters at a place called Taga by the Army of Myanmar in 2019, that its cadres began living in villages or in small makeshift camps in the jungles. No reports of the outfit setting up any large camp in the neighbouring country have been pouring in of late. The cadres are largely involved in agriculture and cultivation to feed for themselves. Militant outfits such as ULFA (I) require money mainly to procure arms and ammunitions. But the fact that the extortion level has come down in the recent years might be a possible indication that they are no longer procuring new weapons.

On the question of recruitment, young cadres may have joined the ULFA (I), but there is no report of any large-scale recruitment by the outfit lately. Paresh Baruah is now in complete charge of the outfit because its Chairman, Abhijeet Asom, was relieved of his duties due to health-related ailments. However, Abhijeet Asom was not an active member and his role was merely limited to issuing just a few press statements from time to time. It was also reported that he had visited ULFA (I)’s Taga camp only twice to interact with the cadres. So, the absence of Abhijeet Asom is not going to have much of an impact on the functioning and activities of the militant organisation.

The stark failure of regional political formations such as the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) in the political milieu of Assam needs to be historically understood and analysed in the context of the rise and growth of the ULFA movement. It is because of the fact that the rise to power of the AGP in Assam was no less than miraculous. But its downfall was equally more surprising. Serious corruption-related charges and scandals were levelled against the politicians of the AGP-led Government during its very first tenure itself, i.e., from 1985 to 1990. Most importantly, it failed to implement the Assam Accord and deliver on its core promise of resolving the immigration crisis. These were the basic promises on which it had been able to garner people’s confidence and eventually come to power.

An inexplicable sense of arrogance that came to overpower CM Prafulla Mahanta and his colleagues within a very short period of them coming to power, gradually began to alienate the party’s earlier mass support base. The fall of the AGP from power was marked by the simultaneous rise of a secessionist movement in the form of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). The ULFA appealed to the raw emotional sentiments of the people of Assam with respect to the issue of illegal infiltration, and also took a pledge to complete the unfinished agenda of the AGP. Can political parties ever be trusted to protect and save Assam from the ever-burgeoning population of these migrants? This basic question is now raised by the ULFA.

No doubt, the historical origins of both the AGP and the ULFA can be traced to the same episode, i.e. the Assam Movement which rocked Assam from 1979-1985. A large section of the youth were motivated by the issues of illegal infiltration, the abnormally increasing numbers of the migrants, and the indifferent attitude of the Central Government towards the issue, besides the exploitation of its resources that was visibly going against the overall interests of the state. Nehru’s step-brotherly attitude reflected in his words – “My heart goes out to the people of Assam” – during the 1962 India-China war – was still fresh in the minds of the common people here.

Led by Arabinda Rajkhowa, Paresh Baruah, and Anup Chetia, the ULFA was founded on April 7, 1979 at the precincts of the historic Rang Ghar in Sivasagar district of Upper Assam. Since then, the electoral history of Sivasagar boasts of a record of electing leaders mostly belonging to either the Congress Party or the Left. One of the foremost objectives of the ULFA was to launch an armed struggle against the Indian state to achieve its goals and demands. Its first target was Hiteshwar Saikia, the then state Home Minister and the future CM of Assam, who later played a key role in the hastily-taken decision of signing the Assam Accord, along with then PM Rajiv Gandhi. A hand grenade was hurled at Saikia by ULFA militants in 1980, but he narrowly escaped.

This incident marked the beginning of unmindful violence that soon came to be identified and associated with the ULFA. Sporadic political killings, loot and extortions almost became the order of the day in Assam in the beginning of the 1980s, which continued till former CM Tarun Gogoi assumed charge of his office in the year 2001. There was an unfathomable sense of desperation on the part of the ULFA to continuously keep on reinforcing its presence in the region and reminding the people about the same. With the imposition of elections by Delhi in 1983, the armed rebellion intensified. These were perhaps one of the worst elections in the political history of Assam, marred by some of the worst communal tensions and social strife.

