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Oct 31, 2026
Viren S Doshi

Hinduism vs. Hindutva - Leftist Insidious Campaign to Criminalise Hindu Defence

How the Communist Leftist Jihadi Nexus tries to equate Hindutva with Terrorism For centuries, the civilisational continuum of the Indian subcontinent — rooted in the Vedas, Upanishads, Darshanas, Epics, Ashrams, Yagnas, Gurukuls, Temples, Festivals, and a pluralistic Dharma — endured successive brutal invasions without forging lasting political, bearing humongous costs. Hindus resisted in regional and local formations: Janapads, Rajput coalitions, Vijayanagara, Marathas, Sikh misls, tribal resistance and countless other efforts. Survival itself was the achievement amid temple destructions, forced conversions, jizya, and demographic shifts recorded in contemporary chronicles. Partition in 1947 delivered a truncated homeland after catastrophic violence, just a year before the Jewish people secured Israel. In the century since and especially post-independence, sections of Hindus began organising with national, cultural and political consciousness - not for conquest but for cohesion and defence of their civilisational space. That effort is labelled as Hindutva by the Leftist Jihadi nexus, though Hindutva is more a generic term for Hinduness and less a cultural-political identity. Those who systematically oppose Hindutva rarely limit themselves to policy critique. Their rhetoric treats Hindu self-assertion as the core problem. In practice, sustained opposition to Hindutva frequently functions as opposition to the political agency of Hindus and the national and public legitimacy of Hinduism itself as the lines thin out. Historical Pattern of Fragmentation and the Late Awakening Over 2,500 years, the subcontinent faced Greek, Scythian, Hun, Arab, Turkic, Afghan, and Mughal invasions followed by European / British colonial rule. Local resistance was real yet remained regional. There was no sustained pan-Hindu political doctrine treating the entire civilisational area as one strategic theatre requiring permanent institutional defence since the unifying mission of Chanakya. The result was not complete erasure — Hindu society proved resilient through decentralised structures right up to families and philosophical depth — but repeated loss of political control, accompanied by documented violence and transformation of sacred geography. The twentieth century altered the equation. Reform movements, the freedom struggle, and the trauma of tragic partition crystallised the recognition that cultural survival in the age of nation-states required organisation. Hindutva emerged as cultural nationalism: the idea that India’s civilisational core is Hindu in the broad sense—encompassing philosophical traditions, sacred geography, and demographic majority—while remaining open to those who accept that framework. It was never a project of invading others. It was an attempt to end the historical pattern of disunity that “invited” predation by Barbaric, Jihadi and Colonial invaders. Hindutva - The Essence Though Hindutva or Hinduness is a generic word that distinguishes the inclusiveness of Hindus as a common virtue or a shared quality, it attracted interpretation as Defensive Hindu Cohesion as distinct from Hinduism - the ideology that it seeks to protect through unity. Under the Hindutva umbrella, all myriads of Hindu denominations were pinned to a stellar identity as a people and as a nation to defend the Hinduness that all of them have in them as a virtue - inclusiveness. Hinduness became the term for inclusiveness that is within all denominations as a common factor on one hand, and for unity on the other hand to defend that quality from becoming extinct due to continuing onslaughts. In its classical formulations and the practice of its major institutions, Hindutva emphasises cultural unity, self-respect, and the right of the Hindu majority to shape the public culture of its civilisational homeland without perpetual apology. Inclusiveness is treated as a virtue of Hindu civilisation itself—its historical absorption of diverse practices—yet that inclusiveness is not infinite license for demographic or ideological erasure. When leftist Jihadi opponents reduce Hindutva to “hate” or “fascism,” they collapse a defensive cultural nationalism into caricature. They rarely apply the same reduction to Islamic or Sub-Islamic regional (Palestine-like) or even Communist transnational ideologies that insist on demographic majorities, and on vital sites, or and on historical memory. Despite their openly blatant and violent calls and actions. Because they are all in cahoots