1962 war

I was in my second year of Engineering in Anantapur, Andhra Pradesh, in September 1962, when we came to know of the unprovoked unilateral attacks by Chinese PLA (People Liberation Army) in Ladakh and NEFA (North East Frontier Agency). Today it is called Arunachal Pradesh. Those days, the only sources of information for us were the All India Radio and the Hindu newspaper. Our hostels were billets constructed in 1940 for keeping Italian POWs (Prisoners of War) of WWII (World War 2). In the centre of these billets was a hockey playground. In one corner of it, at the entrance, was a room where a radio and a gramophone were kept. In the evenings Hindi and Telugu cinema records were played. At 7 pm we heard the Telugu news and at 8 pm the English news was broadcast on loudspeakers. Some of us who were interested in news used to listen to these two news bulletins. In our library The Hindu, the English daily was available. Some of us used to go and read this newspaper (one of the reasons was to improve our English vocabulary) during recess. 

News of the Chinese attack did not surprise many. In fact, what surprised us was the places of attack. Since 1950 when China annexed Tibet, our then Prime Minister Nehru had played a passive role in condoning Chinese annexation. To compensate for this meek acceptance of China’s occupation of Tibet, in 1955 he gave asylum to the Dalai Lama (today H.H. Dalai Lama resides in Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh) and the Panchen Lama, along with their entourage and many Tibetans. Right from the beginning after our Independence Nehru had a soft corner for communist China. He turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to Chinese territorial ambitions towards India. Communist China was getting massive economic and military aid from communist USSR. Whereas, Nehru initiated a policy of non- alignment, the result of which was that we neither got aid from the West nor from USSR. Conveniently, Nehru deviated from the path in 1956 and started talking about socialism. Slowly he started moving towards USSR. But for communist USSR, their priority was communist China.

By 1958, China built up its military arsenal with the help of USSR; whereas India was left with vintage world war models of military equipment courtesy the British after their departure in 1947. Nehru’s mindset was that being a peaceful country, India did not need the military; a police force would suffice to tackle internal law and order. This in spite of the bitter experience India faced in J & K (Jammu and Kashmir) in 1948. Even the invasion and annexation of Tibet by China in 1950 did not awaken him to the hard reality. Nehru did not heed the caution and advice given by Sardar Patel in his letter to Nehru in November 1950, regarding the threat to India by communist China. Patel wrote this letter on his death bed in Bombay, barely a month before he died on 15 Dec 1950.

In those days, our Ambassador to China was Sardar K M Panicker, a communist sympathiser. He was appointed there on the advice of Nehru’s close friend V.K. Krishna Menon, another communist at heart. Panicker was sending all along wrong signals and messages to Nehru, hiding the actual ground situation. The Chief of India Army, Gen. K. S. Thimayya had appealed to the Government many a time to procure minimum essential model arms like semi-automatic rifles and equipment like wireless sets, winter clothing, boots, and high-altitude guns, but to no avail.

In our engineering college, most of us were in the NCC. We had an “Engineers” regiment officer, Major Viswanathan as our NCC commander. With the help of a sketch, he used to show us India’s border with China and how China was eyeing our northern border from POK to NEFA end. Those of us (a dozen or so) who were keen to know more about the Chinese situation learnt a great deal from Major Viswanathan. He used to lament the fact that despite repeated appeals by Gen. K. S. Thimmayya and later Gen. Thapar, Nehru and Defence minister V. K. Krishna Menon did not bother to purchase the minimum necessary arsenal and winter clothing for our jawans. Even the request for semi-automatic rifles was ruled out. So, the Indian soldiers were left literally in the cold (at heights of 12000 feet or so) to fight the Chinese with only 1940 bolt action rifles; they had no high-altitude guns nor winter clothing. Major Viswanathan was suddenly transferred to the Eastern part of India towards the end of September 1962. We missed him badly as we had nobody who could so clearly explain the war situation to us. 

On 10^th October 1962, an Indian Army Patrol of 50 soldiers suddenly encountered nearly 1200 Chinese troops at Yumtso La in NEFA (present day Arunachal Pradesh). During the gun battle between the two sides, India lost 25 brave hearts. Indian soldiers did not have any artillery support unlike the Chinese. And the Indian soldiers were soon ordered to retreat to base positions.