By 1985, the atmosphere was heavily charged up. The ULFA had almost become a common name in every Assamese household with a massive following among the youth. Several popular Assamese songs composed during this period by Xudha-Kontho Dr. Bhupen Hazarika were an apt reflection of this immensely popular feeling among the masses about the organisation in those times. But, hasn’t this same state – the ancient kingdom of Pragjyotishpur – always been the pride of Bharat? The Mahabharata is replete with several references to its warrior-king Bhagadatta and his elephant Supratik, who fought on the side of the Kauravas in the Kurukshetra war. The Yogini Tantra and the Kalika Purana too, are dotted with numerous descriptions about the land of Ma Kamakhya as the major centre of Tantric-Shakti Parampara.

For Hindu Gurus such as Srimanta Sankardeva who is worshipped throughout Assam, the concept of Bharatvarsha implied both a territorial and a spiritual entity, without which any imagination of Assam would forever remain incomplete. So, the most pertinent question that arises here is – What were the real factors that led not only Assam, but also several other states in Poorvottar Bharat to resort to armed rebellion against the Indian state just a few years after India’s Independence? The linkage between the rapid growth of Christianity and the subsequent decline of Dharmic faiths in this region of the country cannot be ignored in this regard. This holds especially true when we try to understand and analyse the various factors behind the growth of militancy and insurgent movements in different states of Poorvottar Bharat.

Immediately after Independence, special constitutional provisions were enacted for these states in the name of protecting their “unique tribal culture”. The reasons behind the introduction of the Inner Line Permit (ILP) System here cannot be separated from the context of the rapid growth and proliferation of the Church. The people of the different states of Poorvottar Bharat, including Assam, had widely participated in the different phases of India’s freedom struggle against the British. But history never taught us about the Rajas who ruled this part of the country. It has always maintained a deafening silence on the different Hindu kings and kingdoms of this region who fought head-on against barbaric Muslim invaders like Bakhtiyar Khilji.

The Indian history textbooks are equally silent on the role played by freedom fighters like U Kiang Nangbah, Togan Sangma, Ropuiliani, Haipou Jadonang, Pasaltha Khaungchera, Sambhudan Phonglo, and many more. Their fight was equally against the Church as much as it was against the exploitative rule of the British colonial state. But the main question that arises here is – Has this blatant discrimination against the history and culture of the North-East perpetuated over the years by a behemoth called the NCERT, got to do anything with the rise of militancy and insurgent movements here in the post-Independence era? It seeks an honest and genuine answer from the successive ruling Governments at the Centre that have exercised control over power since the time of India’s Partition. These are crimes that cannot be whitewashed any longer.    

Coming back to the ULFA, what is most important to take note of is the AGP’s brand of politics after the Assembly elections of 1985. Its relationship with the ULFA now turned into a quite complex affair. It came to be perceived as an over-the-ground political arm of the ULFA. No wonder, the ULFA had received substantial support in the form of both money and material from the state machinery of the AGP Government in its early days. The easy availability of cash and material resources gradually led to the emergence of a money-centric and arms-centric culture, which corrupted the minds of the young ULFA leaders. This also made them to take the support of the ruling AGP State Government for granted.

Paresh Baruah and his team soon played into the hands of foreign powers, establishing links with cross-border terrorist organisations including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Much of the credit in this respect also goes to the academia and the so-called “intellectual” class for providing legitimacy to the idea that each linguistic and “tribal” group in Assam is a separate sub-nationality. A majority of their writings available in the public domain have tried to position the existential threat of illegal infiltration into Assam from the point of view of ethnicity, instead of religion. These are ideologically-motivated “academic” writings that have had their own share of contribution in providing a nascent cover-fire to the ULFA insurgency in Assam.