against Hindu, Christian, Jew and other such religious or cultural or nationalist identities, including that of Arabs. Despite the majority of Arabs being Muslims. Even after Independence, India witnessed communal violence, conversions through inducement or force in certain regions, and demographic shifts in border areas and urban pockets. Hindu refugees from Pakistan and later Bangladesh received uneven attention. Temple rights and educational content about historical invasions often faced resistance. “Hindutva” unity politics gained traction because sections of the Hindu public concluded that abstract secularism, as practised, frequently meant special pleading for one side, leading to erasure of the lone Hindu nationhood. The Leftist Front in the US: Dismantling Global Hindutva This contest against Hindutva has long since gone global. In September 2021, a three-day online conference titled “Dismantling Global Hindutva: Multidisciplinary Perspectives” was organised and co-sponsored by departments and centres at dozens of universities, including Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, Columbia, Berkeley, the University of Pennsylvania, Rutgers, and others. The explicit framing was not scholarly analysis of a political movement, but its outright “dismantling”. Panels examined Hindutva’s supposed fascist dimensions, its “alignment” with caste, gender politics, and digital propaganda and ironically even with white supremacy. Organisers and supporters insisted they targeted only Hindutva politics, not Hinduism - the Dharma. In practice, the conference and its surrounding ecosystem treated organised Hindu assertion as an existential threat requiring academic and activist mobilisation. Audrey Truschke, professor of South Asian history at Rutgers University, has been one of the most visible academic voices in this campaign. She has repeatedly described Hindutva as a hateful political ideology advocating Hindu supremacy. She has compared early Hindutva thinkers’ admiration for certain aspects of interwar European politics to Nazism. She has helped develop resources such as the “Hindutva Harassment Field Manual” through the South Asia Scholar Activist Collective. She has framed Hindutva as both an “American” problem and a transnational global threat. She claims to have researched U.S.-based Hindu organisations she labels far-right. Entire leftist Jihadi Woke ecosystem in the US and across the globe has since gone berserk, “Dismantling Hindutva”. Subsequently, she faced intense backlash from all Hindu groups who stated that her work and public comments—such as characterisations of Hindu texts and deities—cross into denigration of the Hinduism / Hindu religion, apart from portraying Hindutva as a terrorist front. Truschke and allied academics viciously positioned themselves as “defenders of academic freedom” against “Hindutva trolls.” Hindu advocacy organisations countered that the conference and the leftist or woke rhetoric and related activism systematically conflate Hinduism with its political expressions, deny or relativise historical violence against Hindus, and create a hostile environment for Hindu students and scholars and Hindus in general who reject the framing, and it was seen that this led to not only Hindumisia and Hinduphobia but also to actual attacks on Hindus and Hindu Faith Centres. RSS - The Target of the Red Green Nexus Parallel efforts target the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its overseas affiliates. U.S. leftist academics, activists, and “progressive” Democrat lawmakers have long described the RSS as a paramilitary or supremacist organisation. The so-called fact sheets, reports, and public campaigns call for scrutiny of RSS-linked groups operating in America, portray them as exporters of hate, and urge universities, politicians, and civil society to distance themselves. In recent years, this has included protests against RSS-related events, calls for elected officials to reject donations linked to Sangh-affiliated entities, and framing of Hindu cultural organisations as vectors of “Hindu supremacy.” The language routinely places the RSS and Hindutva in the same moral category as authoritarian or extremist movements while applying far softer standards to Islamist Jihadi networks or communist inhuman violence. The Most Dangerous Narrative: Equating Defence with Terrorism Here lies the deepest and vilest insidiousness. Openly racist outbursts against Hindus—street-level slurs, temple vandalism, or crude stereotypes—are ugly and must be condemned. They remain visible and therefore contestable. Far more corrosive (and collaborative) is the sophisticated