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Jun 01, 2026
Siddhartha Dave

Netanyahu's ‘Crazy Love’ Remark and Congress's Discomfort: Why Bharat's Bond with Israel Continues to Deepen

Beyond Diplomacy: A Relationship Built by People In 2001, as a volunteer at Kibbutz Beit Guvrin in Israel, I encountered a phenomenon that has only grown stronger over the last twenty-five years: the extraordinary warmth that ordinary Israelis feel towards Bharat. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent observation that India shows "crazy love" for Israel did not surprise me. It reflected a sentiment I have repeatedly witnessed across Israeli society—from kibbutz communities and business leaders to academics and former military personnel. That warmth was visible long before the current era of strategic partnership. It existed before defence agreements multiplied, before high-level state visits became routine, and before the emergence of groupings such as I2U2 and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. It was rooted in a genuine affection for Bharat, its civilisation, its people, and the sense of acceptance Israelis experienced while travelling across the country. It is this deeper context that makes Netanyahu's recent remarks significant. They were not merely a comment on social media popularity. They reflected one of the most remarkable people-to-people relationships in contemporary international affairs. When Netanyahu remarked, "We face delegitimisation in much of the world—but not in India. In India, there is an absolutely crazy love for Israel," he was acknowledging a geopolitical reality that many strategic observers have noted for years. While Israel remains a polarising subject in many Western societies, public opinion in Bharat has remained favourable towards the Jewish state. The question is why. The Strategic Psychology Behind Bharat's Support for Israel The answer lies partly in shared strategic experiences. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has confronted repeated wars, terrorism, infiltration, rocket attacks, and existential security threats from hostile actors in its neighbourhood. Bharat, too, has endured decades of cross-border terrorism, proxy warfare, separatist violence, and repeated challenges to its sovereignty. For many Bhartiyas, Israel represents a nation that refuses to surrender its security interests, prioritises deterrence, and responds firmly to terrorist threats. Consequently, admiration for Israel is often less about Middle Eastern politics and more about respect for national resilience. This perception has strengthened in recent years as both nations have faced similar challenges from transnational extremist networks. The Human Bridge: The Israeli Connection with Bharat Netanyahu's remarks also point to a unique aspect of bilateral relations that receives far less attention in strategic discussions. For decades, Bharat has been the preferred destination for thousands of young Israelis completing their compulsory military service. Every year, young Israelis emerge from two to three years of service in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF)- Sherut Chova, often after operating in high-pressure combat or security environments. Seeking a psychological reset before entering civilian life, many choose Bharat. This phenomenon is so widespread that it has become a recognised feature of Israeli society. In Israel, the route is often referred to as part of the famous "Hummus Trail." The attraction is understandable. Moving from a highly structured military environment into the spiritual, cultural, and social diversity of Bharat offers a profound contrast. Equally important is the hospitality Israelis encounter. Unlike certain Western destinations where Israeli travellers often encounter political hostility or social scrutiny, they have traditionally found acceptance and warmth in Bharat. This has created a reservoir of goodwill that no government programme could replicate. Mini-Israels in Bharat The most visible manifestation of this relationship can be seen in places such as Kasol, Tosh, Dharamshala, Varanasi, Manali, Goa, Pushkar and many more. In parts of Himachal Pradesh, Hebrew signboards are commonplace. Local shopkeepers converse fluently in Hebrew. Cafés serve shakshuka, schnitzel, and hummus alongside local cuisine. Entire local economies have evolved over decades of interaction with Israeli visitors. These communities represent one of the world's most successful examples of grassroots diplomacy. A Personal Window into the Relationship Over the years, my own engagement with Israel extended beyond that first visit to Kibbutz Beit Guvrin. Interactions with Israeli academics, entrepreneurs, intelligentsia, chambers of commerce, and public institutions and media provided a firsthand view of how rapidly the relationship was expanding beyond diplomacy into economic and educational cooperation. At various stages, discussions were initiated to strengthen ties between Israeli business organisations and the Southern Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry. There were also conversations regarding academic cooperation, including efforts related to establishing a chair at the University of Haifa in honour of Lieutenant General J.F.R. Jacob, the distinguished Bharatiya Jewish military commander whose operational brilliance played a decisive role in Bharat's victory