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May 19, 2026
Siddhartha Dave

Press Freedom Lectures from Europe? Bharat Has the Right to Ask Questions Too

The recent drama created by Helle Lyng Svendsen during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Norway visit says more about the growing desperation of sections of the Western commentary ecosystem than about Bharat itself. As PM Modi concluded a formal joint statement with Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and walked away from the podium, a voice from the audience suddenly shouted: “Prime Minister Modi, why don’t you take some questions from the freest in the world?” The clip was quickly circulated online. Predictably, it was amplified by anti-Modi activists, sections of Western media, and India’s usual political ecosystem eager to portray Bharat as intolerant and authoritarian. But the episode itself was hardly an example of serious journalism. This was not a press conference. It was a structured diplomatic joint statement. By the time the question was shouted, PM Modi had already turned away and was exiting the venue. There was no realistic expectation of an answer. The purpose was visual theatre, social media virality, and narrative creation. The timing was equally revealing. PM Modi’s multi-nation visit to Europe and the UAE had largely gone well diplomatically and strategically. Naturally, some attempt had to be made to shift the conversation away from outcomes and back toward the familiar themes of “democracy” and “press freedom.” The larger issue, however, is not one Norwegian commentator. It is the increasingly questionable credibility of the global ecosystem that lectures Bharat on democracy while applying completely inconsistent standards elsewhere. Consider the so-called press freedom rankings. These rankings routinely place Bharat far below countries facing political instability, censorship concerns, military influence, or institutional breakdown. The logic often appears detached from reality. Ukraine ranks significantly higher despite operating under wartime information controls. The United States, celebrated as a model democracy, witnessed years of media reluctance to aggressively pursue uncomfortable questions surrounding elite scandals like the Epstein files. Countries struggling with deep instability and state pressure often continue receiving better rankings than Bharat. And yet Bharat is pushed down to 157. This despite being home to the world’s largest electoral exercise. This despite opposition parties governing several states while another party rules at the Centre. This despite thousands of television debates, newspapers, digital platforms, YouTube channels, and social media users criticising the Prime Minister, the judiciary, the military, and national institutions daily. India’s media ecosystem is not silent. It is arguably among the loudest and most chaotic in the world. One may criticise sensationalism. One may debate journalistic standards. One may question political bias. But to suggest Bharat lacks media freedom requires ignoring visible reality. The problem increasingly appears ideological rather than empirical. For many Western institutions, “free media” often seems to mean media that aligns with a particular ideological worldview. Anything outside that framework is quickly labelled nationalist, authoritarian, or problematic. This is where the hypocrisy becomes impossible to ignore. European commentators routinely question Bharat’s democratic credentials while rarely confronting their own historical baggage with the same intensity. Take the Netherlands and the broader Dutch colonial legacy. Has the Dutch establishment fully acknowledged the scale of exploitation carried out under the Dutch East India Company across Asia, including Bharat? The global discussion on slavery focuses overwhelmingly on the Atlantic world. Far less attention is given to the Indian Ocean slave trade run by European colonial powers. During the 17th and 18th centuries, the VOC operated a vast slave trading network across Asia. One of its principal centres was Pulicat on the Coromandel Coast, anchored by Fort Geldria. Historical research suggests that tens of thousands of Indians were forcibly transported to Batavia and other Dutch-controlled territories between 1621 and 1665 alone. Men, women, and children displaced by famine, war, regional collapse, and colonial opportunism were reduced to tradable cargo. Many were Bengalis captured after Arakanese raids. Others came from regions destabilised after the collapse of the Vijayanagar Empire. Victims of famine were commodified and shipped across Dutch colonial networks. In Dutch-controlled Cochin on the Malabar Coast, enslaved populations were transported to Ceylon, Batavia, and the Cape colonies under brutal conditions marked by starvation, disease, and high mortality. Yet these chapters rarely dominate Europe’s modern moral discourse. The issue here is not that Bharat is beyond criticism. No democracy is perfect. The issue is selective outrage. When countries with histories of colonial exploitation and continuing geopolitical double standards attempt to lecture Bharat while ignoring their own contradictions, the moral authority of such criticism naturally weakens. The same pattern is visible in the debate around PM Modi supposedly “avoiding questions.” The assumption that democracy can only function through Western-style open press conferences is itself deeply Eurocentric. PM Modi communicates extensively through speeches, interviews, Parliament, elections, public outreach, and digital platforms. More importantly, he continues receiving repeated electoral mandates from the people of Bharat. Ultimately, democratic legitimacy comes from citizens, not from the approval of elite Western commentary circles. What truly unsettles sections of the global establishment today is not merely Bharat’s political rise. It is Bharat’s intellectual decolonisation. For decades, the West assumed the right to define democracy, secularism, freedom, and legitimacy for the rest of the world. That monopoly is weakening. Modern Bharat is increasingly asserting its right to define itself through its own civilisational experiences and democratic realities rather than borrowed European frameworks. And perhaps that is the real discomfort behind these recurring lectures on “press freedom.” Jai Hind. PS: This article was first published at https://organiser.org/author/siddhartha-dave/

