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Jul 06, 2026
Anandh Krishnan

China’s Threats to the Indian Subcontinent

Introduction China’s strategy for the Indian subcontinent is a multi-dimensional, structurally embedded challenge rather than a conventional military threat. It is a carefully crafted combination of economic statecraft, investments in infrastructure, political inﬂuence operations, military collaborations, and intelligence penetrations. China has systematically increased its level of leverage over the Indian subcontinent. These approaches effectively leverage asymmetries in economic capacity, governance weaknesses, or security dependencies in order to shape the domestic decision-making and international alignment decisions of smaller states within the region. However, the general and particular threats to the Indian subcontinent which emanate from China are related to the gradual onslaught of loss of strategic autonomy and sovereignty of the subcontinent and its states, developing overall economic and technological interdependence, and developing dual-use infrastructure with possible background intelligence and military application and intent. Therefore, China’s policies and strategies within the subcontinent have become a long-term strategic challenge with highly signiﬁcant implications within South Asia’s overall future strategic order and framework of stability and overall supranational and regional security. Area-wise Threat Assessment The nature and level of China’s threat to the countries of the Indian subcontinent vary in accordance with the strategic position, economic vulnerability, and internal politics of each realm. China’s strategy is the same throughout—with economic incentives, infrastructure, military partnerships, and politics. However, the end results vary in each country from a strategy of dependency and loss of sovereignty in smaller countries to military and intelligence challenges. Therefore, the analysis of each country is key to understanding speciﬁc threats posed by China and their impact on the overall strategic scenario of the region. North-Western Himalayas For both India and other countries, China’s threat is overt and structural, spanning military, strategic, economic, and technological spheres. China’s aggressive stance along the Line of Actual Control, backed by its financing of infrastructure development along the borders, mobilisation of forces, and undertakings through grey zone operations, has radically transformed the military security scenario along the borders. In Pakistan, China’s threat is mostly implicit, in the form of deepening strategic and economic dependency rather than overt coercion. Recently, the growing number of Chinese security forces and the indirect use of PLA-related entities to secure CPEC-related infrastructure have come to be seen as a source of internal tension. The growing number of these forces, especially in the province of Balochistan, has further heightened internal tensions with locals who increasingly view China’s investment as exploitative and alien. The continued targeted attacks on Chinese nationals and infrastructure have further increased Chinese security force engagement, further clouding Pakistani sovereignty over internal security. Looking further down the road, the continued use of PLA-related forces and intelligence will increasingly turn Pakistan from a strategic partner into a kind of security client state, further fueling internal alienation in Balochistan. In the context of Afghanistan, the Chinese concern remains to a great extent future and contingent, as China’s strategic needs for access to Central and South Asia through the prism of the security interests of Xinjiang determine the dynamics of this engagement. Although the Chinese have kept a low proﬁle and yet been actively engaged through the expanding diplomacy of resource access, the strategic intent remains one of expansion of inﬂuence. In this context, the future vulnerability of potential economic dependence for Afghanistan emerges as a reality, given the reality that the absence of multiple international partnerships may culminate in dependence on Chinese investment. However, from the perspective of strategic security, the engagement between China and the ruling dispensation of the Republic of Afghanistan emerges as imperative to their strategic needs of combating terrorism. On the one hand, the engagement may pose steady challenges to expanded surveillance and intelligence penetration strategies, which may culminate in the strategic manipulation of the overall security architecture of the north-western Himalayan region. Eastern Himalaya In this context, China’s persistent claims over Arunachal Pradesh and its efforts to question India’s sovereignty there add a critical territorial dimension to the threat, reinforcing long-term strategic friction. Additionally, China’s control over Tibet provides it with leverage over transboundary issues, including access and regulation related to Kailash Mansarovar, which carries not only religious signiﬁcance but also strategic implications in terms of border management and political signalling. In Nepal, China’s threat is more political and structural, through sustained inﬂuence- building rather than overt security coercion. China has utilised economic aid, connectivity projects, and political engagement in an attempt to gradually reduce Nepal’s traditional strategic and economic relations with India, which, in essence, is tantamount to a recalibration of Kathmandu’s external orientation. Infrastructure projects and proposals for cross-Himalayan connectivity, though small in number, possess long-term strategic relevance by placing Nepal within China’s regional scheme of things. Politically, the perceived engagement of China with Nepal’s political elites and parties, along with pressure on Tibet and internal security-related issues, has reduced Nepal’s policy space and constrained its strategic neutrality. The military dimension remains minimal, but taken together, the economic inducements, inﬂuence over politics, and information engagement pose a latent threat of