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Jun 10, 2026
Prasad Peketi

PIoJK on the Boil: How Britain’s Mirpuri Diaspora Is Putting Pakistan on the Spot

For years, Pakistan’s establishment has tried to keep the international spotlight fixed on Kashmir by accusing India of repression in the Valley. But events in Pakistan ILLEGALLY - occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PIoJK) are now telling a very different story. Across Muzaffarabad, Rawalakot, Mirpur and nearby areas, protests in June 2026 have erupted not because of India, but because local people are angry with Pakistan itself. The immediate triggers are basic enough: steep electricity bills, shortages of essential goods such as flour, and a long-festering sense that decisions affecting their lives are taken elsewhere. What makes this moment especially striking is that sections of the Mirpuri diaspora in Britain, which once echoed Pakistan’s line on Kashmir, are now turning their attention to Islamabad’s own conduct. It is important not to misread these protests. This is not, at least for now, a movement demanding merger with India. It is a backlash against everyday injustice and a political structure that many locals see as stacked against them. The Mangla Dam remains central to that anger. Built in the 1960s on Mirpuri land, it displaced entire communities and sent thousands abroad, yet many in the region still feel they have never received a fair share of the benefits. Electricity generated from their land flows outward, while locals complain of paying heavy tariffs. The political grievance runs even deeper. In the legislative structure of Pakistan, called “AJK”, 12 of the 45 directly elected seats are reserved for so-called Kashmiri refugees living in Pakistan proper. In practice, those seats often strengthen the hand of Pakistan’s mainstream parties rather than local voices. That is why the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) has demanded their removal. Courts in the region have indicated that these seats cannot simply be wished away without constitutional change, which only underlines how tightly the system is locked. When the JAAC called a shutdown on 9 June, Islamabad answered with a familiar script: anti-terror charges, communications blackouts, detentions and lethal force. That response did not calm the situation. If anything, it confirmed what many protesters were already saying about who really holds power. The demographic question also deserves a clearer look, because Pakistan often uses the word “Kashmir” as though it covers one seamless political and cultural reality. It does not. The people of PoJK are not the same as the Valley’s ethnic Kashmiris in Srinagar, with whom international audiences usually associate the Kashmir issue. Much of the population in PIoJK is Pahari-Pothwari and Mirpuri-speaking, with social roots closer to the Potohar belt. That distinction matters. It helps explain why local grievances in PIoJK have their own history and their own political texture. Gilgit-Baltistan shows how different Pakistan’s approach can be in another occupied region. There, demographic change over decades has been far more deliberate and far more visible. A region once dominated by Shia communities saw increasing settlement from Sunni populations brought in from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, especially from the 1970s onward. Land allocation, administrative influence and military presence all played a part in changing the balance. PIoJK has not undergone demographic engineering on the same scale, but that should not obscure the depth of alienation now visible on the ground. There is another layer to this crisis, and it is one Pakistan’s establishment would prefer not to discuss openly. Any prolonged unrest in peripheral regions raises uncomfortable questions for the army, especially when troops are deployed against populations that share regional, ethnic or social links with sections of the rank and file. The Pakistan Army remains heavily Punjabi in composition, and that imbalance has long shaped how power is seen across the federation. If resentment in PIoJK continues to grow, it may not immediately produce open dissent within the military, but it could deepen unease in quieter ways. At a time when Pakistan is already grappling with Balochistan Liberation Fighters, economic stress and widening internal fractures, even muted strain inside the security apparatus would matter. The international angle becomes more significant when one looks at the Mirpuri diaspora in Britain. This is not a marginal community. It is large, politically aware and deeply connected to families back in Mirpur and the surrounding areas. Many are descendants of those displaced by the Mangla Dam, and those historical memories have not disappeared with migration. In parts of Bradford, Birmingham, Leeds, Luton and other urban centres, Mirpuri networks carry real political weight. The biraderi system, built around clan and kinship ties, has long influenced how communities mobilise and how candidates are backed. British politicians know this very well. In