Suddenly on 20^th October 1962, we heard on the radio that the Chinese artillery had opened heavy and indiscriminate firing & shelling on the Indian garrison in the sector of Nauka Chu Valley. This was the start of the Indo-China war. Massive infantry surge followed this Chinese shelling. Within three hours the Chinese army had overrun the poorly manned & armed Indian garrison. They made their way to the rest of NEFA. During their advance, the Chinese overran Indian posts at Bomdila and Tawang towns. Apart from outdated and insufficient arms and ammo, the Indian troops had not been acclimatized properly before being sent to these high altitudes. Although they had no winter clothing and snow shoes, our army Jawans fought to the bitter end. 

Simultaneously, China attacked all the forward Indian posts in the Ladakh sector and ran over them. 

Then all of a sudden China announced a unilateral ceasefire on 21 November 1962 and withdrew all its forces to the pre-August 1962 positions. It was utterly shocking how the Chinese Army thrashed the Indian Army so badly in this short war. Had it not been for its unilateral ceasefire, their army would have reached the plains of Assam and cut off the North East from the rest of India entirely.

Major Viswanathan returned to join NCC duty in our college. We surrounded him and pestered him to tell us why our army had been so badly defeated. It pained him to tell us how bravely our jawans had fought against all odds. He explained in detail how we had been outnumbered and outgunned in all sectors. We realised for the first time what high altitude fighting was. How could Nehru and V K Krishna Menon keep our army so ill-equipped in spite of repeated requests made by successive army chiefs? 

Major Viswanathan then told us about the “Battle of Rezang La”. In the very early hours of 18^th November 1962, the Chinese launched a full-frontal attack with waves of Chinese soldiers on all the Indian positions at Rezang La. ‘C’ company of 13 Kumaon battalion faced the main brunt with barely 120 soldiers succeeding in resisting the onslaught of a larger Chinese brigade. Indian soldiers were appallingly outnumbered, out-armed and out-gunned. They were so brave and fearless that they did not retreat an inch.

On the contrary they fought with bare hands and bayonets. Then they ran out of ammunition. At 7 am in the morning, the 5^th Chinese wave attack took place. By 8 am, Maj Shaitan Singh lost 7 and 8 platoons and was left with platoon 9 only. But still with the few men he had, he continued to fight back. But, by 10 am or so, the battle was lost. Truly to the last bullet and to the last man. There were no survivors. Maj. Shaitan Singh, the company commander, had led the battle from the front. While listening to this, we had tears running down our eyes. What bravery and what a sacrifice! Today there is a memorial at Rezang La for all these brave hearts. In fact, the ‘C’ company of 13 Kumaon Battalion is today called the ‘Rezang La’ company of 13 Kumaon.

Some of the main reasons for India’s defeat

1. Nehru failed to negotiate a peaceful settlement of our borders with China. In 1950, communist China was two years old. It was not strong and it was trying its level best in the international arena to gain legitimacy. It was the right time for Nehru to have settled the McMohan line discord once and for all with China.
2. Communist China settled its border issues with its neighbouring countries Myanmar, Thailand, Nepal etc, and wanted to settle the border issues with India also. It was Nehru who showed little interest in doing the same. Chinese PM, Chou En-Lai tried a number of times to settle the matter with India starting from 1954 to 1960.
3. Nehru practically allowed China to invade and take over Tibet without a protest in UNO. Tibet, an independent nation since 1912, was a buffer state between India and China, with its border extending up to NEFA. With this invasion, China was sitting directly on Indian borders in the North. The Indo-Tibetan borders had become Indo-Chinese borders thanks to Nehru.
4. Utter neglect of the much-needed modernization of the Indian Army and refusal to procure even semi-automatic rifles, wireless-sets, high altitude clothing and boots, building motorable border roads etc, cost us heavily in this war.