deepening China’s leverage over Nepal’s domestic and foreign policy decision-making with direct implications for the Himalayan security environment. In the Bhutan case, the greater threat posed by the China factor is of a territorial-strategic nature, which revolves around the unresolved boundary issues and the coercive diplomacy of the PRC. Beijing’s pressure tactics in border talks, together with the construction of infrastructure in the disputed regions, are aimed at changing the status quo and increasing Beijing's strategic depth in the Himalayan region. Primarily, Beijing’s efforts at diplomatic engagement are aimed at establishing a normalised relationship with the Kingdom of Bhutan, which may, over time, reduce the traditional strategic ties between Bhutan and Indian forces. Even though Bhutan has resisted the forces of economic as well as political incentives, the long- term application of the ‘bargaining pressure’ tactic along with territorial claims does pose a threat of a strategic nature, which is intended to affect the external options of Bhutan itself, limiting the strategic freedom in the eastern Himalayas. Bay of Bengal Curve In the case of Bangladesh, the danger posed by China is more in terms of its growing economic inﬂuence as well as its defence partnerships, which cumulatively contribute to strategic as well as technological dependence. China is now a signiﬁcant supplier of military equipment, investments in infrastructure, as well as development aid, which enables China to nurture its long-term inﬂuence in Bangladesh’s security as well as policy establishments. This rising security framework of China in Bangladesh enables China to have greater inﬂuence over Bangladesh’s strategic decision-making, speciﬁcally in the maritime security domain as well as regional arrangements. In the economic domain, the development of large infrastructure programs as well as connectivity programs cumulatively increases Bangladesh’s dependence on Chinese capital as well as technology, which has implications for the sustainability of Bangladesh’s debts as well as its autonomy in decision-making. In the case of Myanmar, the strategic and geopolitical nature of China’s threat is framed in the context of China’s homeland guarantee of safe and unconstrained access to the Bay of Bengal and an untouched southwest border. China’s infrastructure investments in port, pipeline, and transportation initiatives within the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor have created several strategic alternative lines of communication up to Kyankpyu port, which circumvent the Bay of Bengal curve and, in effect, make China more resilient and self-reliant while integrating the whole of the Bay of Bengal within China’s regional transport and energy infrastructure. These projects have overt dual-capabilities in terms of maritime and military accessibility. In the realms of politics and strategy, China effectively used the internal and international estrangement of the Burmese government to position and ﬁx itself as the indispensable player in the politics and economics of the country, effectively exercising strategic control over the government and non-governmental agencies of the country while controlling the country’s strategic destiny and projecting power to the east of Indian subcontinent via the parameters of the Bay of Bengal. Indian Ocean Region The threat is further ampliﬁed by China’s growing involvement in India’s neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean region. This is aimed at lessening India’s position in the subcontinent. In this realm, China represents a challenge to India in terms of its cyber capabilities and intelligence efforts related to surveillance and inﬂuence activities. In the economic sphere, China’s asymmetric approach to trading with India represents characteristics that could be exploited during times of tension or conﬂict. Taken together, these aspects suggest that China’s attitude towards India represents a Structural Challenge to India and seeks to achieve strategic containment of India and undermine its deterrence capabilities through its efforts to reorder the broader region in a manner non-aligned with India’s strategic security. In the case of Sri Lanka, the Chinese challenge is geo- economic as well as naval due to high-value infrastructure loans and strategic investments in port facilities. Beijing has invested in infrastructure projects that are drivers of economic dependencies to a great extent through loans that are now strategic access points in the major Indian Ocean by China. Its accumulated debts as well as the crisis-induced dependence upon investments from China have impaired the country’s autonomy in strategic matters, making it difﬁcult for it to maintain a balance in regional partnerships. China’s growing inﬂuence in Sri Lanka has direct implications for the security of the Indian Ocean Region. This makes the Indian Ocean Region a signiﬁcant factor in the overall strategy of China to consolidate its presence within the maritime periphery of the subcontinent. In the case of the Maldives, the threat posed by China is both nascent and structural, mainly based on geoeconomic engagement and the country’s geopolitical position. The engagement of China has opened avenues for economic dependence and interference in the country’s affairs through infrastructure development, economic investments, and tourism ties. The economic condition of the Maldives and high debt levels have created an actual threat of economic dependence on China, through which China could exert undue inﬂuence over the country’s affairs. From a strategic point of view, Maldives’ position on key Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) makes it more signiﬁcant in terms of overall Chinese strategic interests. Even though Chinese activity in the Maldives is currently limited to commercial interests, the potential for dual-use infrastructure to be utilised by Chinese intelligence services poses a latent threat. Moreover, Chinese political inﬂuence activities targeting Maldivian leadership could strengthen Chinese interests in the Maldives’ overall