some constituencies, these networks can shape campaigns, selections and turnout. For years, that influence often worked in ways that supported Pakistan’s broader narrative on Kashmir. What is changing now is not the existence of that influence, but its direction. When phones went dead in Mirpur and Kotli and reports of detentions began circulating in June 2026, the reaction in Britain was swift. Families were suddenly unable to reach relatives. Community networks activated almost instantly. People began writing to MPs, speaking out in public and pushing the issue beyond private WhatsApp groups into formal politics. The letter sent by more than 50 MPs to the Foreign Secretary mattered for that reason. So did the protests outside Pakistani diplomatic offices. The significance of these developments lies not only in the criticism of Pakistan, but in who is voicing it. Communities that once helped amplify Islamabad’s position abroad are now exposing its contradictions. That is politically embarrassing for Pakistan, and it is not something it can dismiss as Indian propaganda. The wider geopolitical context only makes the moment more delicate for Islamabad. Pakistan is under financial pressure, remains tied to Chinese strategic and debt commitments, and is simultaneously trying to retain Western interest through access to mineral resources in its northern regions. But those larger calculations do not erase the immediate political reality in PIoJK. Local anger is real, and it is directed at Pakistan’s own methods of control. India should recognise that fact without romanticising it. The protests are not a sudden pro-India uprising, and any attempt to project them as one would be a mistake. The more prudent course for New Delhi is to stay measured, keep attention on the human and political rights issues involved, and allow Pakistan’s own contradictions to remain in public view. For decades, Islamabad has spoken in the name of Kashmir. What is unfolding now in PIoJK suggests that many people there are no longer willing to let that claim go unchallenged.

Jun 09, 2026
Rohit KA & Dr A Adityanjee

Great Nicobar: India’s Geoeconomic Gateway to the Indo‑Pacific

Introduction The Great Nicobar transhipment port project is more than an infrastructural plan.It is India’s attempt to anchor itself at the junction of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, capture the regional transhipment traffic and give tangible maritime content to its Look East/ Act East policy. By leveraging the island’s location near key sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and integrating the port with an airport, power plant, and township, India hopes to reposition itself within Indo-Pacific trade and connectivity networks. Background To understand the Great Nicobar Project, it is first necessary to position itself within India’s broader journey in the Indo-Pacific and the evolution of its Look East/Act East policy. understand India’s larger journey in the Indo-Pacific and the evolution of its Look East/Act East policy. In the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War and India’s own economic reforms, New Delhi realised that its future economic growth and security would depend heavily on linkages with Southeast Asia rather than just the subcontinent. India was not welcome in the APEC due to resistance from some of the ASEAN countries like Malaysia and later due to opposition by China and the US. The Look East Policy was launched to build trade, diplomatic, and cultural ties with ASEAN countries, signalling that India wanted to “Look” beyond its near abroad or the so-called South Asia region. Over time, this “Look East Policy” turned into an Act East policy. This more active, implementation-oriented framework focused on physical connectivity, trade integration, and security cooperation in the wider Indo-Pacific. The idea was no longer just to talk or sign agreements but more to invest in roads, ports, air links, and regional partnerships that would tie India into the global supply chain network. The Indo-Pacific itself emerged as the new strategic-economic geography of the 21st century, where the Indian and Pacific Oceans meet and where the bulk of global trade flows. Against this backdrop, the Great Nicobar project represents one of India’s most visible attempts to translate its Act East commitments into concrete maritime infrastructure at the junction of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. There are loud and motivated criticisms and legal challenges from biased parties, including NGOs and political opposition, on environmental grounds and on grounds of disturbing the habitats of tribal populations. Geostrategic relevance of Great Nicobar Great Nicobar is India’s southernmost inhabited island in the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago, placed very close to the Six Degree Channel and the western approaches to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. These straits are among the busiest chokepoints in the world, carrying a large share of global container traffic and energy flows between the Indian Ocean and East