during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. This author and his wife, Capt Meera Siddhartha Dave, were fortunate to participate and contribute in a modest way to the community initiatives for public reception accorded to Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Tel Aviv in July 2017. Why Israel Matters to Bharat While people-to-people relations are important, the Bharat-Israel partnership ultimately rests on hard strategic interests. One of the defining moments came during the 1999 Kargil War. At a critical juncture, Israel emerged as one of the few nations willing to provide urgent military assistance. Israeli surveillance equipment, precision systems, and defence supplies helped strengthen Bharat's operational capabilities during the conflict. That support left a lasting impression on India's strategic establishment. Since then, defence cooperation has become one of the pillars of the bilateral relationship. Today, Israel is among Bharat's most important defence partners. Cooperation encompasses air defence systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, intelligence sharing, electronic warfare, cybersecurity, precision-guided munitions, border surveillance technologies, and counter-terrorism expertise. The relationship extends well beyond security. Israeli innovations in water management, drip irrigation, desert agriculture, and precision farming have contributed significantly to agricultural modernisation across Bharat. Technology cooperation in artificial intelligence, health innovation, cybersecurity, and start-up ecosystems continues to expand. For Bharat, Israel represents not only a defence partner but also a critical source of innovation and technological collaboration. The Emerging West Asian Order The geopolitical context is equally important. The Middle East is undergoing a strategic transformation. Traditional divisions based on the Arab-Israel conflict are increasingly giving way to pragmatic partnerships driven by economics, technology, security, and connectivity. The Abraham Accords accelerated this trend, while frameworks such as I2U2 and IMEC point towards a new regional architecture linking Bharat, Israel, the Gulf states, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific. This is no longer a region defined solely by conflict. It is increasingly becoming a region defined by strategic interdependence. Bharat's ability to maintain strong relations simultaneously with Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf partners reflects the maturity of its contemporary foreign policy. Congress's Response: Strategic Reality or Vote-Bank Reflex? Against this backdrop, the reaction from sections of the Congress ecosystem to Netanyahu's remarks deserves scrutiny. Congress leaders have accused Prime Minister Narendra Modi of failing to sufficiently criticise Israel's military actions in Gaza and elsewhere. Similar symbolism has emerged from opposition figures publicly displaying support for Palestine, including within Parliament. Humanitarian concern for Palestinian civilians is entirely legitimate. Bharat has historically supported a two-state solution and continues to maintain relations with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. However, the larger question is whether parts of the opposition continue to view West Asia through outdated ideological frameworks that no longer correspond with geopolitical realities. The Gulf monarchies themselves are expanding engagement with Israel. Strategic cooperation between Arab states and Israel has become increasingly normalised. Yet sections of India's political class continue to frame the issue through binaries inherited from an earlier era. This inevitably raises questions about whether domestic electoral considerations are shaping foreign policy rhetoric. The Congress leadership must explain why it appears uncomfortable with a partnership that enjoys broad support across Bharat's strategic, defence, business, and technological communities. Netanyahu's observation about the affection Israelis receive from Bharat captures something deeper than diplomatic goodwill. It reflects the emergence of a mature strategic partnership rooted in shared experiences, common security concerns, and decades of people-to-person contact. The thousands of young Israelis who travel through Himachal Pradesh, Goa, and Rajasthan every year are not merely tourists. They are participants in one of the most successful examples of grassroots diplomacy in the modern world. As the geopolitical landscape of West Asia continues to evolve, Bharat's partnership with Israel will likely deepen further—not at the expense of its relations with Arab nations, but as part of a broader strategy of regional engagement. The future belongs not to outdated ideological binaries but to pragmatic partnerships rooted in national interest. In that emerging order, the Bharat-Israel relationship stands as one of the defining strategic partnerships of the twenty-first century. Netanyahu's remark may have been delivered with characteristic candour, but it revealed an undeniable truth: the relationship between Bharat and Israel today is sustained not merely by governments, but by societies that recognise in each other resilience, civilisational continuity, and a shared determination to confront the challenges of an uncertain world. Jai Hind. PS: This article was first published at https://organiser.org/author/siddhartha-dave/