political structure. In the long run, this situation poses both latent and imminent threats that could transform the Maldives into a strategic location within Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean region. Major Threats to the Indian Subcontinent from China China’s involvement in the Indian subcontinent represents a uniﬁed and long-term strategy of shaping a new order in favour of China. Instead of using military force, it makes use of economic power, political inﬂuence, and intelligence efforts in order to ensure an asymmetrical dependency of countries of the subcontinent in favour of China. Each of these factors works in a combined manner to ensure a weakening of sovereignty, a breakdown of collective regional security, and a new balance of power in the subcontinent. Erosion of Strategic Autonomy The loss of strategic autonomy to China is a threat to the Indian subcontinent in terms of being one of the most daunting. China has been engaging in economic communism in such a manner that infrastructure development in this region is being accomplished by the creation of asymmetric dependencies, making it impossible for a balanced and free decision-making ability of states in this region to be maintained by them while their reliance on Chinese investment and markets grows. They even have to modify their foreign policies to avoid annoying China. This loss of independence is even more apparent in smaller subcontinental states, where economic susceptibility and governance constraints make Chinese pressure even more effective. Over time, what began as de facto independence turns into conditional sovereignty regarding policy choices on matters such as global alignments, security partnership agreements, and joining multilateral schemes of cooperation regionally. As a result, Chinese pressure alters the strategy of subcontinent without recourse to any form of compulsion. Debt Dependency and Economic Coercion Debt dependence has emerged as a key tool with which China seeks strategic leverage against countries of the subcontinent. Large-scale loans for infrastructure, energy, and connectivity projects dispensed primarily under opaque terms embed recipient states in long-term ﬁnancial obligations that exceed repayment capabilities. This economic asymmetry allows Beijing to translate ﬁnancial exposure into political leverage, particularly during periods of ﬁscal stress or domestic instability. It is in this context that economic coercion becomes salient, as indebted states are forced to either grant strategic concessions, policy alignment, or preferential access to key assets in order to receive ﬁnancial relief or obtain continued investment. These dependencies undoubtedly constrict economic sovereignty, distort development priorities, and reduce the prospects for diversiﬁcation of partners among subcontinental countries. In a broad strategic perspective, debt-driven leverage enables China to shape regional economic architectures even as it pursues its geopolitical goals without overt pressure. Dual-Use Infrastructure and Military Access A key dimension of China’s strategy in the Indian subcontinent is the development of dual-use infrastructure. When China invests in or builds ports, airports, land, transportation corridors, and communications networks across the Indian subcontinent, the end result could be used for civilian as well as defence and intelligence-related projects. For instance, China’s projects and investments on the Indian subcontinent could allow the country to build its capabilities related to its ability to have logistical support, observation, and rapid defence and intelligence access in case of a contingency, hence increasing its strategic reach without using force in the Indian subcontinent. On issues of regional security of the Indian subcontinent, China will be able to gain a secure passage along the important sea and land routes, due to the development of dual-use infrastructure on the subcontinent by China. Political Inﬂuence and Elite Capture China relies on the application of political inﬂuence and elite capture, which are relatively soft yet very effective ways of addressing the internal decision-making structures within the Indian subcontinent states. Political interactions with political party structures, state bureaucracies, and elite business networks allow the government of China to build its strategic inﬂuence and networks that are capable of aligning domestic preference structures with broader Chinese strategic imperatives. These kinds of interactions are further reinforced through material economic incentives, political support, and development aid allocations. Elite capture undermines the autonomy of institutions since it gives higher priority to immediate political and economic beneﬁts rather than prioritising long-term regional-oriented state interests and options. Since elite capture further makes institutions less autonomous and independent, it further makes internal debate structures on matters of defence spending, infrastructure development, and international alignment choices more limited and less transparent and less democratic. Intelligence, Cyber, and Information Operations China’s intelligence, cyber, and information operations pose an ever-increasing non-kinetic threat to states within the Indian subcontinent. By engaging in various aspects of cybersecurity infrastructure, telecommunications systems, and tech systems, China acquires access to conﬁdential information while increasing their ability to gather intelligence in the region. This is an addition to increasing China’s awareness of regional politics, military strategies, and economics. At the same time, information operations and cyber inﬂuence efforts in China seek to create spaces in which public opinion is moulded in ways that favour China while stiﬂing dissenting voices against Chinese policies. This overlap between cyber operations, diplomatic efforts, and strategic inﬂuence is eroding the distinction between civilian engagement in strategic initiatives that China pursues in the region. Regional Fragmentation and Strategic Encirclement China’s engagement strategy