May 18, 2026
Viren S Doshi

Taiwan’s Shield: Trump, TRA, and the Tightening Indo-Pacific

Overview The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) (Public Law 96-8, enacted April 10, 1979) remains the legal foundation of unofficial but robust United States relations with Taiwan. Taiwan identifies itself as the Republic of China (RoC). RoC includes the democratically governed island and ambitiously, as per the still prevalent constitutional position, mainland China too. But its position on mainland China being part of it is a bit ambiguous, as the democratic island effectively cools down with time on gaining the mainland, while not being keen on declaring independent statehood separate from the mainland. Though it wants the status quo, it also wants the world to practically consider it as a nation. On the other hand, the mainland was forcefully captured by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 and got diplomatic recognition after more than two decades. It named China as the People's Republic of China (PRC) and claims that the island of Taiwan is also part of it and threatens that it would capture Taiwan by force. So, there are two Chinas since 1949 - RoC and PRC - a democratic and a Communist - both wanting the whole of China ultimately to have One China. Though Taiwan has now preferred to remain confined to the island as a democratic entity, maintaining the status quo as it is since 1949. The US Congress enacted TRC after the Carter administration switched diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China (CCP-OCCUPIED China) on January 1, 1979. The TRA enables extensive commercial, cultural, and defence ties without formal diplomatic relations. Core Provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) The TRA’s key elements include: Defence Support: The United States will provide Taiwan with defence articles and services “in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence capability.” It declares any non-peaceful effort (including coercion) against Taiwan “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Unofficial Framework: Relations operate via the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). Economic/Cultural Continuity and Congressional Oversight: Taiwan receives treatment equivalent to other foreign countries under many U.S. laws. The President must report threats to Taiwan to the US Congress. The TRA underpins “strategic” ambiguity while mandating support for Taiwan’s defence. One China Principle vs. One China Policy CCP-OCCUPIED China insists on the One China Principle: One indivisible China, with Taiwan as an inalienable part, and the PRC as its sole legitimate government. CCP refuses diplomatic relations with countries recognising Taiwan and has not ruled out force for unification. CCP misleadingly claims that all countries having diplomatic relations with PRC have accepted One China as defined by it, but this is not true. Many countries have not given recognition or acceptance but have only acknowledged CCP claims for One China, nothing more than that. And many countries, some formally and others informally, have maintained relations with Taiwan. The U.S. One China Policy acknowledges the PRC as the sole legal government of China (since 1979) while “acknowledging” (without endorsing) the CCP’s position on Taiwan. The U.S. maintains unofficial ties with Taiwan, takes no position on sovereignty disputes, and bases its approach on the TRA, the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués (1972 Shanghai, 1979, 1982), and the Six Assurances (1982) to Taiwan. These assurances include no set date for ending arms sales, no mediation pressure, and no alteration of Taiwan’s sovereignty stance. The TRA explicitly conditions U.S.-PRC normalisation on peaceful resolution expectations. Economic Relations, Security Ties, and Arms Sales Taiwan is a vital partner, especially in semiconductors (producing over 60% globally and >90% of the most advanced). The U.S.-Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) dates to 1994. Taiwan has made major purchases of U.S. goods. Arms Sales (TRA-mandated): December 2025: Record $11+ billion package (HIMARS, M109A7 howitzers, ATACMS, Javelins, ALTIUS loitering munitions, Harpoons, TOW missiles, tactical networks, etc.). A ~$14 billion follow-on package (including PAC-3 MSE interceptors, NASAMS air defence, etc.) remains pending/held in abeyance as of mid-May 2026. Taiwan’s legislature had approved $25 billion in special defence funds for U.S. weapons. Recent contracts: ~$6.6 billion signed in April 2026 for HIMARS, howitzers, missiles, etc. Backlog and deliveries continue (e.g., Abrams tanks, ALTIUS drones progressing). From 2019–2023, the U.S. supplied nearly all of Taiwan’s major arms imports. Ongoing aspects include high-level visits (facilitated by the 2018 Taiwan Travel Act), support for Taiwan’s international participation, and deepening semiconductor/economic cooperation. Trump’s Recent Remarks - What it means Following his summit with CCP Supremo Xi Jinping in Beijing (May 13-15, 2026), President Trump made these statements in a Fox News interview with Bret Baier and aboard Air Force One: Fox News Interview with Bret Baier: Baier: “Should the people of Taiwan feel more or less secure after your meetings with President Xi?” Trump: “Neutral. This has been going on for years.” Baier (on policy): “Has the policy changed at all?” Trump: “No, nothing’s changed. ... I will say this: I’m not looking to have somebody go independent. ... we’re supposed to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war. I’m