- Sep 15, 2026
- Lt Gen L N Singh (Retd)
Featured Articles
BRICS at New Delhi 2026: From Rule-Takers to Rule-Shapers
The recent BRICS Summit at New Delhi did not create a new world order. It demonstrated something more consequential: the old order can no longer assume that the Global South will merely accept the rules written elsewhere. The 18th BRICS Summit, held in New Delhi on 12–13 September 2026, brought together an expanded grouping of emerging and developing powers at a moment of extraordinary geopolitical fragmentation. Wars in West Asia, US-China rivalry, tariffs, sanctions, disruptions to supply chains and growing dissatisfaction with Western-dominated institutions formed the backdrop to the summit. The 140-paragraph New Delhi Declaration is therefore best understood not as a revolutionary blueprint, but as a document of managed strategic transition. BRICS is evolving from a forum that criticised the existing international order into one increasingly seeking to shape its rules, create parallel mechanisms and redistribute decision-making power. Yet, New Delhi also demonstrated the limits of this ambition. BRICS remains too internally divided to function as a coherent anti-Western bloc. Its more realistic trajectory is towards a multipolar order in which Western institutions remain important but no longer ‘monopolise’ the formulation of global rules. From BRIC to a Global South power platform The original BRIC grouping of Brazil, Russia, India and China was essentially an economic proposition. South Africa joined in 2010, while the subsequent expansion brought in Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia and the UAE, with Saudi Arabia participating in the wider BRICS framework. This expansion has transformed BRICS. It now brings together major energy producers, manufacturing powers, large developing economies and countries representing different regions of the Global South. But expansion has also made consensus harder. The clearest evidence came in May 2026, when BRICS foreign ministers could not to issue a joint statement because of differences, particularly over the Middle East. The fact that leaders subsequently succeeded in adopting a declaration in New Delhi was therefore itself a diplomatic achievement. India's central challenge was to demonstrate that an increasingly diverse BRICS could remain relevant without forcing its members into a common geopolitical position. India and China: cooperation without convergence The most important strategic relationship within BRICS remains that between India and China. Both want a greater role for the Global South, reform of global governance and a more multipolar international system. But their visions are not identical. India's preference is for reforming and democratising the existing order while retaining strategic autonomy and productive relations with the West. China is more interested in simultaneously reforming the existing order and constructing alternative centres of economic, financial and technological power. This difference is fundamental. Prime Minister Narendra Modi argued that the Global South must move from being a “rule-taker” to a “rule-shaper” and described the goal as transforming the existing “pyramid of privilege” into a platform of partnership. China, meanwhile, promoted a more ambitious economic and technological agenda, including greater BRICS cooperation in AI, services, investment and technology. Beijing's approach is aimed at ensuring that Chinese economic and technological capabilities become part of the infrastructure of the emerging Global South order. The difference can therefore be summarised simply: India wants a more representative world order. China wants a more multipolar world order in which China itself becomes one of its principal poles. This is why New Delhi has consistently resisted allowing BRICS to become an explicitly anti-Western organisation. The Modi-Xi meeting on the summit sidelines reinforced this pragmatic approach. Both sides sought greater economic engagement while recognising that unresolved border and trade issues remain. The relationship is therefore moving towards managed competition rather than strategic reconciliation. The United Nations: reform rather than replacement UN reform was one of India's most important successes. The New Delhi Declaration calls for a more representative and effective multilateral system and greater representation of developing countries, including in the UN Security Council. China and Russia reiterated support for India's aspiration to play a greater role in the UN system, including the Security Council. This is the clearest example of rule-shaping philosophy of BRICS. It does not seek to replace the UN. It seeks to change who has influence within it. The same principle applies to the IMF, World Bank and WTO. The objective is not institutional destruction but the dismantling of what India described as a “pyramid of privilege” in global decision-making. Palestine and the Middle East: consensus through ambiguity Palestine emerged as one of the areas of strongest BRICS convergence. The New Delhi Declaration reaffirmed support for Palestinian self-determination, the two-state solution, full UN membership for Palestine and a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. It rejected forced displacement and stressed humanitarian access. The language on the wider Middle East war was more cautious. This was inevitable. BRICS now contains Iran alongside the UAE and other states with close relations with Washington. India has its own interests in Gulf stability, energy supplies and the safety of millions of Indian citizens in the region. The declaration therefore called for maximum restraint, dialogue, diplomacy, protection of civilians and respect for sovereignty, without directly assigning responsibility to particular states. This illustrates a defining feature of contemporary BRICS diplomacy: Where interests converge, the language is firm; where interests collide, the language becomes deliberately ambiguous. That ambiguity is not simply weakness. It is also the mechanism through which India preserved consensus. Terrorism: India's clearest diplomatic