narrative that portrays Hindutva itself as a form of terrorism or fascism equivalent to Islamist jihadism or the violence of communist insurgencies. This leftist-communist-jihadi nexus — academic radicals, “progressive” woke activists, and Islamist interlocutors who find common cause in opposing Hindu political consolidation — works to place Hindus who organise for self-defence on the same pedestal as those who celebrate Jihadi bloodthirsty genocidal “conquests”, practice targeted killings of the unarmed innocent, gang rapes on innocent women and girls or pursue “revolutionary” regime change terror through sheer vandalism. The effect is deliberate moral inversion. A community that spent centuries absorbing blows without a unified political response is told that the very act of organising to prevent further erosion constitutes the real danger. Defensive cultural nationalism is branded as aggression. Historical memory of invasions and Partition is dismissed as majoritarian grievance. Contemporary data on targeted violence against Hindus in certain regions is contextualised away or ignored or normalised. Meanwhile, the same discourse often soft-pedals or “understands” the theological and political sources of Islamist supremacism and remains selectively silent about the body counts of communist violence in India and elsewhere. By manufacturing the equation “Hindutva = terrorism,” the leftist campaign seeks to delegitimise the only modern instrument Hindus have developed for collective political survival. The leftists aim to keep Hinduism abstract, spiritualized, and politically inert—acceptable as yoga and festivals, unacceptable the moment Hinduism claims the same rights of cohesion and security as Hindutva or as a nation that other communities exercise without apology; effectively making it vulnerable as it has been for centuries. This is more dangerous than crude racism because it operates through universities, media, NGOs, and policy networks. It shapes the next generation of scholars, journalists, and officials. It provides “intellectual cover” for demographic and fanatic pressures while pathologising the normal response. It turns the language of human rights and anti-fascism into a weapon against the one civilisation that was historically the primary target of repeated conquest yet never developed an expansionist theological mandate of its own. Unity Without Expansionism - The Viable Path Hindu political unity remains unfinished and contested, ironically even among Hindus in India, in the US and elsewhere. Democratic competition in democracies ensures no single formation monopolises the vote. That internal diversity is a strength, but it gets turned into a liability when it recreates strategic blindness. The last hundred years mark the first sustained modern attempt to treat civilisational continuity as a political good. The project is defensive by historical necessity: a secure cultural majority in its own homeland, equal citizenship, and an end to the cycle in which disunity invited predation, while providing fallback for diaspora against predation in adopted lands. Those who insist Hinduism must remain forever non-political, forever apologetic, and forever fragmented are jeopardising the most successful pluralistic inclusive social order. Hinduism has been the most reformist, but they would still hype on caste, cow and cults to denigrate it. They are denying one civilisation’s right to coherent self-defence. The leftist academic campaign of Global Dismantling of Hindutva in the US and the world, the relentless targeting of the RSS, and the equation of Hindutva with terrorism form a coherent strategy: criminalise the defence so the defended remain vulnerable forever. Conclusion Exposing this vile strategy is not an attack on anyone. This refusal to accept that Hindus alone must choose between political powerlessness and moral illegitimacy must be exposed. Every major civilisation that navigated modernity claimed the right to cultural confidence, demographic awareness, institutional memory, and unapologetic defence of the space that made its existence and pluralism possible. Hindus are late to that recognition. The forces arrayed against them prefer they never complete it. But the way they have survived through millennia, they will definitely compete to attain their due space and due recognition in India, and in other democracies. Moreover, like-minded nationalist conservative counterparts in the US, Israel and other democracies, with Hindutva-led India together, will decimate the Communist Leftist Socialist Globalist Woke Jihadi Axis sooner. What will ensue would be the Right Global Order.

