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Sep 30, 2026
Rohit KA

Norway’s Quiet Ascendancy in the North Sea: A Test of British Energy Sovereignty

The Unasked Question Britain’s North Sea oil and gas industry is undergoing a transformation that has received surprisingly little attention in mainstream political debate. As British and American energy companies withdraw from the basin, citing high taxes and regulatory uncertainty, a Norwegian state-backed company is consolidating its position as the dominant operator of what remains. The question is straightforward, yet it has not been posed clearly in Westminster: who controls Britain’s energy infrastructure, and does that arrangement serve British national interests? The answer matters for reasons that extend beyond energy policy. It touches on economic sovereignty, diplomatic leverage, and the long-term security of a country that still depends on fossil fuels for a significant share of its energy supply, even as it pursues an ambitious transition to renewable power. The Corporate Exodus The departure of international oil companies from the UK North is no longer a matter of speculation. It is a documented trend, visible in a sequence of transactions over the past two years. BP, the company whose initials stand for British Petroleum, is in advanced discussions to sell its entire North Sea portfolio, ending more than six decades of operations in the basin that built the modern company. Apache, a Texas-based independent operator, has announced its exit from the UK by 2029, explicitly citing 78 per cent effective tax rate as the reason its operations have become uneconomic. Harbour Energy, the largest independent operator in the North Sea, has reduced its UK workforce and said its growth strategy lies abroad. These are not distressed sales by failing companies. They are strategic decisions by sophisticated global operators who have assessed the British fiscal and regulatory environment and concluded that their capital is better deployed elsewhere. Into this vacuum has stepped Equinor, a company majority-owned by the Norwegian government. Equinor already supplies approximately 30 per cent of the UK’s gas demand and 15% of its oil demand, according to the company’s own disclosures. The Grantham Research Institute at the London School of Economics estimates the gas figure may be closer to 30 per cent, noting that “British investors receive only a fraction of its profits” from a company whose controlling shareholder is a foreign state. The Adura Merger In December 2025, Equinor and Shell completed a transaction that fundamentally altered the structure of the UK North Sea industry. The two companies merged their entire UK offshore operations into a joint venture called Adura, a 50:50 incorporated entity that is now the largest independent oil and gas producer in the UK North Sea, according to Industry analysts at Wood Mackenzie. The deal brought together twelve major fields, including Rosebank and Jackdaw, the two largest undeveloped projects in the basin, along with established producing assets such as Mariner, Buzzard, Clair, and Schiehallion. The combined entity is expected to produce more oil and gas from UK waters in 2026 than any other single operator. On its face, this is a commercial transaction between two private companies. But the ownership structure matters. Equinor is 67% owned by the Norwegian State; Shell, although a private company, is headquartered in the UK and subject to British corporate law. The joint venture, Adura, is incorporated in the UK and regulated by British authorities. But the company's strategic direction is shaped, in part, by a foreign government that has a direct financial interest in the regulatory and fiscal stability of the UK North Sea. This is not inherently problematic. Joint ventures are common in the oil and gas industry, and foreign investment in British energy infrastructure is not new. But the scale of this consolidation, occurring at a moment when other international operators are exiting, raises a question that British policymakers have not yet addressed. What are the long-term implications for UK energy sovereignty when a foreign state-backed company becomes the single most important operator of the country’s remaining hydrocarbon resources? The Government’s Response The British government’s response to the Adura merger has unfolded along two distinct tracks, one focused on tax, the other on energy policy. Neither has produced a clear answer. The Tax question In November 2025, shortly after the Shell-Equinor merger was announced, a coalition of campaign groups, including Stop Rosebank, Global Witness, Tax Justice UK, and the End Fuel Poverty Coalition, wrote to Chancellor Rachel Reeves requesting an investigation into the transaction. The group’s concern was specific. They argued that the merger could allow Shell to offset its UK tax liabilities against accumulated losses and investment allowances that Equinor had built up separately, potentially reducing the combined entity’s tax burden by up to 1.3 billion pounds over the life of the venture. The letter described the transaction as “a blatant effort by two extraordinarily wealthy mega-polluters to evade their fair contributions to the UK economy.” Shell rejected the accusation. A company spokesperson told Energy Voice that the analysis was “flawed,” noting that Shell paid $1.45 billion in UK corporate income tax in 2023 alone, that the combined tax rate on North Sea production already stands at 78%, and that the company has invested billions of pounds over the past decade producing energy for British consumers. The spokesperson added that Adura “is being set up to sustain domestic production and, as the largest operator in