gain The strongest India-specific outcome concerned terrorism. The declaration condemned the April 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack in unusually strong terms and specifically referred to cross-border movement of terrorists, terrorism financing and safe havens. It reiterated “zero tolerance” towards terrorism and opposed double standards in counter-terrorism. India did not secure explicit naming of Pakistan, but it achieved something arguably more useful: the inclusion of cross-border terrorism in a BRICS consensus document. For New Delhi, this strengthens its argument that terrorism must be treated as a global security problem rather than through selective geopolitical definitions. Trade: challenging protectionism without abandoning the WTO BRICS also took aim at unilateral tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The declaration criticised protectionist measures that distort trade and disrupt global supply chains while reaffirming the importance of the WTO. Again, this is rule-shaping rather than system destruction. BRICS wants developing economies to have greater influence over trade rules while retaining the multilateral trading system. This is particularly significant in an era of tariff escalation and economic nationalism. Currency: de-dollarisation without a common currency One of the most revealing outcomes was what BRICS did not do. There was no announcement of a common BRICS currency. Instead, the grouping continued to support local-currency settlements, cross-border payment interoperability and greater financial cooperation. This is especially attractive to China and Russia, which have strong incentives to reduce exposure to Western financial sanctions. India, however, remains considerably more cautious. The New Delhi outcome therefore represents financial diversification rather than dollar abandonment. BRICS wants to reduce vulnerability to dollar dominance without pretending that the dollar-based global financial system can be replaced overnight. The New Development Bank is central to this strategy: it provides an institutional mechanism through which developing countries can obtain development finance without complete dependence on Western-led institutions. What did the major members gain? India gained diplomatic support for UNSC reform, stronger language on terrorism, greater Global South leadership and space for engagement with China. China gained a larger platform for its economic and technological agenda and greater legitimacy for its role as a Global South partner. Its emphasis on AI, trade and technology points towards an attempt to make BRICS an important component of China's broader international strategy. Russia gained continued opposition to unilateral sanctions and a forum that prevents its complete diplomatic isolation from the Global South. Iran gained diplomatic space despite Western pressure, while the Arab members gained a forum in which they could pursue strategic autonomy without choosing between China, Russia and the West. Brazil and South Africa reinforced their traditional priorities: multilateral reform, development and stronger representation for the Global South. For newer members such as Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia, BRICS offers access to markets, investment, development finance and greater diplomatic weight. New Delhi versus previous BRICS summits The evolution of the grouping is revealing. Kazan 2024 was primarily about expansion and the development of financial alternatives. Rio 2025 placed greater emphasis on climate, health, AI, development and institutional cooperation. New Delhi 2026 was different. Its central challenge was geopolitical crisis management. Ukraine received less explicit treatment than in earlier declarations. The Middle East consumed much greater diplomatic attention. Terrorism became a prominent Indian priority. Trade and tariffs became more urgent. And the question of whether the enlarged BRICS could actually produce consensus became as important as the substance of the declaration itself. Thus, BRICS has moved from institution-building to political consolidation. Conclusion: The real BRICS challenge is not the West—itself The strategic significance of the New Delhi Summit lies in the fact that BRICS is no longer simply demanding a larger share of an existing system. It is beginning to influence the rules governing finance, technology, trade and global governance. But its greatest challenge is internal. China wants greater systemic transformation. India wants reform without Chinese domination. Russia seeks relief from Western isolation. Iran seeks diplomatic space. The Gulf states seek strategic diversification. Brazil and South Africa emphasise Global South representation and development. These interests overlap—but they do not coincide. Consequently, BRICS is unlikely to become a monolithic alternative to the US-led order in the foreseeable future. Its more plausible role is that of a counterweight, negotiating platform and incubator of alternative institutions. Its strategy can be summed up as: reform existing institutions, build parallel capacity, increase Global South representation, reduce dependence on any single power. That is why the phrase “rule-shaper, not rule-taker” captures the significance of New Delhi. The real contest is no longer simply between a “Western” and a “non-Western” order. It is over who gets to define the rules of the next international system. India's achievement at New Delhi was to ensure that BRICS did not become China's instrument for that transformation. China's achievement was to ensure that BRICS moved another step towards becoming a platform through which Beijing can shape the emerging multipolar order. The future of BRICS will depend on which of these two tendencies ultimately prevails. For now, the evidence suggests that BRICS is neither dismantling the existing order nor accepting it unchanged. It is trying to reshape it from within while building alternatives alongside it. That may prove to be a slower transformation than the rhetoric of a “new world order” suggests—but potentially a more durable one.- Sep 15, 2026
- Viren S Doshi