Asia. Large ships passing between the Middle East, Europe, and South Asia on one side and China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia on the other have to transit these waters. Great Nicobar’s location places it just off the main east-west shipping routes, allowing large vessels to call at the island without major deviation from their routes. For India, this means it now has a sovereign island-based node right at the doorway to ASEAN’s maritime core, rather than being confined to midland ports farther west. In Indo-Pacific terms, the island becomes a forward point from which India can monitor and participate in the flow of goods, capital, and connectivity that defines the region. By developing infrastructure here, India is effectively shifting its maritime attention southward and ensuring that it is physically present at the junction of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Great Nicobar Project The Great Nicobar project is a long-term plan to develop the island as a major international container transhipment hub with supporting infrastructure. The international container transhipment port (ICTP) at Galathea Bay is the core of the plan. It is designed to handle ultra-large container ships that currently call at hubs like Singapore, Colombo, or Port Klang. According to information from World Trade Scanner, the design leverages natural water depths of about 20 meters, reducing the need for extensive dredging and allowing very large vessels to berth directly. The port is planned to be built in phases: an initial capacity of around 4 million TEUs per year, with later phases pushing the total to about 16 million TEUs, making it a serious regional hub. Alongside the port, the project includes a greenfield international airport to support both civilian and logistics-linked air traffic, enabling faster movement of cargo and people. A dedicated power plant, based on gas and renewable energy, will supply reliable electricity for port operations, industries, and townships. Finally, an integrated township is planned to house port workers, logistics staff, service providers, and their families, with schools, hospitals, and commercial areas together. These elements form a city port complex that is designed to function as a self-contained economic zone at the edge of the Indian Ocean, with the port as the engine of growth. Geoeconomics - How Great Nicobar changes India’s trade and Logistics The Great Nicobar project is fundamentally a geoeconomic move that seeks to reconfigure how India is positioned in global maritime trade. Today, a large share of India’s container traffic that requires transhipment is routed through foreign ports; these foreign ports include Singapore, Colombo, and Port Klang. This means India pays for services such as port charges, fuel, and wharfage, but most of the value addition and infrastructure revenue remains abroad. The shipments themselves are often carried on global liners that pass very close to Great Nicobar anyway, yet they do not stop at an Indian port. By building a large, deep-draft transhipment hub at Great Nicobar, India aims to bring that traffic inside its own territory so that cargo is rehandled at an Indian-controlled port rather than foreign ones. This reduces transit time and cost for Indian exporters and importers who trade with Southeast and East Asia, improves predictability in supply chains, and allows India to capture a share of regional cargo. Third-country traffic moving between the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and East Asia can also use Great Nicobar as a hub for transferring containers to smaller feeder ports. The resulting hub-and-spoke model allows India to become a regional transhipment node, attracting shipping lines that want an efficient alternative or supplement to existing hubs. Over time, the port can generate employment in logistics, warehousing, cold chains, bunkering, ship repair, maritime finance, and insurance, creating a broader maritime services ecosystem that aligns with national programs like Sagarmala and Maritime India Vision, which seek to make India not only a land-based manufacturing and consumption hub but also a serious maritime trading and logistics power in the Indo-Pacific. Policy Linkage - How Nicobar Advances the Look East/Act East Policy The Great Nicobar project is one of the most concrete ways in which India is now giving physical, maritime content to the Look East and Act East policies. Until recently, Act East was largely expressed through diplomacy, regional forums, road corridors, and some defense exercises. The India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) trilateral highway and connectivity schemes in Northeast India were important, but the sea carries far more trade volume than land routes. By building a major port facing the ASEAN and East Asian maritime heartland, India is finally providing a sea-facing infrastructure for its Act East agenda. The great Nicobar hub directly links India’s domestic economy to the shipping networks that serve ASEAN, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and East Asia. This