in the Indian subcontinent has been one of the main factors that have led to fragmentation in this region, preferring bilateral engagement over multilateral or regional engagement. By engaging with each state in the subcontinent on a bilateral basis, China undermines collective bargaining or security responses. It is also prone to creating alignments based on competition within the neighbouring states. From a strategic point of view, this fragmentation makes it easy to engage China gradually in the entire supranational unit through economic, diplomatic, or infrastructural means. Consequently, this strategy affects the subcontinent’s strategic room on both land and sea. With time, this strategy of encirclement is likely to change the balance of power within this region, with China being deeply embedded within this security construct. Implication for regional stability China’s growing strategic foothold in the Indian subcontinent has far-reaching implications for regional security, going well beyond the implications of bilateral interactions to redeﬁne the broader security framework in the region. The web of dual-use infrastructure, defence partnerships, as well as intelligence networks in the Indian periphery has exacerbated levels of strategic unpredictability, including the undermining of existing bilateral structures for conﬁdence building, thereby heightening the potential for miscalculation in moments of crisis. Simultaneously, the increasing securitisation of economic engagement obfuscates the line between development cooperation and strategic competition. Increasingly, ﬁnancial engagement for infrastructure development, technology cooperation, and trade becomes increasingly susceptible to security externalities with implications for long-term weaknesses inherent in port development, energy security, telecommunications development, and logistics. At the same time, the presence of these weaknesses obstructs transparent governance structures, further making it difﬁcult for countries of the region to shield development engagement with strategic global imperatives. China’s bilaterally driven engagement approach further deepens the divisions inherent in the region via the promotion of strategic alignments over the development of a regionally governed approach. This further weakens the development of collective security structures between the subcontinental states against transcontinental threats. Conclusion The Chinese attempts in the countries of the Indian subcontinent can be characterised as a strategic manoeuvre to shape the entire subcontinent through non-kinetic strategies rather than a military challenge to them. It is observed that with its efforts in using leverage in the ﬁelds of economics and politics, along with developing infrastructure and intelligence activities across the countries of the Indian subcontinent, China has been able to position itself within the strategic map of the subcontinent in a way that creates asymmetric dependency in favour of China. By the analysis of countries in the region, it is evidenced that although the nature and level of threat by China differ among various countries in the region, the ubiquity is that of securitisation of the engagement relationship wherein the relationship is translated to gain strategic advantages in terms of sovereignty assertion by smaller countries in general, while in case of India, it is holistic in nature that includes military, technology infrastructure, as well as intelligence-based challenges in various ways. In the long term, the China strategy is a challenge to the regional stability of the Indian subcontinent, as it has built-in vulnerable elements in the political, economic, and security structures of the Indian subcontinent. This requires higher degrees of transparency in economic interaction, diversiﬁcation of the strategic partnerships, and development of regional cooperation structures to maintain autonomy. Otherwise, the Indian subcontinent is likely to be more vulnerable to external inﬂuence as it progresses into the realm of great powers.

Jul 04, 2026
Siddhartha Dave

Japan's Search for Identity: Why Domestic Change Matters for Bharat

The recent Bharat–Japan Summit reaffirmed growing strategic cooperation in defence, technology and economic security. Yet one of the least discussed aspects of Japan's strategic evolution lies within its own society. As demographic decline, labour shortages and immigration reshape Japanese politics, understanding these domestic changes is becoming increasingly important for India's foreign policy and long-term engagement with Tokyo. The growing strategic partnership between Bharat and Japan is usually viewed through the prism of the Indo-Pacific, maritime security, defence cooperation and economic collaboration. While these dimensions remain critically important, they represent only one part of a much larger story. Equally significant are the profound changes taking place within Japan itself. For decades, Japan was regarded as one of the world's most culturally homogeneous societies. Its remarkable economic success was built upon social discipline, cultural continuity and a strong sense of national identity. Unlike many Western countries, Japan largely avoided large-scale immigration and successfully balanced modernisation with the preservation of its traditional social fabric. Today, however, this model is undergoing unprecedented transformation. Japan faces one of the world's fastest ageing populations. Birth rates continue to decline while life expectancy rises steadily. Every year the country's working-age population shrinks, creating labour shortages across manufacturing, healthcare, agriculture, logistics and construction. To sustain economic growth, successive governments have gradually expanded programmes allowing foreign workers to enter Japan. This policy has addressed immediate labour shortages, but it has also introduced new questions concerning integration, religious accommodation, legal compliance and social cohesion. These debates increasingly influence Japanese politics and, by extension, its foreign policy. Demography Meets National