the North Sea, is also expected to be a major contributor of tax to the UK government over its lifetime.” The Treasury’s response has been silence. Officials have stated only that the department “does not comment on the tax situations of individual companies.” Nearly ten months after the letter to the Chancellor, no formal investigation has been announced, and no parliamentary committee has taken up the matter. The merger proceeded without regulatory intervention, and Adura has begun operations as the UK’s largest independent North Sea producer. This matters for the broader question of energy sovereignty. When a structural concern was raised about how a foreign state-backed company was consolidating British assets, the government’s response was not met with scrutiny. It was inaction. The Rosebank and Jackdaw decision The second track is more consequential, because it involves the government’s actual power to approve or reject production. Rosebank and Jackdaw, the two flagship projects now owned by Adura, had their original development consents quashed by a UK court in January 2025 over inadequate assessment of downstream emissions. Adura was required to resubmit environmental assessments, and public consultations on both projects closed in mid-August 2026. The final decision now rests with Energy Secretary Miatta Fahnbulleh, with Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s government expected to announce its position in September 2026. The government’s public stance has attempted to reconcile two contradictory positions. Officials. Officials describe the North Sea as “a vital national asset” that supports jobs, growth, and energy security, while simultaneously insisting that oil and gas will play only a transitional role “alongside” the shift to renewable power, not instead of it. Prime Minister Burnham has acknowledged publicly that Britain “cannot” ignore the oil and gas resources in its own waters, a statement that marks a shift from the more categorical opposition expressed by the previous Starmer administration. But the Labour Party remains divided. According to Jill Rutter, a researcher at the Institute for Government quoted by AFP, some Labour figures prioritise “security of supply, low energy prices, and the jobs that come with them,” while others insist that “the most important thing remains the commitment to carbon neutrality.” This is not a technical disagreement. It is a genuine ideological fault line within the governing party, and it is playing out in public while Adura’s investment decisions remain paused. Adura has made clear that this uncertainty carries a cost. In August 2026, a company executive told Energy Voice that further investment in the UK assets depends entirely on “signals” from the government, specifically the decision on Rosebank and Jackdaw. The executive noted that while the UK has banned new exploration licenses, it will permit “tie-backs” connecting new wells to existing infrastructure under the legislation coming into force. But the two flagship projects remain in limbo. Sources close to the process told the Telegraph in mid-August that Burnham was “minded” to approve Jackdaw, the smaller gas field, given pressure to secure domestic winter gas supply. Adura’s leadership has said a swift decision could see Jackdaw producing gas by winter. Rosebank’s fate, however, is considered less certain, with Labour insiders reportedly warning the industry to “brace” for a possible rejection. What this indecision reveals Neither response amounts to a strategy. And in the absence of a strategy, the practical outcome is that Adura, backed by Norwegian state capital, continues to consolidate its position as the dominant operator in British waters almost by default, simply because no one in Westminster has decided to stop it, redirect it, or actively manage it. This is how “quiet ascendancy happens. It is not a dramatic takeover; it is not a hostile acquisition announced in a fanfare. It is a foreign state - backed company accumulating operational control over British energy infrastructure while the British government argues internally and fails to resolve questions that campaigners flagged nearly a year ago. Equinor and Shell are not illegal. The merger was completed within existing UK law, and Shell has published detailed figures defending its tax contributions. But legality is distinct from strategic wisdom. Britain has allowed one company, jointly controlled by a foreign government, to become the single most important operator of its remaining oil and gas reserves, at the exact moment its own government cannot agree on what it wants that operator to do next. Significance to the British Citizens The stakes here extend beyond corporate balance sheets and tax filings. British households pay their energy bills based on wholesale prices that are shaped, in part, by how much oil and gas Britain produces domestically versus how much it imports. When domestic production falls and import dependency rises, prices become more exposed to global shocks, whether that is conflict in the Middle East, supply disruptions in Norway, or diplomatic disputes along the tanker routes that bring liquified gas into British ports. If Equinor continues to grow its share of British production, the immediate effect on consumer bills may be limited, since gas is gas regardless of who extracts it. But the strategic effect is different. A future British government negotiating with Norway over fishing rights, EU relations, or defence cooperation may find that Norway’s position is strengthened by the fact that a Norwegian state company controls a meaningful share of Britain’s own energy supply chain. That leverage does not appear on household energy bills. It appears in diplomatic