allows Indian trade with ASEAN and East Asia to move faster and at lower cost, making Indian goods more competitive, while also enabling regional partners to see India as a credible logistics and connectivity partner rather than only a diplomatic participant. Global shipping lines are more likely to consider an Indian port as a viable node in their east-west routes, which in turn deepens India’s integration into regional and global supply chains. India deliberately chose not to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) because of a lack of respect for ASEAN about Indian concerns. ASEAN itself has been a somewhat dysfunctional organisation that India has engaged with consistently without an optimal response. In this sense, the port becomes a bricks-and-steel manifestation of the Act East Policy; instead of only attending meetings or signing MoUs, India is investing in hard infrastructure at the threshold of the Indo-Pacific's core maritime base. The project signals that India is serious about being an active, forward-present stakeholder in the region’s maritime economy, not just a passive user of external ports. Strategic Implications Taken together, the Great Nicobar Project marks a significant shift in how India positions itself geoeconomically and geo-strategically in the Indo-Pacific. Geoeconomically, it aims to capture transhipment traffic, stimulate port-led industrial growth, and embed India more deeply into regional and global supply chains. This reduces dependence on foreign hubs and strengthens India’s autonomy in logistics and trade. The hub can serve not only India’s own trade but also regional and inter-regional cargo, positioning India as a central actor in the network of east-west shipping lanes. Geo-strategically, the project places Indian infrastructure on the threshold of ASEAN’s maritime core, overlooking some of the World’s busiest sea lanes. This gives India greater leverage in discussions about connectivity, security, rules of the road, and information sharing in the Indo-Pacific. If we do not develop the Andaman & Nicobar infrastructure, dangers are that India will be run over by other powers, as happened in the South China Sea. Victor Gao, a prominent Chinese think-tank, has floated the idea that China could take over the Andaman & Nicobar Islands by making an extravagant claim. Similarly, during the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the then Indonesian the President Sukarno while supporting Pakistan, had toyed with the idea of occupying the Andaman & Nicobar Islands The project avoids framing the hub as a direct military or security tool. The island can function as a forward node from which India supports regional trade and participates in shaping the cooperative maritime order. By explicitly linking this forward infrastructure into the Act East policy, the project ties together location, trade, connectivity, and foreign policy intent into a coherent narrative. India is no longer content to be a passive user of the Indo-Pacific's maritime commons but is investing in forward infrastructure that positions it as a central actor in the region’s evolving trade and strategic order. If implemented as envisaged, Great Nicobar could serve as both a geoeconomic gateway and a geostrategic anchor for India, although the pace of execution and regional responses will ultimately determine its impact. We have advocated for India to float an Indo-Pacific Cooperation Organisation for India’s economic integration with East Asia and Pacific Island countries. Conclusions India’s geo-strategic, maritime and geo-economic interests lie in trade and connectivity with East Asia and Pacific Island countries. The Great Nicobar transhipment port project is just one element of the economic infrastructure that India is building to safeguard its future. No amount of negative handwringing on any grounds should detract India from implementing the project at a fast pace. References www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/great-nicobar-island-container-transhipment-port-notified-as-major-port-govt-101754392/ www.maritimegateway.com/government-declares-great-nicobar-island-container-transhipment-port-as-major-port/ www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/international-container-transhipment-port-in-great-nicobar-island www.pmfias.com/great-nicobar-project/ https://worldtradescanner.com/International%20Container%20Transhipment%20Port%20(ICTP).htm#:~:text=The%20development%20of%20this%20Mega,the%20proximity%20including%20Indian%20Ports. India, APEC and the US https://myind.net/Home/viewArticle/india-apec-and-us Whither ASEAN: What Is in A Name? https://www.boloji.com/articles/52707/whither-asean-what-is-in-a-name From the Asian Century to a Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Cooperation Organisation (IPCO) https://myind.net/Home/viewArticle/from-the-asian-century-to-a-peaceful-and-prosperous-indo-pacific-cooperation-organisation-ipco Why Do We Need an Indo-Pacific Cooperation Organisation (IPCO)? https://www.boloji.com/articles/52618/why-do-we-need-an-indo-pacific-cooperation-organization-ipco