Identity Immigration is never purely an economic issue. As foreign communities expand, questions inevitably arise regarding cultural integration, public infrastructure, local customs and national identity. Japan is now experiencing precisely these discussions. The country's Muslim population has increased steadily during the past decade, driven primarily by workers arriving from Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Malaysia and several other Asian countries. Alongside this demographic shift, debates have emerged regarding mosque construction, Muslim burial grounds and the accommodation of religious practices within a society historically organised around different cultural traditions. While many local communities have embraced dialogue and peaceful coexistence, others have expressed concerns regarding land use, environmental impact, planning regulations and the preservation of community traditions. These discussions should not be viewed merely as religious controversies. They represent a broader national conversation about how Japan can remain economically competitive while preserving the social harmony that has long distinguished Japanese society. Earlier Trends Become National Issues Several years ago, this author argued in Organiser that Japan's demographic transition would inevitably bring issues of immigration, religious accommodation and cultural integration into mainstream public debate. Subsequent developments have reinforced that assessment. The controversy surrounding Muslim burial grounds in several prefectures, debates over mosque construction and the widely discussed Kawagoe mosque case demonstrate that questions once confined to municipal authorities are now increasingly influencing national political discourse. The Kawagoe controversy, in particular, highlighted the importance Japanese society attaches to the rule of law. Regardless of religion or nationality, public legitimacy in Japan remains closely linked to legal compliance, transparency and respect for local regulations. This reflects a broader characteristic of Japanese governance, where social trust is built upon institutions rather than identity alone. Civilisational Diplomacy Offers a Different Model Japan's experience also demonstrates that cultural engagement can strengthen international partnerships when it is rooted in mutual respect. The unveiling of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj's statue in Japan provided an excellent example. Rather than generating controversy, the memorial was welcomed as a celebration of shared historical values and mutual admiration between two ancient Asian civilisations. It illustrated that cultural diplomacy succeeds when it encourages dialogue, respects local traditions and creates shared ownership of historical memory. This offers an important lesson for international engagement more broadly. Successful partnerships are built not only through governments but also through trust between societies. Why These Changes Matter for Bharat For Indian policymakers, Japan's domestic transformation should not be regarded as an internal matter alone. It increasingly influences Tokyo's strategic choices. Japan's search for trusted economic partners, resilient supply chains, technological cooperation and reliable defence collaboration is closely connected to its domestic demographic and economic realities. As Japan adapts to an ageing society and a more uncertain strategic environment, partnerships with countries sharing democratic values, institutional stability and long-term policy consistency become increasingly valuable. This is where Bharat occupies a unique position. Unlike many bilateral relationships based solely upon economic interests, the Bharat–Japan partnership combines strategic convergence with historical goodwill, democratic institutions and complementary economic capabilities. Both countries support a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. Both seek resilient supply chains. Both recognise the growing importance of economic security and trusted technologies. Most importantly, both understand that modernisation need not come at the expense of cultural continuity. Looking Ahead The recent Bharat–Japan Summit demonstrated that cooperation between the two countries is steadily expanding into new domains, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence, defence manufacturing, maritime security and critical technologies. However, the summit also underscored a deeper reality. Japan's foreign policy can no longer be understood without appreciating the domestic transformation taking place within the country. Demographic decline, labour shortages, immigration, technological competition and concerns regarding social cohesion are collectively reshaping Tokyo's strategic outlook. For Bharat, understanding these developments is not simply an academic exercise. It provides valuable insight into why Japan increasingly seeks trusted, long-term partners capable of contributing to economic resilience, regional stability and a balanced Indo-Pacific order. As Asia enters an era of heightened geopolitical competition, the Bharat–Japan partnership will derive its greatest strength not only from shared strategic interests but also from a common commitment to democratic governance, institutional trust and responsible regional leadership. The recent summit reaffirmed this trajectory. The real story, however, lies in Japan's quiet transformation at home—a transformation that is likely to shape the future of Asian geopolitics for decades to come. References Dave, Siddhartha. (2026, June 3). Kawagoe Mosque Row: Pakistan Faces Embarrassment as Japan Orders Demolition of Illegally Built Mosque. Organiser. Dave, Siddhartha. (2025, March 14). Commemorating Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj in Japan: A Monument to Transnational Cultural Synergy. Organiser. Dave, Siddhartha. (2023, June 14). Religious Tensions in Japan Grows Amidst Burgeoning Muslim Population in the Land of the Rising Sun. Organiser. This article continues the author's ongoing research and analysis on Japan's evolving domestic and strategic landscape.