May 30, 2026
Viren S Doshi

China, the Epicentre of Indo-Pacific Disputes

Overview Indo-Pacific disputes linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) occupied China’s expansionist history since 1949 — the “seven decades” since the Communist Party captured China - are highly diabolical and increasingly intrusive. The core pattern: CCP asserts “historical rights” over land and sea far beyond its internationally recognised borders, then backs those claims with infrastructure, military presence, and coercion. India & Australia don’t claim territory, but get pulled in because trade routes and regional order are affected. Here is a snapshot of the disputes or incursions, as one might label them meaningfully. Maritime disputes: “Nine-dash line” and island building South China Sea This maritime area affects 60% of Australia’s trade and 50% of India’s trade. CCP Claim: CCP claims ∼90% of the South China Sea via 1940s map with 9 dashes. Covers Spratlys, Paracels, Scarborough Shoal. Overlaps the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. China’s ill-intended actions since 2013: Artificial islands: 7 reefs dredged into military bases — Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, Fiery Cross. 3,200+ acres reclaimed. Runways, missile sites, radar. Maritime Militia and Coast Guard: Ramming, water cannons vs Philippine boats at Second Thomas Shoal. 2024 incident: Chinese Communist military personnel boarded Philippine navy boats with axes. Oil/Gas harassment: Chinese Communist Regime survey ships and their armed coast guard shadow Malaysian/Vietnamese drilling rigs. The 2016 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Tribunal ruled “no legal basis” for the nine-dash line. CCP rejected this international ruling. Australia and India both say the ruling is final and binding. East China Sea CCP Claims: Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, administered by Japan. CCP's ill-intended Actions: Chinese Communist Regime’s coast guard ships enter waters. In 2023, a record 352 days, Chinese vessels entered the waters nearby. Fighter jets scrambled weekly. Quad Response: July 2025 joint statement opposed “unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion” in both the East & South China Seas. Taiwan Strait CCP's claim: CCP says Taiwan is a province of One China that was captured by it. CCP threatens use of force on the tiny democratic island if Taiwan declares independence. CCP's ill-intended actions: CCP military sends 100+ warplanes across the median line each month. Naval blockades were rehearsed. In 2022, missiles were fired over Taiwan after US Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit. India and Australia’s position on Taiwan: No official open diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, but both of them support “status quo”. Australia 2023 Defence Review stated that any conflict over Taiwan would be “catastrophic for the region”. Land border disputes: “Salami slicing” on the Himalayas India-China border — Line of Actual Control CCP's Claim: CCP claims Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet” ∼90,000 km². Also, Aksai Chin in Ladakh, taken in 1962 war. CCP's ill-intended Actions: 1962 War: CCP military seized Aksai Chin, 38,000 km². 2020 Galwan clash: CCP army moved troops into disputed areas, killed 20 Indian soldiers. First deadly clash in 45 years. Infrastructure: Villages, roads, bridges built in disputed zones to “create facts on ground”. Renaming of Places: CCP regime renamed 30 places in India’s Arunachal Pradesh in 2024. Australia’s view: Recognises India’s “critical role” in Indian Ocean stability. Sees border and maritime moves as a connected strategy. Bhutan — Doklam Plateau CCP's Claim: CCP regime claims Doklam, near India’s “Chicken’s Neck” corridor. CCP's ill-intended Actions: In 2017 the CCP regime built a road. India sent troops. 73-day standoff. The CCP regime still has infrastructure nearby. Indian Ocean expansion: “String of Pearls” CCP embarked on forming a network of controlled/leased ports surrounding India. Key sites: Gwadar, Pakistan: 99-year lease, naval-capable. Part of CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor), which is in violation of India's sovereignty as it passes through parts of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh illegally occupied by Pakistan. Hambantota, Sri Lanka: 99-year lease after debt default. Can host naval vessels. Djibouti: First overseas Chinese Communist Regime base, 2017. Next to the key shipping choke point. Myanmar: Kyaukpyu port, oil/gas pipelines bypass the Malacca Strait. Maldives: Leases for infrastructure, 2024 “security pact”. Concern: Dual-use ports can switch from commercial to military (mis)use. Economic Coercion Disputes Australia: After Canberra called for the COVID origins probe in 2020, CCP regime imposed tariffs on barley, wine, coal and banned beef/lobster, affecting a $20 billion trade. Tariffs lifted in 2023-2024. India: Apps banned in 2020, investment restrictions after Galwan. Border trade halted. Philippines/Vietnam: Fishing boats banned from traditional grounds. Scarborough Shoal seized 2012. River & Resource Disputes Brahmaputra/Yarlung Tsangpo: The CCP regime is building a dam, India fears water diversion. Mekong: 11 dams in China reduce flow to Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia. Fish stocks collapsed. Why India & Australia group up: The “rules-based order” problem CCP's Nine-dash line violated the UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS); EEZs extend 200 nautical miles from the coast. Quad, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) push UNCLOS compliance. CCP’s Island Militarisation is in violation of UNCLOS and impinges on freedom of navigation operations; the stakeholders have strongly opposed this. Galwan / Doklam moves violates the 1993 / 1996 Border Peace Agreements. Australia-India Framework for Security Cooperation oppose such incursions. Economic coercion practised by the CCP is violative of international and WTO rules. IPEF pivots on the fair economy pillar and supply chain resilience. India in 2014 lost 19,000 km² to Bangladesh due to UNCLOS arbitration and complied, to show “commitment to international principles”, but CCP's Expansionist Regime is blatantly disrespectful to international law. Bottom-line Disputes stem from CCP regime’s policy since 1949 to restore what it calls the “century of humiliation” — but those claims overlap with modern states and UNCLOS. Result is seven decades of expanding claims backed by military and economic pressure. That’s why India, Australia, Japan, US formed Quad and other blocs like IPEF and IPOI. More coordination and more collaboration among the Indo-Pacific stakeholders is the need of the hour while the free world debates and stakes its points at 23rd Shangri La Dialogue.