1965 Indo-Pak War

After China’s thrashing of the Indian army in the 1962 war, my father felt let down by Nehru and the Congress government. My father was a freedom fighter and had been imprisoned during the 1942 Quit India movement. In fact, he left his law studies mid-way in Poona and came back to his native A.P. to participate more actively in the movement. He escaped the police and went underground. For a man, who sacrificed his studies and youth for the sake of Independence, China’s betrayal of India was shocking. He said it in so many words. Being his eldest son, he encouraged me to join the Army to avenge our country one day. I was taken aback by the intensity of his feelings. But the seed for joining the Army after Engineering was planted in me in the December of 1962.

After completing my Engineering degree, I joined a post-graduation course in IISC, Bangalore. My father was not happy about this and he said it again in so many words. He kept insisting that I should join the Armed forces. Finally, I gave in. I applied for the Technical Officer Course in the Airforce and got selected in March 1965. I joined Air Force Technical College (AFTC), Jalahalli West Bangalore for training as a Technical Officer in the Air Force.

Within a month of my joining the Air Force, Pakistan attacked our border posts in the Rann of Kutch area. We wondered why Pakistan would attack here, a place of no significance- a terrain unsuitable for tank warfare.

Probably this was a diversionary tactic, we assumed, with the impending main attack to take place elsewhere. Indian Armed Forces were put on alert. It was possible for the then Pakistan President, General Ayub Khan to think that the Indian Army was weak with outdated, vintage equipment, having been beaten badly by China just two years ago. Our Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri was a diminutive and soft spoken person. Having been a beneficiary of the American military and economic aid for a decade, General Ayub Khan presumed he would defeat the Indian Army and Air Force in a matter of days and capture both J & K and Punjab.

In May 1965, Pakistan suddenly shifted their area of action to the Kargil area, on the Srinagar and Leh highway. They started firing on our army convoys thereby disrupting our traffic and supplies. Indian Army countered this firing and the conflict was contained. When the Indian Army was busy taking defensive positions in Rann of Kutch and Kargil, Pakistan changed its strategy. They crossed the line of control on the 13^th of August 1965.

Back in our training college, we were all extremely tense. Our instructors were explaining to us the ground positions in Rann of Kutch, Kargil and J & K with the help of maps. We were told that our soldiers were retaliating in full measure. In fact, some of our instructors had already left for front line air bases.

In the early hours of 1^st September 1965, Pakistan launched a massive attack with American Patton tanks and heavy artillery in the Chaub sector of J&K. Our soldiers gave a befitting reply to this onslaught. The then Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was resolute in his desire to teach Pakistan a lesson for this unprovoked attack on India. Pakistan President Gen. Ayub Khan miscalculated the resolve and resilience of both our Prime Minister and the Indian Armed forces. Following this attack, the Pakistan Army launched yet another attack on Akhnoor town in Jammu, so as to cut off our Army communication and supply time to Srinagar and Kashmir valley. Immediately the Air Force was pressed into service to halt this surprise advance of Pakistani tanks.

Within 24 hours, i.e, on the 3^rd September 1965, Pakistan launched surprise air raids on our air bases in the Western sector ranging from Gujarat to J & K. In this surprise attack we lost considerable aircrafts on the ground. In spite of this our Air Force gave priority to give ground support to our Army in Punjab and J & K. As a counter, we decided to attack the Punjab sector and march towards Lahore in Pakistan. Pakistan was rattled with this strategy of the Indian Army. Pakistan was forced to defend its region of Punjab. They started withdrawing forces from the Akhnoor area and shifted them to Punjab. Thus, we saved Akhnoor and our communication and supply lines to Kashmir. 

On 10^th September, 4^th Grenadiers of our Army used 106 RCL guns to attack the advancing Pakistan Patton tanks in the Khemkaran sector. Havildar Abdul Hamid of our Army destroyed four tanks single-handedly and died a martyr due to enemy shelling the same day. He was 20 years old. What bravery and patriotism!! He was awarded the Param Vir Chakra posthumously.

In our training centre we were all eager to go to the front and contribute our might whatever little it could be. There was talk that we would be sent if the war exceeded a month or more. Meanwhile, our brave soldiers were marching forward towards Lahore, the 3^rd Jat regiment was just 12 miles short of the Lahore border. Pakistan was rattled with this rapid advance of our Army. They were also taken aback when we took over Haji Pir Pass, (900 ft above sea level) 5 miles west of our ceasefire line in Pakistan. The capture of this strategically important pass gave India strategic advantage in that sector.