Initially, the primary motive of the ULFA was to tackle the problem of Bangladeshi infiltration into the state, but it soon transformed itself into an anti-India secessionist movement. Its call for making Assam free from ‘outsiders’ gradually turned into a blind hate campaign against the Hindi-speaking population of mostly Biharis and Marwaris residing in different districts of Upper Assam. With time, the ULFA has derived moral and material support from the Maoists and the pan-Islamic forces. As quoted by Rajiv Malhotra in his famous work Breaking India: Western Interventions in Dravidian and Dalit Faultlines from an article written by political analysts Nivedita Menon and Aditya Nigam, the ULFA gradually distanced itself away from the immigration issue and became influenced by Maoism. It now began to put forward the idea of a federal Assam where different ‘nationalities’ would possess maximum autonomy bordering on self-rule.

There was a concerted attempt to give a Leftist orientation to the Assamese nationalist feelings that were emotionally intertwined with the complex issue of illegal infiltration. In July 1992, in a publication addressed to ‘East Bengal migrants’, the ULFA identified not only the Indian state, but ‘Indians’ as the real enemy. It was this hate campaign against ‘Indians’ which eventually resulted in a number of targeted killings of poor migrants from UP and Bihar in Assam. This brand of militant nationalism that soon came to be associated with the ULFA can best be summed up in the words of former ULFA Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa, “Asom and Asomiya identity is not a part of India and Indian identity.”

Ajit Bhuyan, one of the prominent ULFA ideologues who also now happens to be a member of the Rajya Sabha from Assam, wrote – ‘We in Assam often wonder as to why there has been so much concern to depict India as one nation-state….The undisputable truth is that “India is a multinational state, a land of innumerable nationalities, big or small, dominant or weak.”.’ Quite interestingly, Ajit Bhuyan’s candidature for the Rajya Sabha elections was supported by both the Congress Party and Badruddin Ajmal’s All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF). The name of Parag Das cannot be left out while we discuss and try to understand the anti-India, sub-nationalist stance of the ULFA in cutting off Assam from India. A staunch supporter of the ULFA ideology, Parag Das explicitly writes in one of his books titled Rastraduhir Dinlipi, “We are not getting carried away by an emotional branding of Bharat Mata and hence propagate one unified India.”

By making such passionate but politically immature rants, the ULFA tried hard to pander the already charged up emotions of Assamese stoked by Nehru’s insensitive remarks during the 1962 war.  Absurd arguments such as Assam and the entire region of Poorvottar Bharat were never a part of Bharat, Srimanta Sankardeva’s conception of Bharat was not the Bharat that we are living in, etc. came to be put forwarded by the ULFA. The ULFA (Swadhin/Independent) still abides by them, and in every possible instance, it tries to paint a picture of Assam as a completely separate entity from the rest of India. There has been a stubborn appropriation of the colonial and post-colonial history of Assam from the perspective of anti-New Delhi and sub-nationalism.

It was this anti-India, pro sub-national ideological and political development that gave the ULFA access to a larger South Asia network of anti-India subversive activities, including the Dravidian separatists. According to Intelligence reports, it was Pakistan’s ISI which first introduced a few top leaders of the ULFA including Paresh Baruah to the LTTE for the purpose of smuggling arms to India through Myanmar. The networking capabilities of the ULFA with other insurgents, particularly in Tamil Nadu, increased alarmingly thereafter. An ULFA camp was not only discovered in Tamil Nadu, but as per state intelligence inputs, a joint training camp of the LTTE and the ULFA had been in existence for several years.

All these anti-India activities soon resulted in the depletion of the popular support base that the ULFA had earlier enjoyed in various pockets of Assam. The AGP, especially during its second term, had to pay a very heavy price for the reign of terror that was unleashed by the ULFA. Rule of law almost became an order of the past, for the ULFA was now almost running a parallel underground government. The AGP was a part of the coalition government led by former PM of India V.P. Singh. With the change of guards at the Centre and the appointment of Chandra Shekhar as the PM, the Government launched a massive crackdown on the ULFA and its bases. It was declared as an unlawful organisation on November 27, 1990 and President’s Rule was imposed in Assam on the very same day.