Oct 29, 2026
Mukul Asher

India and the Emerging Markets: Projections of Per Capita GDP on PPP Basis

According to the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank, in making comparisons of GDP across countries, the PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) method of estimating GDP is preferable for the following reasons. First, the PPP method Controls for Price-Level Disparities. Market exchange rates reflect financial flows and internationally traded goods, ignoring local price variations. PPP uses a standardised basket of goods and services to equalise currency purchasing power. Second, the PPP method reflects real volume and welfare. By adjusting for lower living costs and cheaper services in developing economies, PPP-adjusted GDP provides a more accurate picture of material well-being, domestic production volume, and standards of living. Third, the PPP method provides greater stability over time. Market exchange rates can be volatile and experience sharp daily or yearly fluctuations. PPP exchange rates remain relatively stable, preventing artificial swings in measured economic size or growth aggregates. Fourth, PPP better provides balanced global weighting: Market rates tend to underrepresent the economic size of developing nations like China and India, whereas PPP-adjusted weights better reflect their actual share of global physical output and industrial production. It should be noted that while the PPP is ideal for measuring real economic size and living standards, the IMF and the World Bank use market-based exchange rates when evaluating financial flows, current account balances, or global market weightings 1. Figure 1 compares trends in India’s per capita GDP on the PPP basis with emerging markets. The following observations may be made from the data in Figure 1. In absolute terms, India’s per capita GDP on a PPP basis has increased from USD 1860 in 2000 to USD 13,000 in 2026, and is projected to increase to USD 19,380 by 2031. All other emerging markets are projected to have higher per capita GDP than India even in 2031. However, the gap between India’s per capita GDP and others has been narrowing, and is projected to narrow further by 2031. Thus, India’s per capita GDP as compared to the Latin America and Caribbean region, has increased from 20 per cent in 2000 to 54 per cent in 2026, and is projected to increase to 65 per cent by 2031. If the current trend continues, with India growing at a significantly higher rate, and the Indian currency currently undervalued, India could match or even surpass the Latin American and Caribbean per capita GDP by 2040. With respect to the Middle East, a resource-rich region, especially in oil, India’s per capita GDP increased from 13 per cent in 2000 to 41 per cent in 2026, and is projected to increase to 48 per cent by 2031. This suggests that India’s per capita GDP will remain lower than the Middle East region for the foreseeable future. India’s per capita GDP was 45 per cent of the Emerging Market and Developing Economies group in 2000, increasing to 66 per cent by 2026, and is projected to reach 76 per cent in 2031. India’s per capita income is likely to match or surpass the per capita income of this group before 2040. The final category is ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), with ten members in Southeast Asia. India’s per capita GDP increased from 42 per cent of ASEAN’s GDP in 2000 to 63 per cent in 2026, and is projected to increase to 70 per cent by 2031. The prospects of India’s per capita GDP being nearly at a level with ASEAN by 2040 are promising. Figure 1: India’s Per Capita GDP on PPP Basis Compared to Other Emerging Markets A more disaggregated comparison of India’s per capita GDP with individual ASEAN countries (except Singapore and Brunei, both high-income countries) from 2014 to 2026 is provided in Table 1. Table 1: India’s Per Capita GDP on PPP Basis compared to ASEAN Countries, 2014, 2019, 2026 Source: Based on IMF Data The data in Table 1 suggest that by 2026, India’s per capita income was significantly higher than that of the three ASEAN countries, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. As data in Figure 1 suggest, India’s per capita income in comparison to ASEAN is projected to increase from 63 per cent in 2026 to 70 per cent in 2031. Thus, India’s lead with respect to the above three ASEAN countries can be expected to widen further. With respect to the Philippines, India’s per capita GDP declined from 1.33 times in 2014 to 1,07 by 2026. But IMF projections suggest that India’s per capita GDP will be larger than that of the Philippines by 2031. Among ASEAN countries, Indonesia is a resource-rich country and has a population of 289 million in 2026. Indonesia’s per capita GDP was twice that of India in 2014, but in twelve years since then, i.e., by 2026, it has declined to 1.48 times that of India. The prospects are for this trend to continue, with the IMF projecting the value of 1.32 in favour of Indonesia. This suggests only a modest improvement in levelling with Indonesia. Malaysia’s