not looking for that. I want them to cool down. I want China to cool down.” Baier (on pending arms): Pressed on approving billions in weapons. Trump: “I’m holding that in abeyance and it depends on China... It’s a very good negotiating chip for us, frankly. ... We’re not looking to have wars. If you kept it the way it is, I think China is going to be OK with that. But we’re not looking to have somebody say, ‘Let’s go independent because the United States is backing us.’” Aboard Air Force One with Journalists: Trump noted extensive talks on Taiwan and arms sales. “I made no commitment either way... That question [would the U.S. defend Taiwan?] was asked to me... I said I don’t talk about that.” He would consult Taiwan’s leader. Xi “feels very strongly” and “doesn’t want to see a movement for independence.” Interpretation keeping in view Trump’s Candid, Transactional Style: Trump’s blunt, pragmatic language reflects his “America First” negotiating approach—projecting strength through unpredictability, avoiding open-ended commitments, and using leverage for U.S. advantage without yielding core interests. He repeatedly affirmed “nothing’s changed” while warning against unilateral disruption (especially formal independence moves). The “negotiating chip” phrasing ties to encouraging mutual restraint (“cool down”) rather than abandoning Taiwan. His assertive delivery and first-term record of the highest arms sales signal deterrence through ambiguity, not concession. Reactions from Taiwan and Allies Taiwan responded measuredly but firmly: President Lai Ching-te: “Taiwan will never be sacrificed or traded away... Only the Taiwanese people can decide their future.” Taiwan is “a sovereign and independent democratic nation.” He thanked Trump for record arms support and called U.S. weapons the “most important deterrent.” MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan: Welcomed U.S. reaffirmations of unchanged policy. Japan (under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, a follower of Shinzo Abe, in office since October 2025): Takaichi has accelerated defence spending to 2% of GDP ahead of schedule, described a Taiwan contingency as a potential “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, and strengthened ties with the Philippines via defence pacts and missile exports. She updated Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, emphasising resilience against coercion. Philippines: Expanded U.S. alliance through record Balikatan 2026 exercises (17,000 troops from multiple nations, including Japan), counter-landing drills near the South China Sea, U.S. Typhon missile deployments, and multilateral maritime activities with Japan and the U.S. in the Philippines’ EEZ. Quad: The U.S., Japan, Australia, and India are advancing cooperation. U.S. Ambassador to India Sergio Gor has emphasised reviving and strengthening the Quad for maritime security, resilient supply chains, critical minerals, and countering coercion in the Indo-Pacific. Foreign ministers plan to meet in New Delhi in late May 2026. Global Conflict Context: Indo-Pacific Heating As the Middle East trends toward cooling (post-ceasefires and de-escalation), the Western Hemisphere stabilises (reduced tensions in Venezuela and Cuba), and Africa sees easing in hotspots like Ethiopia and Nigeria, the Indo-Pacific is warming. Heightened grey-zone activities, military modernisation, and territorial pressures by CCP-OCCUPIED China drive this shift. Japan leads under Takaichi’s Abe-inspired assertiveness, with the Philippines reinforcing front-line defences and the Quad gaining momentum. South Asia remains a potential secondary theatre. This realignment underscores the strategic priority of Taiwan and the First Island Chain. Evaluation: Shift in Position? Nixon/Kissinger, Trump, and Risks Under the TRA’s flexibility, Trump’s remarks represent tactical transactional emphasis rather than a fundamental shift. The core framework endures with ongoing arms flows and policy reaffirmations. Nixon and Kissinger’s Opening: Legitimised the regime, enabled its rise with weak guardrails, creating long-term challenges—a significant miscalculation in hindsight. Trump Repeating It? No—his competitive, leverage-based approach differs sharply. Emboldenment Risk: Moderate short-term if misread, but Trump’s style, ally actions (Japan/Philippines/Quad), and capability-building likely deter aggression while promoting stability through strength. Conclusion The TRA has balanced U.S. interests for over 45 years, supporting Taiwan’s democracy and global supply chains amid managing ties with CCP-OCCUPIED China. Trump’s candid May 2026 remarks add transactional candour amid a heating Indo-Pacific, where allies like Japan (under Takaichi) and the Philippines are stepping up, backed by a revitalising Quad. Xi Jinping issued strong warnings on Taiwan risks leading to clashes during and before the summit but has not publicly asserted a new rigid, short-term unification deadline afterward. Post-visit, the Chinese side has actively built a narrative of U.S. yielding by selectively twisting Trump’s transactional language on arms sales and restraint, portraying it as American acceptance of CCP’s core interests. U.S. officials have countered by reaffirming no policy change. Historical lessons stress the value of credible deterrence; pragmatic flexibility paired with allied resolve best preserves the peaceful status quo. It remains to be seen whether the Indo-Pacific warms up further or this interaction puts shrewd CCP juggernaut on hold for at least now till Trump is in the White House.