For the next six months, the Indian Army executed its anti-insurgency campaign codenamed Operation Bajrang against the ULFA. In a short period of time, several major training camps of the organisation were dismantled and many of its prominent cadres arrested. Although the security forces attained limited success in controlling the insurgency, Operation Bajrang inflicted a severe blow on the ULFA, its organisational structure and ideology. After Hiteswar Saikia of the Congress Party became the Chief Minister of Assam in June 1991, his political manoeuvrings in dealing and negotiating with the ULFA cadres began to take new turns. Very tactfully, he first split the ULFA into two groups; while one group firmly stood against any form of dialogue with the Government, the other group was in favour of suspending insurgent operations and carrying forward the process of dialogue.

It would be wrong to assume that this policy adopted by Hiteswar Saikia did not yield any results. Several ULFA cadres voluntarily surrendered while many others were arrested. However, there was as if no end to the violence unleashed by the ULFA from time to time. A sense of insecurity, fear and the continuous mental trauma of losing their loved ones anytime and any day engulfed the entire state and its people almost every day. Life was no longer the same. Asom Bandhs declared by the ULFA became a regular feature, chaining the people to their homes. Announcements of boycott of Independence Day and Republic Day celebrations came as a proclamation of Assam’s separate identity from the rest of Bharat by the insurgent group. It was therefore in September 1991 that Hiteswar Saikia recommended a second round of military operations codenamed ‘Operation Rhino’ to control the increasing insurgency in the state.

This time, the ULFA had kidnapped 15 senior Government officials in broad daylight adding more fuel to the raging fire. This military crackdown was successful enough to have eliminated the middle-level leadership of the ULFA, although, for a short period of time. It led to the arrest of several thousands of its cadres in due course of time. Operation Rhino against the ULFA is still remembered in the history of Assam for its extensive, inconsiderate brutality. The Army was stationed in several areas of Assam, especially those areas of Upper Assam (e.g. Kakopathar, Bordumsa, etc. in Tinsukia district) which were badly afflicted by the ULFA’s insurgent activities. The results were there to be seen. Insurgency was vastly curtailed in Assam, but only to return back again with fresh vigour within just a period of a few years time.

Surrendered ULFA (SULFA) cadres were offered perverse incentives by the Saikia Government which led to a new wave of violence in the state. Terror struck people’s lives everywhere, from the public space to the comforts of one’s home. The SULFA cadres were later co-opted as a part of the state machinery with the objective of eliminating the ULFA leaders and as well as their families. Despite his best attempts, Hiteswar Saikia failed to provide a long-lasting solution to Assam’s insurgency problem. His sudden death in April 1996, in the middle of the next round of the state Assembly elections exacerbated the monster further. One of the AGP’s foremost electoral promises in the run-up to the Legislative Assembly Elections of 1996, was the withdrawal of the Army from Assam. The mass popularity of the AGP soared.

The AGP’s commitment now solely lay in undertaking measures to significantly curtail the atrocities of the police and especially the armed forces. The 1996 elections perhaps saw the most dreadful face of the ULFA. It was now on a killing spree, everyday, everywhere. The name ‘ULFA’ itself was enough to send shiver down the spine. As written by Prof. Nani Gopal Mahanta in his book Confronting the State: ULFA’s Quest for Sovereignty, a deal was struck between the ULFA and the AGP according to which, the ULFA was to create a reign of terror to facilitate the return of the AGP back to power in Dispur. Family members of several Congress Party workers and leaders were kidnapped and a few were even killed on the spot in their homes. But this honeymoon-period between the AGP and the ULFA changed very soon.