rooms, in trade negotiations, and in moments of crisis when governments need to move quickly This is also why the stalled tax investigation matters beyond the £ 1.3 billion quoted by campaigners. If the British government cannot or will not scrutinise how a foreign state-backed company structures its tax affairs when merging with British economic sovereignty, keeping pace with how modern energy companies organise themselves across borders. The Test ahead Energy Secretary Miatta Fahnbulleh looks set to endorse the Jackdaw project near Aberdeen, with formal greenlight likely coming within weeks. Given that substantial infrastructure is already established, gas extraction might commence prior to the upcoming winter season. Meanwhile, the environmental assessment for Rosebank remains under active consideration by ministers. Internal deliberations have turned to whether approval could be paired with conditions requiring a share of project revenues to be directed into British renewable energy initiatives should final consent be granted. Corporate leaders caution that additional delays to development permits could accelerate the departure of major energy firms from British waters. Conversely, environmental groups contend that proceeding with these ventures will undermine national climate targets and unleash substantial carbon emissions. Either way, the decision will not resolve the underlying structural question. Equinor’s 27% share of UK gas supply, its 15% share of UK oil, and its 50% stake in the country’s largest independent North Sea producer are not going to change based on a single ministerial ruling on two fields. Those numbers reflect transactions that have already happened. The Rosebank and Jackdaw decision will only determine whether that position keeps growing, or whether Britain finally starts asking harder questions about who is running its energy sector, and whether that arrangement serves British interests over the next decade. For now, the honest answer is that nobody in government has definitively answered that question. The tax investigation stalled. The production decision is pending. And Adura, patiently, keeps waiting for its signal. A Question of Sovereignty The North Sea is not dying because the oil has run out. It is dying because politics has made extraction economically unviable. And in the Middle of an energy security crisis, with prices rising, import dependency deepening, and the renewable transition still a decade from maturity, that is a failure with consequences that extend well beyond any single company’s balance sheet. Westminster built this problem through an accumulation of decisions that were each in isolation, defensible. It can begin to resolve it through a similarly structured sequence of decisions, each individually modest, collectively transformative. The question whether the incoming government understands the urgency that the corporate world has already priced in. Britain’s energy sovereignty is not an abstract concept. It is the sum of decisions made in boardrooms, in ministries, and in parliamentary committees about who controls the infrastructure that powers the country. Those decisions are being made now, whether Westminster acts or not. The only question is whether they will be made with British interests. References https://www.upstreamonline.com/production/us-operator-to-exit-uk-north-sea-by-2029-due-to-uneconomic-tax-hikes-regulations/2-1-1736701?zephr_sso_ott=NocP4Z https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/US-Apache-to-Exit-UK-North-Sea-Due-To-Windfall-Tax.html https://www.equinor.com/where-we-are/united-kingdom https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/news/why-the-british-government-must-stand-firm-against-further-north-sea-oil-and-gas-development/ https://www.woodmac.com/press-releases/2024-press-releases/shell-and-equinor-combination-creates-a-new-uk-superpower/ https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/shells-adura-will-see-oil-giant-dodge-13-billion-in-uk-tax/ https://www.energyvoice.com/oilandgas/north-sea/583559/climate-protestors-target-shell-equinor-adura-north-sea-oil-gas-rosebank/ https://www.energyvoice.com/oilandgas/north-sea/583559/climate-protestors-target-shell-equinor-adura-north-sea-oil-gas-rosebank/

Sep 30, 2026
Rudra Dubey

Building India’s Global Leadership in Innovative Biopharma

The NITI Frontier Tech Hub’s recent consultation offers an opportunity to connect work already underway across government, research institutions, industry, and investors. India has experience developing and supplying medicines at scale. The next shared ambition could be to take more Indian-origin innovative products from discovery to demonstrated clinical benefit, international approval, and sustained value for India. A 2026 review identified 1,095 drug projects or molecules pursued by Indian companies from the mid-1990s through 2025, including 98 classified at Phase I, 63 at Phase II, 19 at Phase III, and 21 approved drugs or treatments. These are different projects at different stages—not a clinical success rate. They provide a useful starting point for examining which types of support help promising assets advance. India can build on product experience as well: ROTAVAC received WHO prequalification; NexCAR19 established an indigenous CAR-T pathway; and nafithromycin received Indian marketing authorisation. Each followed a distinct route, so each offers practical lessons for future product teams. Relevant lessons from international experience The most useful comparisons are specific examples of how research, development, and commercial capabilities have been joined. Their figures are not directly comparable to India’s pipeline totals. International example Verified outcome