per capita GDP was 4.82 times that of India in 2014. But declined to 3.67 in 2026. IMF projections suggest that by 2031, Malaysia’s per capita income will still be 3.12 times that of India’s. This suggests that India can at best continue to narrow the gap in per capita income with Malaysia. Thailand’s per capita income in 2014 was 3.05 times that of India. It declined to 2.14 times that of India in 2026. IMF projections suggest that by 2031, Thailand’s per capita GDP will be 1.76 times that of India by 2026. India must continue its much better growth performance to level with Thailand by around 2040. Reflecting Vietnam’s remarkable success in economic management, its per capita GDP has increased from 1.45 times that of India in 2014 to 1.53 times by 2026, a small but significant increase. IMF projects that even by 2031, Vietnam’s per capita GDP, as compared to India, will be around the level reached in 2026. Thus, unlike for other countries, India’s per capita GDP does not exhibit narrowing of the gap with respect to Vietnam. The broad trend of India reducing the gap in per capita income in PPP terms is not only evident for the developing countries, but also for the high- income countries. Thus, using projections by the IMF, per capita GDP in PPP terms of the United Kingdom is projected to decline from 5.28 times that of India in 2026 to 4.13 times in 2031. The corresponding values for Germany are from 6.05 to 4.39, and for the United States from 7.32 to 5.93. India should focus on reducing this gap at an accelerated pace as it progresses towards the Viksit Bharat goals in 2047. Why Optimism is Warranted? Selected examples of trends that give rise to optimism that India will continue to reduce or close the per capita income gap using the PPP method with most countries whose income is higher in 2026 are provided below. First, the Stanford University Global AI Vibrancy ranking, 2024, rates India at #3, ranked after the US and China, and above South Korea, the UK, Singapore and others. The ranking is based on seven criteria, comprising R&D, Responsible AI, Economy, Talent, Policy & Governance, Public Opinion and infrastructure. This augurs well for future economic growth 2. The second factor concerns India’s current favorable demographic trends. One manifestation of this, as shown in Figure 2, is that India is set to contribute about 25 percent (50 million persons) to the increase in global labour force between 2025 and 2030. During this period, contribution to global labor force by Russia, south Korea, Japan, and especially China is expected to be negative. Figure 2: India’s Contribution to Global Labour Force Between 2025-2030 The third factor concerns India’s competence in effectively merging its commercial, diplomatic, and security policies in an integrated manner. Given the current trends, India’s exports of goods and services are expected to reach USD 1000 billion in 2026-27, a significant increase from USD 863 billion achieved in 2025-26. There are only a few countries globally to achieve exports of USD 1000 billion. An important avenue which India is pursuing is the new generation Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), which also include mobility clauses. Figure 3 provides list of India’s new generation FTAs, their status, and economic weight. These FTAs are mostly with the high-income countries. Data in Figure 3 suggests that the total GDP of India’s FTA partners is USD 52.3 trillion or 41.4 percent of global GDP. This is expected to provide considerable opportunities to Indian businesses of all sizes, Indian professionals, and Indian workers. Some of the FTAs have explicit clauses for inward flow of FDI into India. Currently. The stock of FDI into India is around USD 1.2 trillion (USD 1200 billion). This can be expected to increase once FTAs are fully operational. Figure 3: India’s New Generation Free Trade agreements Figure 4: Greenfield Investments of Selected countries. 2016-20 and 2021-25 Fourth, India received the highest greenfield Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) among selected Asian countries during the 2020-25 period. Its FDI of USD 358 billion during that period was significantly larger than China (USD 158 billion), Vietnam (USD 115 billion), Indonesia (USD 133 billion), and Malaysia (USD 140 billion). In the 2016-20 period, however, India’s FDI of USD 222 billion was lower than China’s (USD 350 billion), but higher than that of the other Asian countries in Figure 4. The above select examples suggest that there is considerable room for optimism that India’s per capita GDP in PPP terms will continue to reduce the gap or become level with most countries in the world. India will, however, need to manage its current pro-development, pro-entrepreneurial and technology-encouraging policies through competent management of its political economy. References https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/03/basics.htm-Accessed on 21 October 2026 https://asiaconverge.com/2026/10/is-core-weave-the-canary-in-the-ai-coal-mine/-Accessed on 28 October 2026 ,