After the AGP won the elections of 1996, Prafulla Kumar Mahanta was again reinstated as the Chief Minister of Assam. This second phase of the AGP’s rule in Assam is one of the darkest and bloodiest chapters in the social and political history of Assam and the Assamese society. There was perhaps not a single section of the society which did not suffer in some way or the other. The AGP’s relationship with the ULFA and vice-versa saw a gradual and swift deterioration. The ULFA now became an existential threat for the political survival of Prafulla Mahanta and the ruling AGP Government. It was not that Mahanta did not realise it in the very beginning of his second term as the Chief Minister, but he was waiting for the opportune moment to strike back.

Mahanta therefore put in place a Unified Command Structure to establish coordination between the efforts of the army and the state police together with the paramilitary forces. The ground was now prepared for yet another round of anti-insurgency operations against the ULFA. The Congress Party, including former CM Tarun Gogoi, has time and again accused the AGP-led Government of making use of the SULFA cadres to kill/murder the friends, family members and sympathisers of the ULFA insurgents. This tumultuous period (1996-2001) in the politics of Assam which saw a large number of extrajudicial killings by ‘unknown assailants’, is infamously known as the era of ‘secret killings’ or gupta-hatya, as referred to in the local media. Who facilitated these killings? What were the real motives behind these killings? Can the blame be laid only on the mismanagement of the AGP Government, overlooking the presence of an outside hand in these killings?

Well, these are questions that have still remained unanswered, unresolved. But, the very nomenclature ‘secret killings’ keeps coming in the political discourse of Assam from time to time – a stark reminder of extreme political instability and social unrest that permeated every space of life from the top-ranking officer in his swanky office space to the common man in the streets. Regular and timely disbursal of salaries to Government officials became a story of the past. It was only after the ascendancy to power of former Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi of the Congress Party that the situation began to return to normalcy. Despite all his flaws towards the latter part of his tenure (2011-2016), Assam will forever remember Tarun Gogoi for his deft and smart handling of the prevailing situation.

When the late Gogoi took charge of office in mid-2001, Assam was on the boil on account of the ULFA insurgency. There was no semblance of law and order. Chaos and social unrest became the order of the day. Thanks to Tarun Gogoi, anti-state activities in a politically battered Assam slowly diminished and development was beginning to take place, on all fronts, from agriculture and industry to business, infrastructure and sports. The political situation finally began to stabilise. A terror-driven agenda with an exclusive focus on the gun culture, a well-nourished international network of funding and a hopelessly one-sided ideology of Assamese nationalism, have today made the ULFA a near-irrelevant force in the socio-political space of Assam.

Hence it is indeed a welcome initiative on the part of Dr. Himanta Biswa Sarma to directly launch talks with the ULFA (I) and resolve the issue forever. The ULFA failed to understand the pulse of the people of Assam, which never yearned to liberate itself and become a separate entity from the rest of Bharatvarsha. Independence Day celebrations across the state are today marked by a new enthusiasm and patriotic fervour. Although much more ground-work remains to be done in integrating India’s border states with the rest of Bharatvarsha, in the last few years, the message from Assam has been simple and clear – We the people of Assam have understood the anti-human, hollow ideology of the ULFA cadres; We want to move away from those dark days of disturbance and conflict and are ready to look forward to more positive, optimistic and hopeful days ahead.

 

 

References:

1. Nani Gopal Mahanta. (2013). Confronting the State: ULFA’s Quest for Sovereignty. Sage Publications, New Delhi.
2. Rajat Sethi and Shubhrastha. (2017). The Last Battle of Saraighat: The Story of the BJP’s Rise in the North-east. Penguin Books, India.
3. Rajiv Malhotra and Aravindan Neelakandan. (2011). Breaking India: Western Interventions in Dravidian and Dalit Faultlines. Infinity Foundation, Princeton.
4. https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.thehindu.com/elections/assam2016/blames-mahanta-for-secret-killings-in-assam/article8343762.ece/amp/
5. https://www.google.com/amp/s/indianexpress.com/article/explained/assams-secret-killings-tarun-gogoi-plays-15-yr-old-hand-again/lite/

 

Image source: Deccan Herald