Opportunity for India United States: A Connected Translational network The NIH Clinical and Translational Science Awards program funds more than 60 medical institutions and explicitly supports shared expertise, partnerships, training, and improvements from early translation through clinical research. As Biopharma SHAKTI and ICMR expand clinical capacity, connect selected sites with specialist development services and common quality measures. The value of a network lies in the studies it can execute together. Japan: retain a role in a Global Partnership Daiichi Sankyo partnered with AstraZeneca in 2019 to develop and commercialise its antibody–drug conjugate Enhertu globally, while retaining exclusive Japanese rights and responsibility for manufacturing. Their agreement included a $1.35 billion upfront payment and shared development costs and profits outside Japan. The companies reported $4.982 billion in combined Enhertu sales in 2025. The upfront payment, potential milestones, and product sales are different financial measures and should not be added together. Help Indian innovators prepare differentiated assets for international partnerships while negotiating deliberately over retained rights, manufacturing, future development, and value sharing. A global oncology company: develop an original asset across markets BeOne Medicines traces its BTK inhibitor zanubrutinib from its discovery program into international clinical development and FDA approval in 2019. It reported $3.9 billion in global BRUKINSA sales in 2025, including $2.8 billion in the United States. This is one company’s experience, not a national benchmark. Plan target-market evidence and clinical development early enough that an Indian-origin product can compete internationally, whether the innovator commercialises it directly or with a partner. Global R&D commitment: sustain a portfolio Roche reported CHF 10.4 billion in pharmaceutical R&D expenditure in 2025 and a pipeline of 66 new molecular entities across 107 projects. Its scale cannot be transferred directly to India or an individual Indian company. Design public and private finance to support successive product milestones and a portfolio of assets, while allowing rigorous decisions to stop programs whose evidence does not justify further investment. These examples suggest several possible routes to global value. A product can be developed through a connected research network, advanced by an Indian company internationally, or partnered with a global company while the Indian innovator retains meaningful rights and participation. India can support all three. A joint agenda for NITI Aayog and partner agencies 1. Select a portfolio around patient need and product potential. NITI Aayog could convene DBT/BIRAC, the Department of Pharmaceuticals, ICMR, CDSCO, clinicians, companies, and investors to agree on selection criteria for Indian-origin assets. Each selected program would have a target product profile covering its intended patients, evidence of differentiation, development requirements, intellectual property, and potential markets. Independent reviews at successive milestones would help teams make timely decisions. 2. Connect funding across the full development path. BIRAC’s early and later support, the National Biopharma Mission, PRIP, and the RDI scheme provide complementary starting points. The practical step is to make the transition between them predictable for an asset that meets agreed evidence standards. PRIP’s ₹5,000-crore framework covers novel entities alongside other product categories; the ₹1-lakh-crore RDI scheme offers a wider financing framework. Reporting innovative therapeutics separately would make their contribution to this particular ambition visible. 3. Organise facilities around the package a product team must deliver. NITI’s proposed bioinnovation clusters, DBT/BIRAC facilities, and NIPER expertise could provide connected access to validated assays, toxicology, CMC development, GMP clinical supply, bioanalysis, and regulatory support. Shared facilities would then be assessed by the quality and timeliness of completed product-development work. 4. Make the clinical network a distinctive Indian strength. Biopharma SHAKTI proposes ₹10,000 crore over five years and more than 1,000 accredited clinical-trial sites. Working with ICMR’s INTENT network, partners could develop therapeutic-area groups with common training and measures for recruitment, retention, data quality, and inspection readiness. That would help Indian-origin programs generate evidence suited to their intended markets. 5. Build partnership and market planning into development. The Daiichi Sankyo example shows why a licensing agreement should be evaluated for the rights and long-term participation it preserves, as well as its initial payment. NITI’s proposed IP and investment coordination functions could help teams prepare for regulatory engagement, due diligence, licensing negotiations, and commercialisation. A Shared Measure of Success The participating bodies could follow supported Indian-origin innovative assets through clinical phases, regulatory decisions by jurisdiction, international licenses, payments received, original-product sales, and royalties retained in India. Indian approval, WHO prequalification, FDA approval, and EMA approval should be recorded as distinct achievements. Aggregated public reporting could show national progress while protecting confidential product information. This would give each initiative a clear contribution to a common outcome. India’s 2035 bioeconomy leadership would be demonstrated most convincingly by products that improve care across borders and create enduring value for the Indian institutions and companies that originated them.