The Indian Air Force was crucial in supporting the Army, by stopping and destroying enemy tanks, guns, bridges and supply convoys.

On 20^th September 1965, the UNO passed a resolution for a ceasefire by 22^nd September 1965. But the actual ceasefire was finally declared on 23^rd September 1965. Even then, uneasiness continued on both sides. The Indian Army sustained nearly 12,000 casualties; 3000 martyrs and 9000 wounded. India had occupied nearly 1900 square kms of the Pakistan territory while we lost approximately 530 square kms to Pakistan. Thus, we captured nearly four times more of their land compared to what they had captured of ours! 

There were five important battles fought in this war-

1. Hajipir Pass
2. Asal Uttar
3. Phillora
4. Barki
5. Degrai.

The Role of the Indian Air Force 

IAF was used for counter air, air defence and interdictory roles (in support of ground forces). India’s light weight Gnat aircraft took on the superior Sabre fighters of Pakistan and busted the myth that Sabre aircrafts were invincible. At that time Pakistan had 120 Sabre fighters and 14 F104 Starfighter aircrafts. These Starfighters had supersonic speeds. They were very capable even at high altitudes. Both types of aircrafts were supplied by America to Pakistan. There were three squadrons of Sabre fighters at Sargodha and Mauripur air bases.

At 0400 Hrs on 1^st September 1965, as Pakistan started its surprise attack on Akhnoor, Mystere and Vampire aircrafts of the Indian Air Force based at Pathankot were launched for a counter attack. Mystere aircraft carried out ground attacks and destroyed 60 armoured vehicles of Pakistan. On 2^nd September 1965, our light weight Gnat fighters were deployed to provide air defence cover to air bases. Gnat aircrafts took on superior Pakistan Sabre jets head on. On 3^rd September 1965, four Sabre jets were intercepted and destroyed by our Gnats. IAF had scored its first air to air combat victory. By 5^th September, Pakistan army lost their advance in Chamb sector and diverted the force to Lahore. Air warfare continued on 7^th, 8^th, 9^th September in the Punjab sector. With Gnat aircrafts providing air defence and Hunter and Mystere aircrafts providing ground support by attacking Pakistan troops and tanks, we were successful in reaching the borders of Lahore city in Pakistan.

With superior American aircrafts at its disposal Pakistan thought it would decimate the Indian Air Force and with superior American Patton tanks its Army could run over sectors in J & K and Punjab easily. The brave hearts of the Indian Air Force and Indian Army did not let that happen. In this war India lost 24 aircrafts and Pakistan lost 37 in air-to-air combat.

Tashkent Peace Declaration

After the ceasefire on 23^rd September 1965, uneasiness prevailed on both sides, each unsure of the other’s intentions. USSR was a good friend to India by now and most of our military equipment and aircraft had been purchased from them. The then PM of USSR, Mr. Kosygin played an important role in bringing India and Pakistan to the table for direct talks. This meeting began on 4^th January 1966 in Tashkent, with Kosygin as a mediator. Finally, India and Pakistan signed a peace declaration on 9^th January 1966. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan were signatories. The main points of this summit declaration were-

1. Both sides would pull their forces to pre-August 1965 positions
2. Both countries would exchange POWs (Prisoners of War)
3. Diplomatic relations would be restored by both countries.
4. Neither country would interfere in the internal affairs of the other country.

Preparation for 1971 War

My desire to be in the theatre of war and to contribute my bit for the nation was ironically fulfilled by the President of Pakistan, Gen Yahya Khan, in the December of 1971. Like me, thousands in my generation were itching to take on Pakistan, and teach it an unforgettable lesson. One way we were all lucky to have had that opportunity and we did it!

My father was very proud of my contribution to the country. Seeing satisfaction in his eyes after we won the 1971 war was enough for me, it validated his insistence on my joining services in early 1965.  To me that is more than any award by the Government.

Jai Hind!!

Image source: Russia Beyond